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ABSTRACT
Constructivist analyses of international norm articulation assume that norm
articulation happens through the process of international discussion and agreement, yet
such works lack a rigorous analysis of how international organizations articulate norms
for the world internal to the organization. Further, analyses of international organization
norm articulation almost completely ignore the important influence of leadership. This
dissertation analyzes two distinct norms of gender equality and participation in two
international organizations, the United Nations Development Programme and the World
Bank. The theory developed here argues that the leader’s ability to influence norm
articulation is dependent on the organizational culture which reflexively impacts the
influence of the leader. Leadership drivers of norm articulation include major speeches,
influence over and relationship with organizational Executive Boards, and punishment
and reward tactics. In analyzing gender equality and participation, I argue that the two
organizations articulated the norms differently based on different logics of governance.
The World Bank prioritizes government public service delivery efficiency and
effectiveness in achieving development goals, while the UNDP favors civil society
empowerment and participation in decision-making procedures and government policies.
These logics affect the way the leader is able to articulate the norm and impacts the final
articulation into policy and practice for both organizations.
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INTRODUCTION
Why do international organizations articulate governance and democracy norms
differently in the policies that guide their projects and programs when those development
organizations have similar histories, development foci, and work extensively together on
implementation of projects in country settings? This dissertation argues that international
organizations pick up norms from various sources (whether they be member states,
transnational civil society, norm entrepreneurs, or non-governmental organizations) but
that the process of norm articulation happens within the organization in such a way that
leadership and organizational culture affect the way the norm is articulated in policy and
practice.
In its first stab at governance issues, the World Bank produced a report in 1981
informally called the “Berg Report” named after its main author, Elliot Berg. The report,
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, suggested that
the economic crises experienced by developing African countries in the late 1970s, and
their poor economic performance, was due to inefficient government policies related to
macroeconomic instability and corruption in decision-making processes (World Bank
1981). The report shocked many in the developing world because it argued that
detrimental state economic policies, rather than exogenous influences, were the cause of
economic crises facing Africa. The report led to an era of structural adjustment programs
(SAPs) encouraged as loan conditionalities through the Bank and the International
1

Monetary Fund (IMF). The report and the Bank practices that it inspired sparked an
internal debate within the Bank, but also an external debate over the important
characteristics of governance and whether or not international organizations should push
governments on particular governance principles. That discussion came to the fore after
the disastrous and negative social effects of the SAPs pursued in the 1980s. Another
Bank publication that discussed the importance of efficient and effective government
policies, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (World Bank 1989),
supported the suggestion that government efficiency and correct policies were necessary
to achieve development goals.
For the Bank, governance has to do with efficiency and effectiveness of public
institutions in providing public goods and services to a population, considering anticorruption and transparency aspects of public administration of great importance. Based
on the analysis in this dissertation, the Bank’s governance norms support neoliberal
ideology of limited state intervention and free market efficiency just as it did in the 1980s
with the SAPs. This conclusion builds on research studies documenting the infusion of
neoliberal economic ideology throughout the Bank’s work (Ayre 1983; Griffin 2009, 9;
Hales 2007, 150; Nelson 1995, 115; Pincus and Winters 2002, 9). The Bank promotes
governance as governments acting in all their practices, as efficient, effective, and
transparent (World Bank 1993; Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2010) with “predictable,
open, and enlightened policymaking” (World Bank 1994, vii). Everything that it does in
sector and thematic work supports that overarching goal, including in civil society
participation and gender equality. Even in recent years the Bank struggles with its impact
on the political environment in its member countries. It is now more likely to suggest that
2

formal or informal power sharing agreements are important in political structures, a
characteristic the Bank called “inclusive-enough” governance in its World Development
Report (WDR) on conflict (World Bank 2011b). Good governance or inclusive enough
governance takes on an apolitical definition for the World Bank which means that
governments are efficient, effective, transparent and accountable to citizens (Ager 2000;
Chemma 2003; Grindle 2004, 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009, 2010).
Yet, in comparison to the World Bank, other international organizations like the
United Nations (UN) spend a greater amount of time and resources to encourage states to
follow certain accepted democratic governance norms that focus on citizen participation
in politics and in the political process of their governments. Indeed, in the aftermath of
the Cold War the UN’s advocacy on democracy strengthened, especially through the
speeches and statements of the influential Secretary General Boutros Ghali. The United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) followed and even led in the promotion of
democracy through the influence of leaders like William H. Draper III who supported the
idea and creation of the human development paradigm which focuses on the freedom of
the individual in all aspects of life: political, economic, and social. The human
development paradigm and index created in the 1980s at the UNDP contends with a
version of development that focuses on macroeconomic and GDP growth. In contrast to
economic concerns, the focus on civil society engagement and participation supports the
notion that citizens should be directly involved in their governments through voting,
engaging in the decision-making procedures of government, holding government
accountable, and running for office (Acamoglu and Robinson 2006, 2011; Cheema 2005;
Feinberg 2008; Franck 1992; Held 1987, 1995).
3

The fact that the World Bank emphasizes governance norms of government
efficiency in public service delivery while the UNDP emphasizes building democratic
institutions as the best way to achieve development goals is puzzling because they work
together frequently on development projects in countries, have similar histories, similar
member states, and similar benefactors. This is not to say that the World Bank does not
work on supporting democratic institutions or citizen participation, they just do it in a
different way than the UNDP and vice versa. These two organizations also drive the
accepted goals of international development practice evident in their cooperation on
creating the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a feat accomplished during
the 1990s along with hundreds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and major
development organizations like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011; Hulme and Scott 2010; Hulme
2009). Further, they are currently working in solidarity to replace the MDGs when they
expire in 2015. For instance, they work together with other United Nations (UN) agencies
in the UN System Task Team to discuss and develop new world development goals and
targets for the post-2015 development agenda (United Nations Task Team 2012).
The UNDP and World Bank are instrumental in promoting norms to states
through their publications and actions. This includes working in specific sectors, like the
agricultural and financial sector for the World Bank and tackling issues of corruption in
public administration. For the UNDP it means building programs on knowledge sharing,
civil society capacity building, and electoral cycle support. It is essential to understand
how these organizations articulate norms because of their respective impacts on state
policy and programmatic work in states that exhibit different policy outcomes.
4

This study addresses this puzzle by considering how international organizations
articulate new norms that turn into policy and practice, eventually guiding organizational
behavior. It asks why similarly placed organizations that pursue similar development
goals diverge on the normative frameworks set up to achieve those goals. While the
difference in governance promotion between the two organizations may have diminished
in recent years just as their polarized support for economic versus human development
has minimized (Joshi and O'Dell 2013), it is still puzzling that development organizations
articulate policies differently when pursuing similar goals. The study focuses on the
development of governance norms in general within the two organizations as well as
focusing on two specific governance norms: participatory development and gender
equality.
In each of the empirical chapters I ask the following questions of each
organization from 1985-2012 in order to flesh out my theory of institutional pathdependence and leadership influence. (1) How did the World Bank and the UNDP
articulate norms from 1985 to 2012 in policy documents and outcomes? (2) How did
leaders influence norm articulation for governance, gender equality, and participation?
I argue that the reason for the difference in norm articulation has to do with the logic of
the organization and the reflexive relationship that the leader sets up with the
organization throughout his or her tenure. While leaders can have a significant influence
on the way that the norm is articulated that is dependent on his or her own ideology, it is
still important for leaders to speak to extant organizational culture and beliefs. The
articulation of the norm happens in a process of articulation in speeches and statements,
feedback and evaluation from the organization, discussion and suggestion on pursuing
5

norms through punishment and reward, and constraint by organizational processes.
Finally, a norm is articulated in policy and publications as a result of leadership influence
and the reflexive influence with the organizational culture.
Questioning how governance norms are articulated in international development
organizations is important because these organizations have such a critical influence on
the way that governments economically, politically, and socially govern their respective
societies. International development organizations exercise such influence in a multitude
of ways. First, conditionalities on loans require that governments change certain policies
or structures conditional to receiving loans. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the World Bank are well known for their conditionality practices. Secondly, international
development organizations provide governments with technical assistance and advice to
government officials, impacting the way that they govern. Technical assistance ranges
widely. Examples include advice on writing a constitution from the UNDP, or guidance
on changing the health care system from the World Bank. Thirdly, international
development organizations support civil society organizations (CSOs), encouraging
interaction between government and citizens.
This dissertation analyzes the difference in governance policy promoted by the
UNDP and the World Bank; the main difference is not in regime type, but in the actors
that are the focus of the governance intervention and the extent to which the governance
promotion supports democratic principles. The UNDP’s version of governance, selflabeled democratic governance, more explicitly centers on civil society, citizen
engagement and inclusion with government. This version of governance focuses on the
demand for governance coming from citizens. The World Bank engages with
6

governments, specifically with the Finance Ministries, and its version of governance
focuses to a greater degree on government efficiency, effectiveness and public service
delivery while it still has some strong versions of citizen participation and gender
equality that contend with the UNDP. The World Bank’s version of governance is often
called good governance, good enough governance, or supply-side governance.
Secondly, arguing against the traditional understanding of how international
organizations articulate and internalize norms, this dissertation argues that leadership
influences the way that organizations articulate governance norms (and thus policies) in a
reflexive relationship with organizational culture and processes. That influence is
sometimes based on normative preferences of leaders, yet, there is also a clear path of
influence that starts with leaders articulating ideas in speeches and statements, and ends
with policy outcomes most often stated in strategic plans, operational policy documents
or guidance notes. Such documents reflect the reigning logic of governance already
developed in the organization’s beliefs and ideology. The more traditional explanations
suggests that international organizations pick up their cues from member states or from
external forces, and then articulate the norms based on that influence, even if IOs do have
some independent capabilities in the relationship with their member states (Abbott and
Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984; Schermers and Blokker 1995).
The issue of which governance norms are promoted to states through international
organizations is of utmost interest in development circles today because of the debate
over what will replace the MDGs. Indeed, the Sustainable Development Goal Review
Process is ongoing as I have written this dissertation and will continue until new goals are
created to replace the existing ones that expire in 2015. The 2000 MDG conference
7

included discussions on governance, but so much controversy surrounded it that
governance was only placed in the MDGs surreptitiously in goal 7 and 8, calling for
environmental sustainability and global partnerships. Yet the Millennium Declaration
itself, upon which the MDGs are based, suggested “democratic and participatory
governance” as an essential norm of international relations (United Nations September
18, 2000). The idea has not been forgotten and the new goals may yet include targets for
governance (United Nations 2012).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NORMS
The theory of norm articulation that relies on the influence of leadership and
organizational culture that I develop here does not ignore external influences. Both
internal and external forces influence development organizations to articulate norms
which turn into policy and practice. The forces work both simultaneously and in
relationship with each other. Yet I argue that leadership does indeed have a greater ability
to influence the articulation of governance policy in an organization than do outside
forces such as member states or civil society. While most studies heretofore focus on the
external forces that affect the normative leanings and actions of international
organizations, this study develops a concrete theory of the internal forces at work,
focusing on organizational culture and individual leadership, while including external
variables as important in the analysis.
The following table represents the various forces at work in international
organizations on norm articulation. For external forces, the UNDP and World Bank have
similar forces working to influence them (albeit for different reasons and in different
8

ways): epistemic communities, partner development organizations, bilateral capital flows
and funding sources, and member countries (194 UN countries with UNDP offices in
174; 188 World Bank member countries).
Table 1.1: Individual and Collective Forces on Norm Articulation
Individual
Collective
External
• Bilateral Funding Sources
• Transnational Epistemic
Forces
Communities
• Influential Member Countries
• Partner Organizations
Internal
• Bureaucratic Leaders and
• Organizational Culture
Forces
Decision-Makers
• Organizational Epistemic
Communities
The internal forces at work on norm articulation are multitude. For the UN the
UN General Assembly (UNGA) influences UNDP policy. The Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) provides mandates and missions. Policy is created by the Executive
Board (36 Representatives) and Executive Bureau (5 Representatives). The UNDP
Administrator is head of the UN Development Group (UNDG) which brings the UNDP
to work closely with other agencies. The Administrators and Assistant Administrators
influence policy formation because of their important positions. Resident Representatives
play an important part in implementation and re-articulation of policy. Finally, the
Strategic Plan and stated mission of the organization influence policy articulation as well
as the culture built around democratic ideals and social goals of development.
For the World Bank internal forces include the Board of Governors (188 Country
Representatives) and Executive Board (25 Representatives) who deliberate over policy
articulation. The President and Senior Management’s influence is particularly important
because of their strong roles in the organization. The Development Committee plays a
role in guiding development ideology. The Articles of Agreement guide the structure and
9

actions of the organization. The International Development Association (IDA)
Replenishment Plans, which the Board approves every three years, guides policy,
especially in sectoral work. The Operational Policies (OP) and Bank Procedures (BP)
guide all policy implementation. Finally, the stated mission and culture influence the way
that policy is implemented around the world. Leadership works reflexively with all these
variables to articulate norms.
My argument suggests that despite the numerous exogenous and endogenous
forces at work on norm articulation, it is leadership and institutional path-dependence that
are the best explanation for why the UNDP and World Bank articulate particular norms.
External forces matter, but the extent of their influence on the ways that international
organizations articulate norms is challenged in this dissertation. This argument suggests
that the nature of bureaucracy is fundamental to the changing nature of any organization,
but that it does not preclude the ability of leaders to influence and change the direction or
influence of the organization.

METHODS
This dissertation uses small-N case-study and complex narrative method as seen
most often in Weberian analysis (Della Porta 2008). The study uses the structured
focused comparison method, comparing two well known international development
organizations on the formation of their respective governance norms are articulated in
policies (George and Bennett 2005). The case study is inherently qualitative; the methods
of analysis include semi-structured interviews, content analysis, and process tracing.

10

The UNDP and the World Bank exhibit similarities within the organizational
structure, including bureaucratic organization as well as substantive development focus;
both the organizations are development funding organizations that have traditionally
focused on economic development, technical assistance, and public administration
support. These two organizations are in a similar organizational field defined as “those
organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations
that produce similar services or products” (Dimaggio and Powell 1991, 64-65). This is
important for the emphasis that the study places on policy analysis. In policy analysis, a
problem is addressed or analyzed by considering the policy environment, which includes
a policy domain, “the substantive area of policy over which participants in policy making
compete and compromise” and a policy community which “consists of those actors who
are actively involved in policy making in a particular domain” (Birkland 2001, 95). By
choosing these two organizations, I can extrapolate to the larger universe of international
development organizations that have a similar history, foundation, structure, and
interaction model. In this list I include many UN specialized agencies, and regional
development organizations and banks.
The “building block” analysis identifies common patterns within cases and
between the variables under study. This helps to theorize about the process of norm
articulation and policy creation within an international organization. Studying two cases
of the emergence of governance concepts in international organizations in depth reveals
much about the particular history, social position (both within the international
organization, and of the international organization among the international community),
11

and complex interactions of actors in the process of articulating norms. It provides an
understanding of what happened in a particular place at a particular time and how the
actors were purposive in making decisions at the same time that the structure of a system
forbade or permitted. The study uses process tracing, document analysis, and interview
data in identification of the variables under study.
The interviews for this research project were carried out over a period of
approximately one and a half years from May 2012 to December 2013. Interviews were
conducted with a variety of individuals. Some currently work with the World Bank and
UNDP on policy analysis. I also interviewed individuals in bilateral development
organizations who had knowledge of the World Bank and UNDP and had worked with
the organizations in various capacities, either through policy engagement or in country
level planning and projects. Finally, I interviewed academics who study development
organizations. The interviews included open-ended questions under the following
categories: (1) Policy process, (2) Leadership influence and impact on policy, (3)
Organizational culture, (4) Member state influence on policy, (5) Governance policies
and outcomes, and (6) Norm articulation. I have not included any quotes from my
interviewees in this dissertation because many of my interviewees were concerned about
attribution and the possibility that their quotes would be interpreted in ways that they did
not intend, which is a concern for anyone describing political processes.
Finally, the methodology includes content analysis of key policy documents
published by both the UNDP and the World Bank. “Content analysis is the intellectual
process of categorizing qualitative textual data into clusters of similar entities, or
conceptual categories, to identify consistent patterns and relationships between variables
12

or themes” (Julien 2008). Content analysis includes considering the words that are used
in primary and secondary texts and coding or categorizing those words into meaningful
categories in order to attest to what is going on in the context of the situation under study.
The analysis of qualitative textual data is an inherently inductive process; however, this
study used both a deductive and an inductive process to identify the important words that
came out of the text.

STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTERS
The main premise in this study is that international organizations are autonomous
actors and influence the way that states govern. International organizations do not simply
act as functional representatives of states, but have bureaucracies, norms, ideas,
idiosyncrasies, and impacts in their own right. The only way that we can understand how
they act in this way is to understand the organizational culture and leadership of a
particular time and how this interacted with other variables within an organization to
explain actions (in this case, norm articulation in policy). Furthermore, this research
focuses on governance policies that are prevalent in international relations and with
which international organizations are (surprisingly) concerned. This research adds to the
literature by further illuminating the internal functioning of international organizations
from a sociological standpoint and argues that leadership works in a reflexive relationship
with organizational culture to articulate norms.
Chapter one offers a theoretical foundation for explaining the difference in the
UNDP and World Bank governance policy outcomes. The theory of leadership influence
argues that the leader’s ability to impact norm articulation is dependent on the
13

organizational culture (i.e., the logic of governance), which reflexively impacts the
influence of the leader. Leadership drivers of norm articulation include major speeches
and statements, the leader’s influence over and relationship with the Executive Boards of
the organization, and tactics of punishment and reward to encourage employees to follow
a particular understanding of the norm. International development organizations do not
simply adopt norms from member states or from the prevailing agreement on what is
right in international politics (i.e., custom). Norms go through an extensive process of
formulation through dialogue, discussion in meetings between key leadership and
Executive Boards and Boards of Directors, through key leadership statements and
speeches, through re-articulation and discussion in lower levels of the organization, and
finally into the policy outcomes. Through this reflexive process, governance norm
articulation is influenced by the logic of governance that guides the organization, evident
in the shared beliefs and values of the organization’s employees developed over time.
This process is based on our understanding of how leaders influence organizations and on
how organizations themselves act. The basis for my argument that norms reflect internal
more than external forces comes from the theory that is detailed in chapter one.
Chapter two then lays the framework for analyzing primary documents and for
conducting interviews, arguing that norm articulation is best studied through those two
methodologies. It first considers the influence and impact of liberal democracy norms in
development during the twentieth century. The importance of such a focus becomes
evident when considering the influence of Western states and transnational civil society
on international organizations, which many studies have thoroughly examined. What is
interesting in these studies is how little they consider the importance of the internal
14

culture and leaders of international organizations themselves; they assume that
international organizations are more susceptible to values and norms from member states
(Keohane 1984) or transnational civil society movements (Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink
2002) than they are to internal forces. My analysis shows the contrary; that the level of
influence that member states and transnational civil society have on international
organizations depends heavily on the shared values and beliefs of the organization and its
leaders. The chapter develops a typology between two logics of governance, one in which
government efficiency in delivering public services to a population is highlighted (most
evident in the World Bank), the other in which citizen participation and freedom to
engage in government policies and politics is paramount (most obvious in the UNDP). It
also develops a framework for the quantitative content analysis used in the subsequent
chapters.
Chapter three describes the UNDP and World Bank policy making process in
understanding the development of democratic governance for the UNDP and good
governance for the World Bank. The analysis shows that the UNDP is much more likely
to promote civil society participation in government from the civil society perspective
while the World Bank is more likely to promote government efficiency and effectiveness
in delivery of public services to a population. The historical overview of both
development organizations shows why it is essential to focus on internal forces on
changes in international organization behavior, rather than on external forces, in order to
understand the norm articulation process. This chapter considers Annual Reports and
Development Reports produced by the two organizations, analyzing them through
quantitative content analysis and coding. The chapter discusses specific policies that the
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UNDP and World Bank pursued that suggest differences in logics of governance and
therefore in governance norms as articulated in policy. Based on the content analysis and
interview data this chapter argues that the UNDP and World Bank do indeed work
according to different logics of governance.
Chapter four then discusses the individual influence of leaders of the organization.
Because of the limited time and space, this study focuses on the highest leaders in
authority in each organization, asking how they influenced governance outcomes and
how they interacted with staff and Executive Boards in the process. UNDP
Administrators who have led the organization from 1985 to present include William H.
Draper III, Gustaf Speth, Mark Malloch Brown, Kemal Derviş, and Helen Clark. The
World Bank Presidents represent the highest leadership position in the Bank. From 1985
to present this list includes Barber Conable, Lewis Preston, James Wolfensohn, Paul
Wolfowitz, Robert Zoellick, and Jim Yong Kim. I identify the primary mechanisms of
influence that guide the whole organization on policy. These include articulation of
norms through speeches and statements, influence with Executive Board members, and
the use of tactics to reward and sanction employee behavior.
Chapters five and six comprise the two case studies of the dissertation: each of the
organizations under study is analyzed for how they articulated the governance policies of
participation and gender equality. These chapters show that the UNDP has been more
successful in changing its mandate and articulating its support for governance in a way
that supports liberal democracy than has the World Bank, but that both organizations
move forward in promoting participation in development and government. Considering
that both the organizations are from the same development field and they both focus on
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development as the importance of macroeconomic stability and poverty alleviation, it is
puzzling that they articulate these norms so differently, especially when they have similar
exogenous pressures on them to change their policies in similar ways. Thus internal
variables explain the variation, not exogenous influence. Through in-depth process
tracing and isolating the impact of leaders, these two chapters show how leadership
engages with these organizations to influence policy outcomes. Further, leadership
commitment to the norm under study influences the way that policy is articulated. The
study is very issue-specific and thus shows that each policy case is different.
The analysis provides important implications for thinking about future
development policies, such as the 2015+ debate and the relative influence that member
states and transnational civil society will have on the creation of new development
policies as compared to the impact of leadership as it interacts with organizational
culture. The final chapter also assesses the strengths and weaknesses of my argument in
relation to various other alternative arguments.
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I: LEADERS AS NORM ARTICULATORS
How do the UNDP and the World Bank articulate governance norms into policy?
This chapter argues that the neo-liberal, functionalist, and principal-agent approaches to
explaining norm articulation and policy outcomes in international organizations do not
offer sufficient explanations for how and why international organizations articulate
norms. What is needed is a combination of these theories with a more robust analysis of
the particular internal forces at work in international organizations. This dissertation
studies how organizations discuss and articulate norms into policy.
Norms are important if international organizations have autonomy because
international organizations influence the way states behave. The UNDP and the World
Bank influence how a state is politically structured and how it governs its citizens,
impacting the lives of millions of individuals all over the world. As many theorists have
pointed out, international organizations are an essential part of normative influence on
states (Finnemore and Barnett 2004). Theorists seeking to answer when and why
international organizations act autonomously of member states consider both macro- and
micro-levels of interaction: some taking the perspective from the structure of the
international system (Bull 2002), others focusing on the internal (bureaucratic) structure
of the organizations (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Weaver 2008). They delve into the
individual idiosyncrasies of leadership styles and staff (Karns 2004), and into the
interactions with civil society or domestic groups (Hopgood 2006).
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Norms are of increasing interest for international relations theorists because of
how norms work as a part of the structure of the international system (or international
society) to constrain state behavior (Checkel 1999). Martha Finnemore argues that
international organizations are “teachers of norms” in some cases, teaching states how to
behave on global governance issues (1993). International law and regime theory focus on
the importance of international organizations as holders of information and treaties, and
as centers of global governance discourse and action (Keohane 1984; Schermers and
Blokker 1995; Keohane 2000). Just so, international relations literature focuses on
international organizations as the purveyors of the normative framework that binds the
structure of international society (Dimaggio and Powell 1991; DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Finnemore 1996a, 1993, 1996b; Haas and Haas 2002). Because of their
importance, it is absolutely necessary to study how international organizations articulate
norms and create policy based on those norms. This dissertation shows how the UNDP
and World Bank exhibit that process on governance policy articulation.
It is important to understand how international organizations identify, adopt, and
promote norms to states because of the integral part that international organizations play
in the international arena. The findings in this dissertation on how international
organizations articulate norms and write them into policy can be applied to various types
of organizations in the international arena including international development
organizations, both bilateral and multilateral (i.e. intergovernmental organizations or
IGOs), as well as to other international and regional development banks.
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First, they can be applied to development organizations because of the substantive
focus of the dissertation. All development organizations promote governance, a trend that
started in the 1990s. Bilateral organizations like the United States Agency for
International Aid (USAID) (2013), the United Kingdom’s Department for International
Development (DFID) (2013), and Australia’s Agency for International Development
(AusAID) (2011) increasingly focus on promoting democracy around the world, arguing
that governance and democratic institutions are essential for reaching development goals
such as poverty reduction. The methods these organizations use to promote governance to
states are similar to those of international development organizations, save that they
usually are not hindered by the need to remain apolitical because of their direct
connection with one state and its democratic institutions and regime. However, the
findings in this dissertation on the importance of organizational culture and leadership for
norm articulation can be expanded to explain why agencies like USAID promote
democracy through their loan programs, or why the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC), created by the US Congress in 2004, specifically supports states that exhibit
democratic governance practices and policies deemed acceptable according to MCC
democratic governance criteria and indicators (Millennium Challenge Corporation 2007,
2009).
The findings are most important for those organizations that are similar in
bureaucracy, membership and hierarchy to the two under study. Such organizations
include all the UN agencies, which in one way or other affect the governance outcomes in
states, whether it is the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or the
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UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA). All these organizations work closely with
governments to promote specific kinds of governance in their own ways, but the
similarities with the UNDP and the World Bank go beyond the substantive focus and
include the bureaucratic nature of the organizations. When organizations must worry
about multitude of members that have very different opinions on an issue, when they are
hindered by the funding they receive from these members, when they have to be aware of
their mandates and Articles of Agreement with those members, it causes organizations to
act in different ways than do bilateral aid organizations who do not have the complexity
of voices contending for power and control. This dissertation shows that complexity and
power between different members gets played out in practice in governance norms and
policies.
Finally, the findings from this dissertation apply to regional organizations and
banks that have similar development missions and apolitical mandates, with a host of
member states. Banks like the South African Development Corporation (SADC), the
African Development Bank (AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) among many others make a long list of organizations to which this research
can be extrapolated.
While I do not return to these organizations because of the focus of this research
on the UNDP and World Bank, it is important to note how influential all these
organizations can be in international politics, especially as relates to governance policy
and norm promotion.

21

Articulating and Promoting Policy
The UNDP and the World Bank both act as norm promoters and agenda-setters in
international development. One example of such agenda-setting is in the production of
the Human Development Reports (HDRs) and the World Development Reports (WDRs).
The Reports convey the current thinking and practice in development ideology and guide
other organizations on development theory and practice (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate
2010; Yusuf et al. 2009). These two organizations also create a wealth of information in
knowledge products. Promoting norms relates to the autonomy of the UNDP and World
Bank because of the implications for influencing political outcomes for member states.
Norms often do not represent planned, calculated policies dictated by member states.
Rather, norms emerge as “unplanned, unexpected results of individuals’ interactions”
(Bicchieri, Muldoon, and Zalta 2011) which are associated with observable and
unobservable practices and are both moral and social. 1 International organizations act as
an authoritative pressure, guiding and influencing state behavior and thereby acting as
mechanisms of norm diffusion to states.
Because of the influence that international organizations have on government
behavior, it is especially important to understand how an organization articulates norms
in policy and publications. Asking why and how norms become important to an
organization as exhibited in policies and projects is crucial. International organizations
impact whether or not governments adopt and internalize international norms, thus

1

A vast literature exists on the definition of norms. For the differences between norm types and varying
definitions see (Elster 1989) and (Bicchieri 2006).
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international organizations act as the mechanism of norm emergence and diffusion
(Legro 1997; Barnett and Finnemore 1999) because international organizations are
influential actors in “teaching” states how to behave (Finnemore 1993). Governance
norms have the possibility of influencing state behavior.
The norm life-cycle theory (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) suggests that norms
emerge, cascade, and internalize through a society (or international society) through
specific mechanisms. 2 Analyzing how norms internalize in societies is important because
it allows us to begin to have an understanding of why some norms become so
constraining on individual or group behavior and why other norms are rejected by
individuals and societies. The UNDP and World Bank represent an organizational society
of hundreds of members who work at specific functions to fulfill specific purposes, but
who all have a vision of development toward which they are working, and share
particular beliefs and ideals. Those beliefs and ideals become entrenched in an
organization in ways that regulate the behavior of the group.
A social norm is “an idea in the minds of the members of a group, an idea that can
be put in the form of a statement specifying what the members or other men should do,
ought to do, are expected to do, under given circumstances” (Homans 1950, 123;
Bernstein 2001). In this context social norms are not simply observable unplanned or
planned behavioral outcomes; they rely on shared moral ideals of members of a group.
2

Academics highlight a range of mechanisms for norm diffusion to states. Mechanisms include metanorms
(Axelrod 1986, 1096), internalization processes (Opp 2002; Coleman 1990b; Demsetz 1967; Diefenbach
and Opp 2007), social embeddedness (Matzat 2004), reputation (Bicchieri 2010; Keohane 1984; Cook and
Hardin 2001; Holländer 1990; Elster 1989; March and Olsen 2006), or sanctions (Parsons 1951). Recent
international relations constructivist literature highlights global deliberation, decision making, and
bargaining that occurs in and through non-state actors at the international level such as transnational
networks, NGOs, and IOs (Dubash 2009; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ensminger and Knight 1997).
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Thus norms are ideational and behavioral (though not always concomitantly). They are
historical (whether evolving over a short or long period of time) and are related to a
group of individuals who interact with each other based on deeply embedded
relationships and shared worldviews (i.e., the norm cannot be merely traced to the beliefs
or behaviors of individuals within the group). Furthermore, social norms normatively
(morally) specify the correct behavior that members (and sometimes non-members) of
the group should follow. Norms can be planned and unplanned, formal and informal. 3
Governance norms, specifically participation and gender equality norms, emerged
in international relations for differing purposes. Development projects encountered
failure in actually achieving development goals almost from the inception of
development practice in the 1940s up to the 1980s. In the 1980s a consensus among
development practitioners suggested that the real problem with the development failures
was not necessarily the development foci and plans themselves, but rather the structural
impediments and hindrances to their full implementation and realization. In this sense,
governance norms became crucial to connect to development to explain the failures of the
development practices and to ameliorate future failures. Rational choice theory is one of
the most influential heuristic accounts of individual and collective normative behavior,
applied in all disciplines for explaining individual and group behavior. At the structural
level functionalist, rational-choice accounts explain that groups deal with externalities,
i.e., problems that arise that threaten a group’s society, way of life or existence, by

3

The list of social norms characteristics comes from a range of definitions given in the literature on social
norms (Bernstein 2001; Bicchieri 2006; Coleman 1990a; Elster 1989; Homans 1950; Legro 1997; Parsons
1951; Parsons 1968 [1937]).

24

creating norms that help the group collectively address the problem/s (Demsetz 1967;
Coleman 1990a; Cook and Hardin 2001; Diefenbach and Opp 2007). Norms emerge in a
society under “a condition under which a demand for effective norms will arise…[and] a
condition under which the demand will be satisfied” (Coleman 1990a, 241).
Internalization of a norm is a powerful mechanism for a group institutionalizing
behavior that addresses an externality, especially one that is detrimental to society
(Demsetz 1967; Opp 2002; Diefenbach and Opp 2007). In considering governance norms
in the international development institutions in this way we come to an answer for why
the two organizations turned to promotion of governance norms in the 1990s. They both
needed to counter the failures of the projects they had been funding for years by
suggesting an explanation for those failures and they both needed to change their
behavior in some way to reflect the needs of development in the post-Cold War world
that required more than public administration support.
The end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy to more states in the 1990s
represents a situation in which the structure of the international system was changing in
such a way that international organizations had to change along with it to survive. Indeed,
after the end of the Cold War the major Western powers did not see as much of a need to
support development projects throughout the world and therefore development funding to
both the UNDP and World Bank decreased in the 1990s, making it imperative for both
organizations to look elsewhere for their funding and importance in international
relations. Agency-based evolutionary models explain norm emergence by suggesting
that individual actors maximize utility at all costs and respond to external stimuli in order
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to save themselves (Parsons 1951; Parsons 1968 [1937]). Game theory modeling suggests
that members of a group (players in the game) will act to maximize their self-interest
(i.e., utility) in order to come to the Nash Equilibrium, or best option under the
circumstances of the context (game) (Skyrms 1990, 1996, 2004; Hardin 1982).
These authors take into account the constraints of lack of knowledge, lack of trust,
and unfamiliar contexts (i.e. bounded rationality) (Bicchieri 2010; Bicchieri and Chavez
2010; Bicchieri, Muldoon, and Zalta 2011; Alexandar 2007). Bicchieri and colleagues
add the condition that players have “expectations and preferences” that alter the game so
that the Nash Equilibria outcomes depend on context (Bicchieri 2006, 1993, 2010;
Bicchieri, Duffy, and Tolle 2004). 4 Under this explanation, the UNDP and World Bank
appropriated governance norms in order to maintain relevance in an international system
that did not see the need for them anymore. Each organization had particular expectations
about its position in the international system, and within the UN system, and therefore
changed its policy.
The rationality-based explanations above provide powerful and nuanced reasons
for why governance norms became integral to international society and for explaining
norm divergence between the UNDP and World Bank. Indeed, the UNDP was influenced
by the preferences of the international system to focus on human rights principles and
practices, while the World Bank had consistently been focused on economic progress and
poverty alleviation (which it had always associated closely with GDP per capita). Thus,
4

Cook and Hardin show that norms work better as cooperating mechanisms dealing with externalities in a
small society than in a large one, the latter has to rely on trust mechanisms rather than norms; they also
make a distinction between “exclusionary norms” as applying to small groups and “universalistic norms” as
applying to large groups (Cook and Hardin 2001).
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each organization changed its stance on public administration in a way that allowed it to
adapt to the changes in the international community and continue to make itself relevant
in development. Furthermore, as shown in many of the arguments of particular UNDP
Administrators and World Bank Presidents, each organization tried to make itself
relevant by creating its own competitive advantage in an internationally competitive
business environment.
The UNDP’s comparative advantage in development is to offer political advice
and assistance on political structures including electoral commissions or the whole
electoral cycle process, on practices that will include all members of society in
government in order to make it legitimate in international relations, and on parliamentary
training and support. On the other hand, the World Bank’s comparative advantage entails
focusing on enhancing the economic structures of a society, on making public
administration of goods and services to society as efficient as possible, and on fostering a
sense that efficiency means including participation of the population in development
projects as well as transparency and anti-corruption measures.
While the above explanations offer a good framework for understanding the
differences in governance policy outcomes between the two organizations, they still lack
a consideration of the normative framework in which these organizations function that
also provides evidence for choosing one policy outcome over another. Organizations and
individuals also act out of normative based beliefs or from a “logic of appropriateness”
(March and Olsen 2006). 5 Another interpretation of norm internalization suggests that the

5

March and Olsen called this distinction on following behavior the “logic of consequences” versus the
“logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989). This distinction is a relatively well known concept in
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influence of human rights norms and liberal democracy ideology, connected with ideas,
morals and identity (Finnemore 1996a, 1993, 1996b; Keck and Sikkink 1998; FukudaParr and Hulme 2011; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Towns 2010, 2012) of both the
organization and individuals within that organization offers a strong explanation for why
the UNDP pursued liberal democracy norms in a political manner while the World Bank
did not. This strand challenges the assumption that norms always serve a functional
purpose, as is also lightly done in rational choice literature (Kitts 2006).
Thus, the explanation for why the UNDP and World Bank articulate governance
norms differently may be indeterminacy of individual understanding of context, avoiding
negative outcomes associated with following a norm, or simply value orientations that are
not influenced by material considerations. March and Olsen’s (2006) argument that
individuals sometimes act from a logic of appropriateness and sometimes from a logic of
consequences, depending on the context, provides an analysis that bridges the divide in
the norm evolution literature. Landolt argues that ideational interests and calculations
cannot be separated from consideration of material interests, even in discussion of
compliance with norms (Landolt 2007). Furthermore Elster (1989) argues that rational
choice theory is dependent on outcomes and therefore cannot be applied to the range of
normative experiences in life, although his interpretation of rational choice theory is
criticized by Opp (2013) as too narrow. However, this dichotomy is not without its critics
who argue that the two motivations cannot be separated from each other if we want to
understand complex social situations (Epstein 2008).
sociological literature as evidenced in Berger and Luckman’s discussion of symbolic universes (Berger and
Luckmann 1966, 117).
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An element of constructivist theory argues that norms become so important to a
group that they will follow that norm simply based on its power to dictate or constrain
behavior because it has become accepted (and not necessarily because it is the most
rational choice). As such, the social embeddedness or path dependence of a norm is an
important element of the institutionalization of norms as shown in Matzat’s study in
which individuals behaved in certain ways based on how well they knew and connected
with their counterparts (Matzat 2004). Applying this idea to the UNDP and World Bank
would indicate that promoting governance norms had to do with the kinds of agreements
that existed between members of each organization, the pressures they felt from leaders
as well as from each other to act in certain ways, and the closeness they felt to each other
(all elements of organizational culture). Indeed reputation is an important part of identity
and is therefore considered essential to norm emergence and compliance in rational
choice literature (Bicchieri 2010; Keohane 1984; Cook and Hardin 2001; Holländer
1990) as well as constructivist literature (Elster 1989; March and Olsen 2006). Further,
authors identified global deliberation (Dubash 2009), bargaining and decision-making
(Ensminger and Knight 1997), and the bottom-up approach (opposed to dominance)
(Clapp and Swanston 2009) as mechanisms of norm internalization among international
actors in international politics.
Moreover, not only do actors behave in certain ways because they are forced to do
so, and therefore act rationally to save themselves, but that they act out of concerns for
legitimacy (Schmelzle 2011; Wendt 2002). Checkel notes variation with state compliance
to norms and argues that the variation has to do with domestic characteristics (ranging
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from elite learning to societal pressure) and domestic diffusion techniques (Checkel 1999,
90). Clapp et. al. (2009) note the varied national implementation by arguing that national
implementation of the anti-plastic shopping bag norm varies from one state to another
due to local characteristics and differences “best characterized as the result of nonnetworked, locally specific set of initiatives and campaigns” (323).
Applying these domestic, internally focused arguments for norm internalization
and articulation to international development organizations therefore offers a more
complex understanding of why they would act differently, not based on rational-choice
calculation only, or based on exogenous influences only, but based on the differing
internal characters, influences, and processes of each individual organization. Indeed, the
UNDP and World Bank share many organizational trait characteristics such as having
executive boards, strong leadership roles (in the UNDP Presidents and World Bank
Administrators), being both hierarchical in the way that policy is created, but
decentralized in the way that policy is implemented, which would indicate conformity on
development policy and outcome. Yet the internal processes, individual characteristics,
individual belief systems and leadership capabilities of leaders all contribute to creating
very different environments within which organizations articulate norms.

A THEORY OF NORM ARTICULATION
It is essential to study the internal bureaucracies, functioning, and mechanisms of
international organizations in order to explain why they differ on supporting governance
norms in policy and practice. The principal-agent rational-based analysis offers powerful
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explanations for differing support, yet it does not fully explain that difference because it
excludes the analysis of internal differing characteristics including belief systems and
legitimacy concerns or extant normative underpinnings of individuals working within the
organizations. Organizational culture offers a specific way to consider how international
organizations function and provides particular entry points for explaining why similarly
placed organizations would differ so greatly on governance norm outcomes.
The UNDP and the World Bank function as hierarchical organizations with
powerful leaders in the organizational structure. In order to narrow down the scope of this
study, this research focuses on UNDP Administrators and World Bank Presidents as
powerful leaders who affect norm articulation within their respective organizations both
by support for the norm and through collaboration with the organization’s staff. Because
the UNDP and World Bank act as fundamental promoters of governance norms,
specifically guiding states in particular issue areas, it is essential to study how the process
works. The literature on norm internalization indeed suggests that leadership from
various sources impacts the process of norm internalization (Yan 2011; DeMarzo 1992;
Ikenberry 1992; Kim 1992; Sylvia and Pindur 1978). Based on this I argue that
leadership affects norm articulation.
Further, independent evaluations of gender mainstreaming and participatory
inclusion policies at the UNDP and World Bank, the policies themselves, and literature
on the impact of gender mainstreaming policies, point to the importance of leadership and
culture in guiding the intensity and success of the emergence and internalization of norms
in an international organization’s policies and practice. I argue that UNDP and World
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Bank leadership impacts the way that these organizations internalize, and thus articulate
norms in their policies and projects; both related to normative orientations of the leaders,
and in their leadership style, i.e., in the mechanisms they use to convince staff to follow
particular policies concerning governance norms.
Organizational culture provides a profound way of analyzing norm articulation
within the UNDP and World Bank. I follow Schein’s definition of organizational culture:
Culture can now be defined as (a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented,
discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well
enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as
the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems
(Schein 1990, 111). 6
When an organization has an orienting logic or “pattern of basic assumptions” that guides
its policies and practices, it means that new norms that develop will be guided by that
logic. In the next chapter I develop what I argue are the two logics of governance that
serve as the organizational culture that has influenced the way these two organizations
articulated governance norms, and specifically gender equality and participation.
Furthermore, Schein breaks all this down into three levels under which organizational
culture can be studied: artifacts, espoused beliefs and values, and underlying assumptions
(Schein 2004, 26). First is the level of the artifact which includes “visible organizational
structures and processes” (ibid., 26) such as the mandates already written in policy
documents that guide the organization’s practice, the way that the organizational staff are
6

Frost’s definition of culture relies on symbolism and interpretation to which Alvesson adds the notion of
values and assumptions of social reality as important, focusing on culture as a metaphor (Alvesson 2002).
Mohan’s review of organizational culture definitions classifies “three dominant theoretical approaches:
cognitive, systemic, and symbolic,” and further outlines characteristics of organization culture as
“assumptions, values, and artifacts” (Mohan 1993, 15). Similarly Ashkanasy identifies “culture, discourse
and identity as key concepts in organizational theory” (Ashkanasy, Wilderom, and Peterson 2000, 12).
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structured in relation to each other (i.e., the type of hierarchies), and the buildings or
office spaces themselves. The level of artifact is one of the most difficult elements of
organizational culture to study because of problems with outside interpretation. For
example, the researcher will have one way of interpreting the mandate and mission
statement, but the staff in the organization will have another (and it may never come to
light what the difference is). Thus, this study does not focus on artifacts except to point
out the similarities and differences between the UNDP and World Bank. They are both
hierarchical structures with powerful leaders at the top rank making policy decisions,
however they also function with a decentralized nature meaning that policies and project
are implemented on a local level (through country offices) with little to no interaction
with headquarters on some issues or implementation decisions.
Both the UNDP and World Bank furthermore suffer from a “silo” effect in which
the organizations create departments focused on issue areas that do not communicate with
other departments, thus making it difficult to coordinate efforts or mainstream policies
such as gender equality policies. Both mandates argue that the two organizations should
be apolitical in nature, though the UNDP has taken a very liberal interpretation of
apolitical while the World Bank continues with its conservative interpretation.
Furthermore, both organizations have a similar vision and history of development.
The third level of underlying assumptions of the staff is similarly difficult to
study, especially for a longer-range research project such as this which studies the
organization from 1985 to present. The level of underlying assumptions includes
“unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts, and feelings” (Schein
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1990, 26) of staff members and argues that this has an effect on the goals and outcomes
of the organization. It includes beliefs of the staff as a whole, their ideas about
development, about their own roles and jobs, and about what they think the organization
should be doing.
Since the UNDP and World Bank shared many staff members over the years,
including cross-over with top leaders, we can assume that many of their beliefs about
how the world works converge and they place similar pressures on each organization, but
the two organizations have distinctively different organizational cultures. As an example,
it has been noted that the World Bank largely focuses on neoliberal economic policy and
hires people trained in neoliberal economics rather than having a diverse staff that holds
differing economic views. Furthermore, the World Bank has not been very open to hiring
people from the social sciences or political science, though this has changed in recent
years with more hiring of experts from social sciences.
The level of organizational culture that this study highlights is that of espoused
beliefs and values, meaning the “strategies, goals, and philosophies” (Schein 1990, 26) of
the organization and its members, and this study narrows these down to the specific
strategies, goals and philosophies of leadership, arguing that leadership normative
persuasion impacts the internalization of norms in an international organization through
specific strategies or sanctioning behavior. Under the espoused beliefs level two elements
are important: leadership style, and the organizational culture. 7 First, leadership style is

7

Leadership style is usually subsumed under the heading of ‘organizational climate’ in the organizational
theory literature, but for clarity’s sake I will only use the term leadership style here. Climate refers not only
to the way that leadership guides the organization, but also the type of interaction that the leaders have with
employees and the interactions that employees have with each other. It consists in how decisions are made,
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an important characteristic of organizational culture (Lewin, Lippitt, and White 1939).
Leaders use mechanisms to guide the organization, either in current work, or in creating
new goals, missions, and changes in structure and policies. 8 Indeed Weber argued that the
individual had the capacity to “stand apart from society” (Kalberg 2005, 19) and from the
structure and to analyze his or her position in society and to make autonomous decisions
based on that position. This is true for leaders within organizations, i.e., they are able to
stand apart from the organization culture to analyze their position and make decisions
about their actions and which norms and ideas they will support.
Leader mechanisms and ways of acting and interacting in the organization have
an impact on how the organization functions and how easily it adapts to the changing
environment, including adopting new norms and practice that are then diffused to states.
Indeed, the only way to understand how and why the organization functions is to
understand how leadership impacts the organization (Cannella, Finkelstein, and
Hambrick 2009). Academics and researchers consistently come back to the influence of
leadership in political and economic studies. From Carlyle’s concern for hero worship in
the mid-19th century (Carlyle 1841) to Weber’s discussion of charismatic leadership in
the early 20th century (Weber 1947; 1964), to Cox and Jacobson’s discussion of decisionmaking in international organizations (Cox and Jacobson 1973), we see a concern with
and in the shared meanings, beliefs, understandings, and interactions that staff share together over a
prolonged period of time. Climate is the intra- and inter-organizational interaction norms, principles, and
behaviors of members of the organization (as members of a group). For clarity I focus on the basic
dynamics of the leadership style in this analysis.
8

Schein identifies what he calls “embedding mechanisms” that leaders use to “embed their beliefs, values,
and assumptions” into the culture (246). He also identifies the ways that leaders attempt to change
organizational culture (319-336). I do not rely on all of these mechanisms, only the ones that I identify as
essential to leadership style.

35

how leaders affect the efficient functioning of an organization, including the ability of a
leader to garner support on particular norms and behaviors. In the contemporary context,
leaders are pointed to as the main variable for explaining events or as actors in a structure
in which they interact in various ways, both having an effect on events, and being
affected by events (Grint 2005). This dissertation takes this latter perspective.
Indeed, leadership is one of the most important characteristics in the norm and
policy articulation process. “[T]he way that you get new policy initiatives in Washington
is to put them into the president’s speech” (Weiss et al. 2005, 189). Yet leadership effects
are mitigated and changed through a reflexive relationship with organizational culture
and processes. First, the way that the leader’s values are embedded into the organization
will serve to change its focus and articulation of certain norms. Secondly, the ability of
the leader to interact with the organization in a way that facilitates change toward
particular values or adoption of new practices or norms that emerge in international
relations is important to norm articulation.
The leadership focus does not highlight norm entrepreneurs or people who are
considered “leaders” of a particular idea. Rather, the notion is that bureaucracies are
created with particular sets of rules and powers that are embedded in the leadership role.
Therefore no matter how many movements or people within the organization support a
new norm and push for its adoption and inclusion, it is essential that the leader of the
organization be committed to that norm as well, and he or she support the norm in both
language and action. Yet, this support is not the only element that determines whether a
norm will be adopted by an organization. The content of the organizational paradigm, and
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the ability of the leader to couch the new norm in a way that it will be immersed in and
defined by the paradigm, are essential for the norm adoption and internalization success.
Understanding the general characteristics and mechanisms of leadership offers a
way to understand how leadership interacts with norm emergence, adoption, and
diffusion within an organization. Following Schneider this study identifies four types of
organizational culture that resonate with most of the typologies defined in the literature
on leadership style: control, collaboration, competence, and cultivation (Schneider
1994). 9 As represented in Table 1.2, the typologies distinguish between the way that the
authority figures or leaders of the organization 1) make decisions, 2) facilitate the
distribution of responsibilities and resources among staff, 3) implement changes in the
organizational structure, 4) outline job and responsibility functions, and 5) implement
practices on recruiting, hiring, and firing.
Table 1.2: Leadership Style Typology
Leadership
Style

Control

Characteristics •
(developed
from Schein
2010, 192;
Schneider
•
1994)
•

Collaboration

Autocratic – no •
consultation in
decision-making
(Paternalistic)
•
Dictates
Responsibility
Changes made •
immediately and
without

Competence

Decision-making •
based on
consultation
Responsibility
goes to the most •
likely to succeed
Changes made in •
consultation with
staff (more likely

9

Cultivation

Democratic
•
(Consensus)
decision-making
(Participative)
•
Delegates
Responsibility
Few changes
•
made and only
after coming to

Decisionmaking as last
resort
Abdicating
responsibility to
others
No changes
made – no
“rocking the

An excellent overview of the different organizational cultures or leadership styles advanced in the
literature is found in Schein’s well known and loved book on organizational culture, much used in
classrooms. I used much of the information that Schein collected in creating my two influential elements of
leadership style and paradigm and in creating a scale for each of these. See (Schein 2010), especially pages
189-202. His overview includes the following typologies of organizations that inform my two types and
scales: Coercive, utilitarian, normative (Etzioni 1975); Use of Authority including Autocratic, Paternalistic,
Consultative or Democratic, Participative and Power Sharing, Delegative, and Abdicative (delegating tasks
and power/control) (Schein 2010, 192); Fragmented, Mercenary, Communal, and Networked (Goffee and
Jones 1998); and Clan, Hierarchy, Adhocracy, and Market (Cameron and Quinn 1999).
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•
•

consultation in
the organization
(structural,
staffing, etc);
more likely to
•
bring in new
staff
Tell staff how to
function
Recruiting,
•
hiring, firing
done at top
levels

to change and
continue with
current staff than •
bring in new)
Show staff how
to function
(model in
leader’s
•
behavior)
Recruiting,
hiring, firing in
consultation with
staff

complete
consensus
•
Decide together
how staff should
function (dual
definition of
role)
•
Recruiting,
hiring, firing on
the basis of merit

boat”
Each person
decides how to
function – no
input from
leadership
Very little
Recruiting,
hiring, firing
occurs

Bringing the ideas of espoused beliefs and values of the leadership together with
leadership style, Table 1.2 describes how leadership espoused beliefs and mechanisms of
leadership style fit into the puzzle. For research purposes, leadership espoused beliefs and
values, i.e. leadership normative persuasion and sanctioning behavior, impacts the norm
articulation process in ways that foster different outcomes for similarly placed
organizations. Table 1.3 shows what that the normative leanings and persuasions of
UNDP and World Bank leaders have indeed been different over the years and conform to
the differences in UNDP and World Bank governance outcomes, and that their
sanctioning behavior for the most part has followed similar patterns within each
organization.

Table 1.3: Espoused Beliefs and Values of UNDP and World Bank Leadership
International
Organization
Leadership
Normative
Persuasion of
Leader
o Goals
o Philosophies

UNDP

o

o

World Bank

Promoters of Democracy
(Free Market Economics a
priority, but not most
important)
Constitutionalism and Rule of
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o

o

Promoters of Free Market
Economics (if that works
with Democracy, all the
better)
Constitutionalism and Rule

o

o

Law essential to promote
successful political and
economic development
Participation in politics
absolutely necessary - both in
voting and running for
political positions
Demand side for public
services the main focus

o

o

of law good, but especially
(or only) as relates to open
and free market
Participation of citizens
necessary in development
not necessarily in politics
Supply of public services the
main focus

A focus on leadership alone would provide an inadequate analysis of why norms
which are seemingly similar in international relation’s agendas should come out so
differently in similarly placed organizations. The second important characteristic focuses
on structure as sociologists and historical institutionalists point out as a constraining force
in society, either through command of embedded institutions or through valueorientations (Kalberg 2005; Weber 1978). The organizational paradigm or the shared
mission and goals of members of the organization and of the organization as a whole act
as guiding principles for the organization’s decisions and actions embedded in the policymaking process. Schein defines the formal philosophy as the “broad policies and
ideological principles that guide a group's actions toward stockholders, employees,
customers and other stakeholders” (13). Yet the substance of the philosophy or paradigm
does not guarantee or eliminate the possibility for a norm to be adopted in all cases.
Therefore I refer to the level of clarity on defining the organization’s mission and goals
as the variable that impacts the emergence or adoption of a norm.
The logic of the culture provides the leader with the ability to either mold current
policy or create new policy that will be accepted. It follows that when an organization’s
mission and goals are clearly understood and in line with the new norm presented, it is
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possible for the new norm to be adopted by the organization and furthermore the
organization is more likely to change the content or substance of the norm in order for it
to conform with the mission. When there is a less clearly defined mission, the norm may
be adopted depending on the level of promotion and ability of communication of the
leadership, but it will likely remain undefined and less institutionalized and less
articulated in the organization’s policies, rhetoric, beliefs, and practice.
This study operationalizes the variables as follows based on the above discussion.
First, leaders’ espoused beliefs and values, along with the leadership style and ability to
function in the organizational culture, determine the ability of a new norm to be
articulated within an international organization. In order to identify those espoused
beliefs and values (the leader’s commitment to the norm) the study analyzes leader
statements, speeches, their own accounts and others’ accounts of their beliefs and values
(interviews, secondary and primary sources). In both norm cases, the study considers
conformity to the norm, the frequency that the norms are considered and the way that the
norms are couched. Furthermore, the research identifies the leadership style according the
Schneider’s typology to discern the effectiveness of the leader in guiding the
organization.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Three types of alternative explanations from international relations theory explain
the difference in UNDP and World Bank governance policies: division of labor (liberal
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institutionalism and functionalism); following different mandates (principal-agent
relationship); and external influences from civil society.

Division of Labor
This study asks why the UNDP and World Bank should create such different
governance policies, specifically considering participation and gender equality
governance norms, if they are guided by the same member states, and work in the same
organizational field of development and therefore have similar exogenous and
endogenous influences. The expectation would be that both organizations would take up
governance norms in a particularly liberal democratic way, creating policy that suggested
that states should have constitutions that ensure multi-party politics, endorse free and fair
elections, and promote equal participation in government from all groups and individuals
of society either through voting or through active participation in political positions. The
connection with the ability of an organization to act autonomously is important in this
situation; whether or not international organizations act autonomous or follow explicit or
implicit direction from member states is a perennial question in regime theory and
institutional theory of international relations (Keohane 1998). Autonomy means to be
self-governing, without the political or moral influence of other actors and especially
focuses on the ability of an organization to practice “political independence” or the
“impermeability of the organization to external institutional interferences” (d'Aspremont
2011).
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Member states created the UNDP and the World Bank to function for specific
purposes, but after some years these organizations gained some autonomy from their
member states. Autonomy as defined by principal-agent theory explains the behavior of
the actors always in relation to the principal; in the case of international development
organizations, principals are member states in the international system that created the
specific international organization to serve a specific function or a set of specific
functions, yet the organization can veer from its original mandate outside the aegis of the
principal on specific issues. The United Nations Charter (1946) called for fostering
economic security around the world (United Nations 1945; Browne 2011) and it
purported to do so by creating a fund for the transfer of technological knowledge from
the global north to the global south (i.e., to the developing world), which started out as
the Extended Program for Technical Assistance (EPTA) and became the UNDP in 1965.
The UNDP later became its own funding agency in the 1980s, and also became a trendsetting advocacy organization with the publication of the Human Development Reports
(HDRs), thus straying from its original mandate and member state direct request. The
World Bank was created as a bank for funding reconstruction in Europe post-WWII at the
Bretton Woods conference in 1944 and soon moved beyond merely funding
reconstruction to alleviating poverty through funding economic and infrastructure
development, and technological transfer to developing countries. The Bank furthermore
sought to become a norm-setter in development by creating the World Development
Reports (WDRs) (published every year from 1978-present) that report comparative
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economic development indexes and topical development issues for countries throughout
the world.
Both organizations were created to serve specific functions and have also deviated
from their original mandates, functions, and even from the express desires of their
member states in some cases. Agency slack is “independent action by an agent that is
undesired by the principal” in principal-agent theory (Hawkins et al. 2006, 8). Mission
creep is usually defined as when an organization moves or ‘creeps’ from its original
mandate and mission as given by its member states in order to take on new
responsibilities (Pincus and Winters 2002, 2; Weaver 2008, 143-148). Both these terms
are applied under a theory that does give some leeway for international organizations to
act autonomously as agents, and the explanation for their actions is based on rational
cost-benefit calculations (a central tenet of the neorealist, neoliberal, and functionalist
theories that use these concepts). For the neorealist theorists, other entities exist at the
behest of states and do their bidding meaning that international organizations do not have
autonomy—they may veer from their original purpose, but they function according to
instructions from their principals. Yet, when using the principal-agent theory to analyze
the behavior of the UNDP and the World Bank, it alone does not explain why these
organizations would pursue policies in the way that they do.
On the face of it, the institutional, functional, principal-agent theories do seem to
provide adequate answers to the question of norm divergence and therefore different
policy outcomes. The World Bank provides loans as a bank to facilitate infrastructure
development. While a specialized agency of the UN, it works independently, closely
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aligned with the IMF. It is interested in economic growth. Conversely, the UNDP is an
agency of the UN directly under the aegis of the Economic and Social Council and the
General Assembly. The UNDP must embrace the role of supporting and promoting
democracy worldwide as one of the global norms upheld by the UN. However,
contradicting the apparent divergence in function, mandates, and goals, the UNDP and
World Bank both work closely together on country projects. In this capacity, they work to
remain apolitical or disinterested entities, supporting each country in its development
despite a country’s politics or government institutional arrangements. Further, they work
on the same international development goals and pursue the attainment of those goals
together. These goals include the creation of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) based on the Millennium Conference and Declaration of 2000, and the current
discussion of the development goals that will replace the MDGs when they expire in
2015. Finally, strong member states certainly do have an impact on policy creation, but
that impact is not always as tangible and evident as some would argue.
It is too simplistic to say that the World Bank and the UNDP pursue different
policies because of their mandates, mission as relates to development goals, or individual
associations with other agencies (as in the functionalist and principal-agent explanations).
Constructivist and sociological theories analyze the culture, belief systems, ideas, and
identities of actors. These characteristics are then connected with their actions to offer a
different explanation for behavior than do rational outcome calculating theories (as in
most institutionalist liberal and principal-agent theories). Under the constructivist
analysis, much of the pressure for pursuing specific policies and projects comes internally
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from within each organization, rather than from without. Further, the internal
characteristics consider the identities, beliefs, and interactions of actors. The analysis also
considers the path-dependence of policy formation, the relationship that each
organization has set up with individual countries and pressures from transnational civil
society.

Member States
In principal-agent theory, which closely mirrors neorealist theory in international
relations (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001, 1994), the principal always has some kind of
control in the relationship, guiding the international organization in how it should serve
those functions and what it should do to achieve the principal’s goals. Both the UNDP
and World Bank exhibit the truth of this statement. Both have executive boards made up
of representatives from member states that meet regularly to decide the policies of the
organizations. The UNDP is further guided by General Assembly resolutions and
requests. In project funding and implementation, both organizations work on a “demandbased” system, only offering advice, technical assistance, funds and projects to member
states when requested by the member state. Thus far, principal-agent theory offers a
convincing explanation for why these organizations might act in different ways
depending on the mandates set forth by their member states as well as the requests from
member states for funding. However, the evidence does not solely support this
explanation. First, member states consistently request political structure advice and
support from the World Bank, and yet the Bank consistently denies such support,
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preferring to remain as neutral an organization as possible when it comes to politics and
claiming their lack of knowledge and technical skill in that area.
Secondly, the UNDP consistently receives criticism for the work that it does in
the political arena, criticism both arguing that the UNDP should stick more to its
principles and not work with authoritarian states as well as criticism that suggests the
UNDP is wrong to be involved in political structures. Critics suggest that the UNDP
should go back to supporting only the efficiency and effectiveness of public
administration as the World Bank does. In both cases, rational cost-benefit analysis
would suggest that the UNDP and World Bank would lean more toward a neutral middle
rather than sit at the opposite ends of the spectrum; their responses suggest that the
organizations have not only strayed from their original missions and the direct authority
of their principals, but that they do so for normative and value-laden reasons.
The principal-agent literature narrowed the scope of the answer to simplify and
operationalize the possibility of studying the issue of autonomy of organizations; that is,
when international organizations act against the will of the principal or at least without
the principal’s influence or consideration (Haas 1958; 2004; Keohane 1982). In so doing
it created a problem of lack of alternative variables in the analysis. Indeed, actors do not
only act out of rational, efficient, utility-maximizing consideration of the costs and
benefits of the possible action, they also act out of value considerations or what is
considered appropriate by the social structure and culture (March and Olsen 2006).
Functionalist arguments do not tell us enough about the changing nature of international
organizations, or about their bureaucratic and internal processes.
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Civil Society
One trend in the literature assigns the changes in international organizations to the
pressure applied by civil society, whether from one nation or a multitude of nations as
transnational civil society. Indeed, the literature on the impact and influence of civil
society organizations (CSOs) has blossomed in recent years as the number of NGOs and
CSOs increased. These authors claim that it is largely the pressure from transnational
civil society that causes international organizations to make changes to their roles or their
policies because the normative pressure is so intense. Indeed some claim that without
civil society pressure, these organizations would not even remain relevant and would
become intractable in their organizational culture and bureaucracies.
The transnational CSO literature builds out of a vast literature on the impact of
national civil society on national politics and policy outcomes (Scholte 2002; Freeman
1997). Some argue that CSOs have become stronger and more influential in an age of
mass media. They suggest that media allows CSOs to garner more citizen support and
make their statements well known and influential in government circles (Aucoin 2012;
Themudo 2013). Others argue that civil society does not have as much impact on the state
as current globalization literature would like to think because it is simply not as strong as
the national government apparatus against which it is contrasted in mainstream literature
(Diamond 1994).
Others are more nuanced, noting that transnational civil society is certainly
important in particular situations, but that the international arena is so complex that there

47

is usually something else going on at all levels of analysis. For instance, Audie Klotz
argues that while transnational and national CSOs were influential in shaping foreign
policy decisions regarding putting sanctions on South Africa for the continued use of
Apartheid laws, other variables were most influential in getting governments to impose
those sanctions as well as in pushing South Africa to finally end Apartheid (Klotz 1995).
Indeed, CSOs have become very important in the recent era of globalization and
development (Fraser-Moleketi 2012), as will be seen in the discussion of the participation
norm later in this dissertation. Governments are more aware of the impact of CSOs and
the importance of gaining the approval and support of civil society. International
organizations are more concerned with influencing governments to care about and ensure
the participation of civil society in government decision making or at a minimum in
development project planning and implementation (United Nations Development
Programme 2012c; World Bank 2007). Indeed, many of the norms that become
influential in development organizations do start with CSOs rallying around a particular
issue. We see this in the gender equality norm that this dissertation will also discuss later.
It was largely due to CSO pressure and indefatigable insistence that the UN hold
conferences on gender-specific issues related to development and that the international
community of states and organizations started paying attention to gender based issues.
This dissertation does not deny the importance and influence of CSOs on the
normative leanings and changes that happen in organizations. However, I argue that the
ultimate responsibility and influence for the way that the norm becomes articulated in
policy in the organization has to do with the organizational culture and path dependence
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of the ideas that formed or shaped the organization. It also has to do with the influence
and impact of the leader on how the norm will be articulated, interpreted, and finally
implemented into the practice of the organization. Once that ball starts rolling within the
organization, CSOs become less influential because they are outside the organizational
bureaucracy and do not have the same normative and material pressure as those within
the organization.

APPLICATION
Neofunctionalist, behavioralist and constructivist analyses begin to explain the
internal workings of organizations, including how autonomy may be different than
simply creeping away from a mandate for rational reasons (Hawkins et al. 2006, 32).
These theories give agents some independence based on rational considerations plus
concern for non-rational based explanations. Neofunctionalist work spans the gap
between rational explanations of international organization behavior and that of
constructivist considerations which focus on normative considerations and influence,
suggesting that international organizations act for other reasons than maximizing
efficiency, fulfilling mandates and functions, and only for material considerations (Haas
1958; 2004); as Haas argues “the ontology is not materialistic: values shape interests, and
values include many nonmaterial elements” (2004, xv).
Indeed, international organizations can be autonomous agents, perhaps more so in
an era of globalization wherein intergovernmental organizations, regional organizations,
non-governmental organizations, transnational civil society, and other entities make all
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the difference for certain issues of global importance, or what is often called global
governance (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010). Related to their missions and mandates,
international organizations can be ‘dysfunctional’ by making decisions that overturn their
original goals and upset their ability to meet their mandates (Barnett and Finnemore
1999; Weaver 2008). Furthermore, constructivist arguments in favor of international
organization autonomy focus on their bureaucratic nature, pointing to how the
bureaucracy’s impersonal characteristics or normative leanings allow for autonomy
(Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Oestreich 2012).
My theory builds on the constructivist analyses and further suggests that internal
forces are most important to study in the analysis of how international development
organizations articulate norms for the world.
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II: GOVERNANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
In the twenty-first century international development organizations promote
specific governance ideas by funding and implementing policies and projects that are
based in ideas of what it means for a state to govern well. The UNDP and many Western
bilateral aid agencies focus on supporting democratic principles through development
projects, arguing that democracies are the best form of polity to enhance development
outcomes, or at least arguing that democracy and development are inseparable.
Organizations like the World Bank articulate and promote governance focused on public
administration efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency while, at least in rhetoric,
minimizing the importance of democracy for reaching development goals. Despite the
obvious dichotomy in rhetoric, the definitions of democratic and good governance remain
contentious. This dissertation argues that democratic versions of governance that
highlight the need for citizen involvement in government are founded in the historical
evolution of human rights and human development paradigms. Versions of governance
that focus on efficiency and effectiveness of government in providing goods and services
to citizens are founded on the historical evolution and support for public administration
development assistance.
This chapter has two arguments concerning the definitions of governance. First,
despite diversity in the governance notion and definitions found in practitioner and
academic literature, there are two logics of governance that guide each organization. One
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focuses on the importance of individual participation in government (demand side). The
other focuses on government institutions providing public goods and services to a
population (supply side). The demand and supply side governance dichotomy refers to
public administration and delivery of goods and services (Coston 1998). The terms most
commonly applied in practitioner literatures, “democratic governance” and “good
governance,” respectively refer to these different definitions. This does not mean that the
governance notion is ever at one time monolithic and unchanging (obviously reality is the
reverse). Yet, in order to study what goes on in international organizations on the
promotion of governance norms, the distinction is essential. This argument is based on an
historical analysis of governance in development practice, showing how historical trends
influenced the different ideals represented in democratic versus good governance, i.e.,
human rights and public administration support.
Second, this chapter argues that the term governance does not always refer to state
institutions and that there are a multiplicity of actors involved in governance mechanisms
and actions. The term governance applies to institutions, authorities, and mechanisms of
controlling society that extend beyond the state institutions of government, and thus we
see a trend to include civil society organizations in governance norms and policies. In
development practice, the term primarily focuses on government authority figures,
mechanisms of control, and institutions. Yet, this trend to focus solely on government is
changing to meet a changing world, and thus we see a focus on the governance of civil
society outside the purview of the state. The chapter provides a mechanism for
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identifying when we are discussing state actors versus market or civil society actors in the
actions of governance.
The historical analysis and analytical framework for studying the definition and
focus of governance guides the analysis of the UNDP and World Bank history and
structure as presented in the following chapters in which the two organizations under
study are considered for the way they have discussed governance throughout the years.

HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC AND ECONOMIC LIBERALISM
In the Western world the nineteenth through twenty-first centuries witnessed
“waves” of democratization in which groups of states changed their forms of government
from authoritarian to different forms of democracy that emphasized the will of the people
and the ability of people to choose their representatives in government positions (Markoff
1996b; Huntington 1993; Whitehead 2001). Measurements of the types of political
systems in the world show such waves. Well known and used measurements include
Polity IV, Freedom House, the EIU Democracy Index, Bertelsmann Transformation
Index, and Vahanen Democratization Index. In their different ways these measurements
show the overarching change among states from mostly authoritarian polities in the
nineteenth century to mostly democratic polities in the twenty-first century. For instance,
the Center for Systemic Peace, which publishes the Polity IV Index, recorded that
During the Cold War period, there had been a steady increase in the number of
democracies at the rate of about one new democracy every two years. During the
early 1990s, the number of democracies increased by thirty (30) in five years
(from 48 in 1989 to 77 in 1994)” with “95 countries classified as democracies in
late 2011” (Marshall and Cole 2011, 12).
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In their 2013 Freedom in the World publication, Freedom House categorized 212
countries as electoral democracies of which 90 countries were labeled mostly free using
indicators based on political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2013).
Despite the waves of democracy as perceived in the measurements described
above, and as written about in the academic literature (Fukuyama 1992), contention still
remains over defining the appropriate principles and characteristics of democratic
polities. The contention spills over into desires to define the precise meaning of
governance and indicate the best form of governance for a group of people. A brief
historical overview provides the main ideas that have surfaced over the years on what the
best form of governance would be, including ideas about the best type of political
entities. The practices of liberal democracy formed from the ideas of liberalism starting in
seventeenth century and the European Age of Enlightenment, especially exemplified in,
but not restricted to, the writings of John Locke, Montesquieu, and Thomas Hobbes
(Rawls 1993; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). While encompassing a broad range of
principles and ideals, political liberalism, especially classical liberalism, focuses on three
overarching and guiding ideas: the primacy of the individual (individualism focusing on
creating a system in which individuals can pursue the good life as they see fit, i.e.,
positive liberty), limited government (especially that run by constitutionalism and the rule
of law), and the free market (represented by the protection of private property, i.e.,
negative liberty) (Gaus 2000). Libertarianism, an interpretation of liberalism by early
theorists such as Thomas Paine, argues that the state should be drastically limited in the
social, economic and political life of the people; this argument continues in modern
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debates (Nozick 1974) as shown in the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice
2001).
John Locke’s theory (1698; 1988) is particularly important for identifying the
foundation of the liberal democracy and governance debate. Locke is perhaps one of the
best known natural law theorists. He lived in a time when the British questioned the
tradition of absolute monarchical rule. The English Civil Wars (Great Rebellion of 164251) in progress against the Stuart Monarchy (1632-1704) caused contention in the society
between the monarchs, or ruling authority, and subjects on issues of decision-making
procedures along with the right of voting, and arbitrary taxation on private property. It
was during this era that Charles I was executed (1649) and Oliver Cromwell took over as
Lord Protector. The English conflict between the parliamentarians and the monarchists
concerned who had the right to rule (whether it was the monarch or the people) and was
especially a rebellion against arbitrary rule (Tilly 1990). For instance, Charles I sent an
army to quell the Irish rebellion against the will of the English parliament, a policy with
which the parliamentarians disagreed.
It was in the context of problems arising between the parliament and the
monarchy that Locke wrote his Two Treatises of Government (1690). Locke argued that
the state of nature is a state of freedom and in this freedom the law of nature governs
human action to consider others as equals:
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one:
And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health,
Liberty, or Possessions” (2:6, p. 271).
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The first principle developed from this use of natural law was that individuals
were at liberty in nature and therefore should be as close to that in society as well. The
second principle, on the limitations of government, is connected with the first. The ruling
authority or civil government run by magistrates or representatives of the people is only
allowed two rights that are given to them through the consent of every citizen and the
onus is upon them to justify the imposition of lack of freedom. According to Locke, the
only rights of government could be the right of punishment and the right to seek
reparation. In Locke’s writing we begin to see the development of freedom of the
individual and limited government, two essential ideals of liberalism.
Contention over how the market fits into liberalism developed from a long history
of change from the feudal system to that of capitalism. Structural shifts in economic
organization that resulted in calls for changes in political representation meant that
liberalism became a defining battle cry in the eighteenth century (Ishay 2004). Indeed,
the political and economic order of Feudalism broke down all over Europe under internal
and external pressures (Markoff 1996a). European feudal lords, and the emerging middle
class, challenged the monarchical, authoritarian nature of the political system in which
they had no rights to decision-making procedures. Lacking a voice in decisions of
government was especially irksome for those who owned property when monarchs taxed
property arbitrarily. As the middle class formed and people gained economic status, they
challenged the political ideas and leadership of the time. Challenges erupted in outbreaks
of political and violent disputes. Examples of the violence include the English Civil Wars
and Great Rebellion of 1642-51, the French Revolution (1789-1799), and the American
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Revolution (1775-1781). During these conflicts groups of people following liberal
ideological principles of individual freedom and limited government acted in violent
opposition to the ruling monarchical and colonial (in the American case) authorities.
Classical liberalism encourages the free market and limited government
intervention into the market. This is a contentious issue in development that has produced
deep divides over what people think is the type of economic system that is appropriate for
states to pursue in conjunction with a governance structure. Indeed, development practice
traditionally focuses on providing technical advice and knowledge about how developing
states should handle the market-state relationship, as evident in practices and policies of
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs, and the United Nations Development Programme. The varieties of capitalism
literature suggests that two possibilities, or ideal types, emerge from the key debates over
classical and modern liberalism that developed: liberal market economy featuring
reduced government intervention, and the coordinated market economy which features
extensive government intervention. According to Peter Dicken these can be further
broken down into “neo-liberal-market capitalism,” “social-market capitalism,”
developmental capitalism,” and “authoritarian capitalism” (Dicken 2011). Keynesian
economists favor the free market while arguing that government intervention is necessary
to address market failures, thus advocating a welfare state or social-market capitalism.
Chicago school theorists, such as Milton Freedman and Friedrich Hayek, support
“liberal-market capitalism” arguing that any intervention in the market causes distortions,
not least because individuals in government are opportunistic and self serving and will
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always make decisions in their own interest rather than in the interests of all (Hayek
1944). The contention over these arguments spilled over into development practice in the
1950s through 1970s, especially as development organizations provided technical
assistance and public administration support to dozens of decolonizing countries.
The Bretton Woods Institutions, created by the countries that emerged triumphant
after World War II, were heavily influenced by thinkers such as John Maynard Keynes
who supported the ideals of classical liberalism in a conservative sense. These institutions
continue to champion international and domestic political and economic institutions built
around the ideals of classical liberalism embedded with a sense of social responsibility
and need for some government intervention in order to avoid crises (Ruggie 1982). The
continual negotiation over liberal principles defines governance: negotiation over the
level of government intervention in economic institutions, the ability of the individual to
engage in government and the economy, and the ability of a government to provide goods
and service to citizens; all these continue to be paramount in what the World Bank, the
IMF, and the WTO (formerly GATT), and even the United Nations do today.
In support of the development state, or development capitalism, the New
International Economic Order created by the Group of 77 developing states in 1960 and
supported through the UN Conference on Trade and Development suggested a new
system of economic organization that would not be solely based in free market
functioning (United Nations General Assembly 1974; Stokke 2009). Despite such
progress in defining a program, the new block of countries experienced economic crises
in the 1970s which destabilized their power in the United Nations. In the 1980s the
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Reagan and Thatcher respective conservative governments in the US and UK supported
the classical economic liberal ideals, thus pushing for change toward a free, unhindered
market. Some argue that it was these countries that pushed international financial
institutions (especially the World Bank and IMF) to require that states receiving loans
should implement neoliberal policies such as deregulation, privatization, floating
exchange rate system, and a whole host of other “structural adjustments” in order to
create what they considered to be functioning and efficient economies in developing
countries. This neoliberal agenda, also called the “Washington Consensus” (Williamson
1990), continues today under less stringent conditionalities and reforms.
Equality, as an element of the liberal economic and political order developed in
the Western world, continues to be of major interest to theorists and development
practitioners in the governance debate. Under the theoretically equal operations of a free
market, everyone has a similar chance to the same opportunities as all and has the same
capability to pursue those opportunities (Freidman and Freidman 2002; Hayek 1944). The
question in today’s debate is whether or not he or she will take the opportunity and can
make use of the opportunity provided (Nussbaum 2000; Sen 1999). Remembering that
capability does not mean functioning (Nussbaum 2000, 86-96) one approach is to create
public institutions that allow for people to actively engage with their government and
economy, but does not require them to do so. This kind of policy is closely associated
with the meritocratic approach, which can be problematic for those who support equality
and equal rights (not only equality of opportunity). Meritocracy argues that the free
market sorts out the dross; those who work for the opportunity to have better access to
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goods and services will obtain it, those who do not work for it have given up their equal
opportunity or chance to that access.
Contemporary development and political theorists consider equality as an
essential element of societal and development practice, but also argue that the free market
is a powerful mechanism for ensuring that equality in access and capability, not
necessarily functioning. Development theorists are apt to consider equality as equality of
opportunity, not equality of goods, services, or income. Amartya Sen’s arguments for
development consist in the principle of equal access to the market and policies based on
the notion that each person should have the same capability to function in the economic
and political system of their country, i.e., equity (Sen 1999). Without such access,
individuals and societies cannot easily achieve the human freedom outlined as important
under liberalism, but with equitable access it is up to the individual to turn that capability
of access into functioning, highlighting the importance of meritocracy.
Political theorist John Rawls also argues for a market-based meritocratic
interpretation of equality that would lead to a world system of just societies. Building on
classical liberal ideas, his guiding principles stipulate that societies should be guided by
the “justice as fairness” and the “difference principle,” both founded in the idea of equal
respect for persons:
1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights
and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in
this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be
guaranteed their fair value.
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to
be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and (b), they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
members of society (Rawls 1999, 5-6).
60

While Rawls may indeed be “justifying the status quo in the developed West” (Jaquette
1990, 61), he also provides a foundational argument for development practice. The focus
should not be on creating equal societies where everyone has the access to the same
amounts of goods and services, rather it is about creating societies in which “public
policy to foster human capabilities and substantive freedoms in general can work through
the promotion of these distinct but interrelated instrumental freedoms” [political,
economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective
security] (Sen 1999, 10). Following this line of thinking, one employee for the World
Bank argued that the Bank was not responsible for encouraging affirmative action
policies or programs in country states in any way, rather, the Bank should be concerned
with influencing policies built on the principle of meritocracy.
While the argument for meritocracy may have prevailed in the economic liberal
version of governance, it is still contentious in the political version. Indeed, equality in
political representation and participation in government remains crucial in development
thinking. In recent years the trend to promote participatory inclusiveness and stakeholder
participation in development projects increased substantially (along with a push through
the governance ideology for states to include citizens in decision making procedures).
Equality, equity and meritocracy are deeply embedded in the way that international
organizations pursue development goals in the contemporary era, though contention
surrounds how these principles should work in practice. In the end, most development
practice concerns creating societies focused on procedural, not distributive, equality.
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Along with the importance of participatory development in recent decades,
international development practice exhibits a trend to focus on the individual as the level
of analysis rather than state, society, or family. The human development paradigm
enhanced individualism. Historically, the focus on the individual was also evident under
the poverty alleviation paradigm that was especially important to the World Bank during
the McNamara years, yet poverty alleviation tends to focus on groups of people as a
whole rather than as individuals struggling to exist on one or two dollars a day.
Western liberalism influenced the modern form of liberal democracy, including
the government’s connection with the market. Classical liberalism’s main tenets of the
primacy and freedom of the individual, limited government, and a free market continue to
cause debate, contention, and disagreement in development practice and discussions,
especially over the issue of the proper mode of governance to be connected with
development practice. Democracy theorists suggest different forms, or ideal types, of the
modern state, including constitutionalism, the liberal state, liberal or representative
democracy, or one-party polity (Held 1995, 50-51). Varieties of capitalism theorists
suggest that different forms or ideal types of capitalism include “neo-liberal-market
capitalism,” “social-market capitalism,” developmental capitalism,” and “authoritarian
capitalism” (Dicken 2011), or more simply, the neoliberal, free market economy and the
coordinated market economy.
This section of the chapter has shown that the governance concept developed out
of a long history of contention between the power of those people who are in
authoritative positions and the people over which they intend to rule. The most important
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elements of governance to develop out of this historical understanding are that of
representation and access to decision-making, provision of goods and services to citizens
in an efficient and effective manner, the contention over the involvement of the
government in the market, and equality/equity among citizens. The next section discusses
how these ideals were further crafted by development practice in the 20th century to take
two different foci on the substantive elements of governance that are appropriate for
modern states (especially developing states). The two trends are (1) human rights
protections and political freedom, and (2) public administration efficiency.

GOVERNANCE PROMOTION
Governance is promoted by international development organizations through
policies and projects. This is a contentious issue when we consider what it means for
global governance and globalization. Global governance encompasses the key elements
of the theoretical nature of liberal theory by suggesting that the international political and
economic order should follow liberal principles and that international organizations
should be involved in promoting those principles. Called idealism in the interwar years,
later called functionalism and neo-functionalism, liberals argued that international
organizations would be able to address collective action problems that surfaced in global
governance better than individual states, and especially better than individual politicians
(Mitrany 1943), and take global governance problems out of the realm of power politics
in which states traditionally interacted. Later theorists argued that power politics are
inextricably linked to global governance issues, and elites must be connected and buy in
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to the use of international organizations to address the problems or else they will fail as
was the fate of the League of Nations (Haas 1958; 2004).
Governance, or the way that states themselves govern their citizens, emerges as a
global governance problem when connected with development practice for three reasons.
First, development organizations have traditionally been connected with providing advice
and help to governments in public administration capacity. Organizations argue that this
work is apolitical, only offering advice to states on the proper conduct and organization
of government institutions. Secondly, development practitioners noticed that when
governments function poorly in providing goods and services to the population, or being
responsive to a population’s needs and requests, development does not proceed at rapid
pace if at all. Third, globalization, while creating enormous prosperity in some parts of
the globe, has not had an equally beneficial effect. The apparent goods of globalization
have meant ‘bads’ as well, such as increased inequalities and imbalances in knowledge,
technological access, and capability of income generation (Arizpe 2005; Aucoin 2012;
Rondinelli and Cheema 2003) that states themselves have to deal with, requiring efficient
and effective governance. Thus, the internal political and economic governance systems
of states entered the realm of being a global governance problem that international
organizations take responsibility for addressing in different ways.
The post-World War II era proved to be a boon to the ideals of global governance
built on liberal principles, leading to the creation of the Bretton Woods Institutions
(addressing the issue specific areas of finance, reconstruction/development, and trade),
the United Nations (as a collective security organization), the European Coal and Steel
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Community (coordinating European trade and reconstruction) which eventually evolved
into the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (collective security for
Western member states), among other international and regional organizations created to
address specific issue areas (Haas 1958; 2004; Keohane 1984). From the beginning these
organizations operated as arbiters between states, creating rules and laws deemed to
guide state action, even if that action was voluntary. Regime theorists put high hopes in
such organizations to create a situation in which states would be less likely to go to war
with each other over specific problems because such organizations take on functions that
are delegated to them by their member states and thus international organizations provide
important functions to states (e.g., reducing transaction costs) (Abbott and Snidal 1998).
The United Nations views individual state governance as a global governance
issue. Its main body, the United Nations Security Council, functions as a collective
security institution for all the member states. However, it quickly expanded to pick up a
concern with human rights through the creation of the Human Rights Commission that
drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted by the General
Assembly on December 10, 1948 (Weiss et al. 2005; Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss 2009;
Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2010; Weiss and Thakur 2010). Through its promotion of
human rights and support for elections, even before the end of the Cold War, the UN
influences states to follow an ideology based on Western liberalism promoting aspects of
liberal democracy as the appropriate form of political orientation, especially equality
between human beings and the rights of participation in one’s government.
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UN leaders’ promotion of liberal democracy ideals increased in the 1990s when
there were drastic shifts in the structure of the international system (end of the Cold War)
that freed up the space for such influence. Boutros-Boutros Ghali partially influenced this
change by producing policy statements such as An Agenda for Democratization and An
Agenda for Peace (Ghali 1996, 1992) which were a response to requests from the
General Assembly. However, Boutros Ghali created his own interpretation of peacekeeping, turning it into a mandate for peace-building (Karns 2012). Both Boutros Ghali’s
policy documents were accepted by the General Assembly, and both charted a course for
UN influence in post conflict situations for peace-building (beyond peace-keeping) and
for supporting democracy in member states.
For development organizations like the UN Development Programme (UNDP)
the shift meant that development should include encouraging states to follow democratic
governance principles. This shift largely started in the 1980s when William H. Draper III
was Administrator of the UNDP. One of the largest influences he had on the organization
was in the area of advocacy of development. Prior to this time the World Bank and
economists were the most influential in development politics and policy, making a claim
that development was about income, poverty reduction, and macroeconomic growth and
stability. However Draper and others found this understanding of development to be too
narrowly focused on income. He hired the famous economist Mahbub ul Haq who then
applied to Amartya Sen to join in the project to create a new paradigm of development,
labeled human development, in which the freedoms and capabilities of the human being
were at the center of development goals, not income aggregation. The human
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development paradigm influences the UNDP and development ideology to focus on the
human being as the center of analysis, paving the way for development to be inextricably
linked to liberal democracy norms as well as human rights principles.
Most other bilateral development organizations, especially those situated in
Western liberal democracies, have followed in the same footsteps as the UNDP and
actively promote democratic governance, at least in rhetoric. Most notable are the United
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) whose governance
department was created by Roger Wilson and colleagues in the early 1990s, USAID, the
US based Millennium Challenge Corporation created during the G.W. Bush
Administration specifically to fund development in countries that exhibit “good
governance” policies, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD),
Australia’s AusAid, among others from OECD countries. These organizations all focus
on promoting democracy, encouraging elections, and supporting public administration
toward changes that encourage the creation of democratic polities in their bilateral
relations.
Furthermore, regional development organizations and development banks follow
suit in pressuring for a shift in political orientation of developing, non-democratic
countries. The most important here include the African Union (AU), the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development
Community (SADC), the Inter-American Development Bank, and the European Union.
These regional development organizations increasingly highlight the importance and
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influence of governance, suggesting that states need to govern in a particularly liberal
way in order to enhance development project success in each country.
While many of the regional and bilateral development organizations listed above
do not have limitations on the kinds of influence they can have on politics within
countries, the mandates and Articles of Agreement prohibit international development
organizations (like the UNDP and the World Bank) from engaging in politically
influencing states. Yet, since the 1980s they have increasingly done just that under the
benign and obtuse language of good governance or even democratic governance. The
next section analyzes governance rhetoric, highlighting the origins of the democratic
versus good governance concepts.

Defining Two Governance Concepts
Two concepts emerge from an analysis of the governance for development
literature. First, one trend in development is to push countries toward democratic regimes
and rules, ensuring representation in government, and ensuring equal participation in
decision-making procedures of government and in running for government. The first
trend is called either democratic governance or demand-side governance. The second
trend is to focus on how governments can efficiently and effectively carry out their duties
of providing goods and services to their populations. The second trend is a focus on good,
good-enough, or supply-side governance. I argue that good governance takes a more
tangible and evident definition in international development than some would argue, yet
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it does not exactly parallel either substantive liberal democracy or the neoliberal ideology
of the conservative right.
Yet, just as historical contention over the definition and rights associated with
liberal democracy has not been overcome, and continues today, the definition of the
appropriate form of government and mechanisms of governing remains ambiguous.
Practitioners and academics usually contend that the concept includes any or all of the
following substantive elements: accountability, decency, effectiveness (in problem
solving and decision-making), efficiency (in allocating resources to the public), fairness,
lack (control) of corruption, legitimacy, participation, responsiveness to citizens, rule of
law (judicial framework), transparency, security enhancing, and maintaining social peace
and political stability (Coston 1998; Kaufmann 2009; Rodrik 2008, 18; Hydén and Court
2007; Keefer 2004; Ager 2000; Schmelzle 2011).
A vociferous critique exists over both the relevance and definition of the good
governance concept. One side argues that the good governance concept is imprecise and
therefore inapplicable, or at the very least inefficient to either meet development
outcomes (Nanda 2006; Jabeen and Iqbal 2010; Grindle 2007; Andrews 2008). There are
those who argue that good governance is not an apolitical concept, but that it was built on
liberal democracy and/or neoliberal beliefs and policies and does not stray far from
liberal democracy principles (Williams 2009; Keefer 2004; Hewitt de Alcántara 1998;
Moore 1966). Others argue that the good governance concept offers clarity to
governance issues where the democratization literature does not (Hydén and Court 2007).
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Several studies pull together the various works on governance to formulate
substantive theories and definitions of good governance. These definitions are supposedly
objective of any regime type as identified in the democratization literature (from
authoritarian to democratic) and measureable. Two major studies focused on developing
a definition of good governance and measurable indicators that have caught international
development attention and have been used widely in development: the Worldwide
Governance Indicators developed by Daniel Kaufmann and colleagues at the World Bank
(Kaufmann 2009, 2010), and the World Governance Survey developed by Göran Hydeń
and colleagues at the United Nations University and ending the project at the Overseas
Development Institute World Governance Assessment (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004;
Hydén and Court 2007).
Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi developed the Worldwide
Governance Indicators. Since 2002 the authors have measured six dimensions of
governance including “Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of
Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and
Control of Corruption” (Kaufmann 2009, 2). These aggregate indicators are all based on
subjective understandings of governance and perceptions on governance, attempting to
get an idea of how individuals in societies feel about their own government on the six
dimensions. The authors’ definition of governance relates to the process of government
institutions but is also connected to outcomes of governance:
We define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which
authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens
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and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions
among them (Kaufmann 2009, 5).
The World Governance Assessment specifically attempts to overcome what the
authors see as a subjective trend in assessments of good governance that conflate good
governance with liberal democracy (as in the Worldwide Governance Indicators). Göran
Hydeń, Julius Court, and Kenneth Mease focus on regime type, process of exercising
authority, and public administration capacity (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004, 15). They
use the process dimension of governance to assess a country’s measurable results using
principles from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and not, as they claim, a
substantive understanding of liberal democracy. Thus their definition of governance is
process oriented: “Governance refers to the formation and stewardship of the formal and
informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic
and societal actors interact to make decisions” and governance is measured by these
authors by six objectifiable indicators: “(1) participation, (2) fairness, (3) decency, (4)
accountability, (5) transparency, and (6) efficiency” (Hydén and Court 2007, 3).
While these two projects attempt to measure governance on the whole using
several different aggregate indicators and speaking at either process, outcome dimension
or both, a multitude of other indexes and indicators measure what the international
development community accepts as characteristics of governance. 10 Considering the
numerous attempts at measuring governance and the multitude of substantive foci as well

10

Some of the most well-known and widely used include Transparency International’s “Corruption
Perceptions Index,” the Polity Project measuring regime types from democratic to authoritarian, the
Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports measuring political
and civil freedoms, and the Fund for Peace’s Failed State Index.
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as differences in the way that the indexes analyze processes of government (hierarchical
versus vertical control and associated mechanisms) and whether or not the index is
primarily focused on process or outcome, it is no wonder that the idea of governance
having a shared or definitive substantive meaning is both incomprehensible and difficult
to claim definitively. However, some key similarities abound in the attempts at
measurement as well as in governance definitions in academic and practitioner literature
that conceptually separate democracy and good governance, or demand versus supply
governance (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004). 11
Based on these studies and analysis of the literature on governance discussed
above, two trends in governance appear: one built on the notions of public administration
provision of goods and services (good governance or supply side governance). The other
built on the ideas of democracy and individual freedom (democratic governance or
demand side governance). It is not that the one excludes the concepts embedded in the
other. Rather, they create a very different focus on the norms and ideas that go along with
governance. Both these trends and concepts build on the tradition of democratic and
economic liberalism that developed in the West, and both are utilized by development
agencies and practitioners at different times for different purposes.

11

In a working paper produced for the World Bank Phillip Keefer argues that while there is no unifying
concept on governance among international development organizations and academics, at the core of all
definitions is some aspect of securing "property rights, voice and accountability, or the performance of
bureaucracy"(1). I agree with this to the extent that securing property rights are an element of equal access
to goods and services (which does not mean having property or securing property rights to every society
and the governance concept is sufficiently vague to deal with this ambiguity). The performance of
bureaucracy is the process versus outcome issue and as we have seen definitions differ widely on whether
or not they include process or outcome. Finally what this author terms voice and accountability is the idea
of stakeholder participation which is an essential element of all the definitions of governance listed above
(Keefer 2004).
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Two Historical Trends: Human Rights and Public Administration
This section summarizes how the two governance trends of democratic
governance and good governance developed historically that now guide the governance
debate. It shows that democratic governance developed out of the historical trend to
support human rights and the human rights regime, as well as in the creation of the
human development paradigm. The good governance trend, on the other hand, traces
back to support for public administration in development aid and funding with the notion
that governments can be efficient and effective in public service delivery and growth no
matter what their political bent, as long as they follow certain bureaucratic rules of
organization.
International development organizations have long focused solely on public
administration as a way of enhancing government capacity to deliver goods and services
to citizens, function in the international global economy (through trade especially), and
engage with other states through efficient public sector (bureaucratic) institutions
(Williams 2009; Leftwich 1993; Keefer 2004). In the 1980s public administration theory
and practice started to include considerations of the content and substantive aspects of
government institutions with what became termed new public administration and new
institutionalism (North 1990).
The trend to support the capacity of public administration and ignore the content
and quality of government changed in the 1980s near the end of the impacts of structural
adjustment. The International Financial Institutions (the World Bank and IMF)
acknowledged that changes were needed in order to make amends for social costs that
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were felt in the developing world because of unnecessarily strict neoliberal policies
impressed on states through conditionalities for receiving loans. Furthermore,
international development organizations were tasked from the beginning with apolitical
mandates that kept them from influencing or impacting governments beyond capacity
building (Moore 1966; Nanda 2006; Williams 2009). Thus the governance concept was
useful as a tool for development organizations to begin focusing on government content
and quality without being considered political.
The failed nature of development projects themselves also proved an impetus for
a shift toward a focus on governance in the development community. Practices and
lessons learned from past attempts to reduce poverty and increase growth emerge as an
important reason for focusing on the governance of a country. One respondent from
UNDP argued that UNDP has focused on governance because of difficulty with
succeeding in development in the past associated with problems related to the way that
the government implements or works to implement projects. From failed projects of the
past, development practitioners realized that there was a need to focus on governance or
else there would never be success in development.

Democratic Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights
The first trend in governance is to focus on the ability of the individual to
participate equally in government through decision-making procedures, voting, and
running for office. This built out of the democratization experience and literature of the
latter 20th century, and out of the human rights regime connected with the United
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Nations. First, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, the political structure of
democracy continued to expand to more countries of the world in the 20th century
(Cheema 2005, 3), especially at the end of the Cold War in which many of the former
Soviet Union countries identified as democracies (Kenney 2010). Indeed, some
democracy theorists called this a triumph of democracy and the ultimate end of history in
the sense that humans have perfected the best form of polity. Francis Fukuyama, well
known for making this argument, commented on the rise of democracy and its connection
with human rights by saying that democracy “is the right held universally by all citizens
to have a share of political power, that is, the right of all citizens to vote and participate in
politics,” thus making a connection between liberalism and democracy (Fukuyama 1992,
43).
Democracy theorists are most concerned with the ability of individuals to engage
and participate in government equally. David Held argues that the most important
element of contemporary democracy is that “decisions affecting a community are taken
not by its members as a whole, but by a sub-group of ‘representatives’ who have been
elected by ‘the people’ to govern within the framework of the rule of law (1995, 51),” a
position often labeled representative democracy. While democracy and democratic rule
vary from the constraints of liberal democracy, most theorists note that liberal democracy
has become the “dominant form of the modern state” (Held 1995, 51) and it includes the
following principles:
(a) the constitutional entrenchment of control over governmental policy in elected
officials; (b) the removal of elected officials in frequent, fair and free elections;
(c) the right to vote for all adults in such elections (unless legitimately disbarred
due to severe mental illness or criminal conviction); and (d) the right to run for
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public office. In addition, there must be (e) an effective right for each citizen to
freedom of expression, including the freedom to criticize the conduct of
government and the socio-economic system in which it is embedded; (f)
accessible sources of information other than those controlled by government or by
any other single body or group; and, finally, (g) an established right to form and
join independent associations, whether they be political, social or cultural, that
could shape public life through legitimate, peaceful means (Held 1995, 51).
One of the most influential theorists on democracy, Robert Dahl, argues that
“democracy provides opportunities for effective participation, equality in voting, gaining
enlightened understanding, exercising final control over the agenda, and inclusion of
adults” (Dahl 1998, 38). Francis Fukuyama simply defines democracy saying that “a
country is democratic if it grants its people the right to choose their own government
through periodic, secret-ballot, multi-party elections, on the basis of universal and equal
adult suffrage” (Fukuyama 1992, 43). The democratization literature is vast,
incorporating much controversy over what democracy means and how it is implemented
in various ways throughout the world (Diamond 2009), yet it centers around the ideas
developed in the Western world on liberalism, that the individual should have the right to
participate equally in government—this historical trend and literature has influenced the
way that development organizations think about and articulate the proper mode of
governance for developing countries.
Second, the United Nations influence in human rights created a sense that
participation in government is a right of all human beings and should be respected
through democratic representation. The United Nation’s concern with norms or ideas 12 of

12

The terms norm and idea are frequently used interchangeably by authors to mean the same thing, yet they
are distinctly different. Here note that I take norms to be standards of behavior that actors follow and
through which they analyze and interpret each other’s behavior. Ideas are thoughts, concepts, or notions
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international relations abounds. Indeed, writers stress the influence of UN ideas in the
international system. 13 Two projects of note studied and traced the impact of ideas, both
within the United Nations, and from the United Nations: the United Nations Intellectual
History Project (UNIHP), and the Creation, Adoption, Negation and Distortion of Ideas
in Development project (CANDID). 14 Using a constructivist perspective, these authors
found that ideas (or norms) were influential and important in international relations and
that actors like the United Nations could function autonomously and have an influential
impact on world politics. The United Nations has influence over development ideas,
human rights norms, and norms of security, cooperation, and nation-state behavior (Boas
and McNeill 2004; McNeill 2006; Schrijver 2010; Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss 2001; Jolly
et al. 2004; Stokke 2009). Human rights norms are influential in the development of
governance ideas, including normative ideas. Human rights norms have been especially
important to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) because of the close
relation with the formation of the United Nations, with the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), and thereby, with the human rights regime.
The norms associated with democratic governance are founded in the human
rights treaties and documents that representatives to the United Nations created first in
about things in the world or about how the world works. Obviously norms and ideas overlap, but
conceptual clarity is important.
13

Virtually every book written for the Intellectual History Project on the UN stresses that the UN has been
influential in promoting the ‘ideas’ that pervade the international system. See for example: (Jolly, Emmerij,
and Weiss 2009) Also (Emmerij, Jolly, and Weiss 2001; Jolly et al. 2004) and (Stokke 2009).
14

The UNIHP project published a series of volumes, four of which address the change in the concept of
development at the UN, and eight of which include the UNDP in the specific study (Reinalda 2011). The
most influential publication from the CANDID project was a book that traced the progression and diffusion
of ideas in the UN, one of them being governance (Boas and McNeill 2004).
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1948 and subsequently in further documents (Fox 2003, 181-82; Pollis and Schwab
1979). Of special note are the three documents of the Universal Bill of Human Rights
which are accepted by all states, and which garner the most attention in human rights
practice because of their authoritative status. 15 These documents attest to a right of a
citizen to participate in his/her government, and to be involved in the decision making
process of one’s state. 16 The ideas elucidated in the International Bill of Human Rights
were a precursor of the focus on participation that emerged as the first important concept
in democratic governance in the 1990s, closely associated with electoral assistance and
voting rights.
The UNDP’s documents underline how certain human rights bolster and provide a
foundation for the concept of democratic governance. In 2011 the UNDP said about itself
that “in its efforts to advance human development, UNDP supports Member States and
partners in grounding their national development plans, policies and processes in the
human rights principles of participation, inclusion, equality and non-discrimination”
(United Nations Development Programme 2011b). Indeed, the focus on human
development to which I return below is a prime example of the connection between
human rights and democratic governance. Human development puts at the forefront the
idea of the freedom of the individual, which is of high priority for human rights norms.

15

Here I refer to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1966) which every state in the world has supported through either signature, ratification, accession, or
succession. (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 1996).
16

See UDHR, Article 21; CESCR, Article 1, and CCPR, Article 1.
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Norms offer a particular social purpose to the community that accepts them.
Human rights, accepted by the international community, provide the social purpose of
protecting the citizen from the state, or encouraging respect of citizens by states, and of
legitimating a state in the international community. Human rights were created in order
for the international community to regulate that relationship between the state and the
individual, arising from the harsh realities of powerful states against citizens occurring in
World War II (Lauren 2003, 2nd Edition; Donnelly 2007). Human rights have become
more than just statements of right and wrong and attempts at regulating state behavior
toward citizens; human rights serve as legitimation of a state’s right to exist, or its
“political legitimacy” (Donnelly 2003, 2nd Edition, 12). States claim legitimacy and
authority based on their track record for signing human rights treaties, reports to human
rights committees, and membership in organizations that support human rights such as
the United Nations or regional organizations.
The development discourse shift within the UNDP toward sustainable human
development is a clear forerunner of democratic governance concept (Emmerij, Jolly, and
Weiss 2001; Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate 2010; Dadzie 1995). 17 The UNDP experienced a
crisis of identity as an agency of the UN in the 1980s and 1990s, but leadership worked to
overcome this crisis by redefining the work of the UNDP and pushing it in a new
direction, a move that paved the way for the democratic governance practices that
17

The four stages, as outlined in Weiss, Forsythe and Coate from Kenneth Dadzie, are: National state
capitalism (1945-1962), International Affirmative Action (1962-1981), Return to Neo-Liberalism (19811989), and Sustainable Human Development (1989-present). My analysis will be concerned only with the
latter two stages of development and how these incorporated “good” or “democratic” governance norms.
Furthermore, my analysis suggests a subsequent stage rather than ending at Sustainable Human
Development.
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developed at the end of the 1990s. First, the UNDP stopped funding other agencies of the
UN and started funding its own work in technical assistance. This was a propitious
moment for the UNDP as it started to take on the being of an independent organization
and leader of the UN system as a whole on development, rather than a fund. This
occurred under the leadership of William H. Draper III along with a shift in the focus on
the development agency, from the focus on poverty as an economic issue to incorporating
the human rights and democracy focus on the UN in ‘human development’. The shifting
nature of the organization to try to promote its own development ideology as well as its
own policies and practices on the ground rather than supporting other agencies is most
evident in the Human Development Reports that began annual publication in 1990.
The concept of human development was created by Mahbub ul Haq who later
described the period of the shifting notions of development to incorporate the idea of
freedom of the individual and concerns above and beyond economic status (Haq 1995).
Haq is considered the founder of the Human Development Reports, having been charged
with the task of creating such a report by William H Draper III in the latter 1980s. Draper
came to the UNDP with his own ideas and principles of development, i.e., “promoting the
private sector, women, non-governmental organizations of 'civil society', and the
environment” and a belief that the organization needed “something to believe in”
(Murphy 2006, 240; 239). Draper had heard about Haq and sought someone to help back
up his ideas in the UNDP (Murphy 2006). Haq worked with a team of development
experts on the project that would redefine the development practice. 18 The human
18

The team included Amartya Sen, Paul Streeten, Frances Stewart, Gus Ranis, and Meghnad Desai
(Murphy 2006, 247; Kaul 2003, 85).
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development paradigm redefined the UNDP’s role in development and its impact in states
around the world, re-articulating the very concept of development in a way that
considered human freedom as crucial to development. Prior to the concept of human
development, the focus in development studies centered on economic prospects, gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita, and the structure of economic relations within and
between states. The economic development focus came from a focus on comparative
economics that emerged in development studies in the mid-20th century with wellintentioned and concerned people such as Hans Singer, Walter Rostow, and especially
John Maynard Keynes who is said to have created the idea of macroeconomics.
A stanch economist, Mahbub ul Haq came to argue that human agency and
freedom, that is, what one could do and be in life, was of crucial importance to
development work and that thinking about development must move beyond the statistics
and income calculations so important to development economists in the early years; this
in contrast to his early focus on economic indicators (Weiss et al. 2005, 98). Amartya
Sen, one of Haq’s colleagues on the human development reports, later wrote a famous
work that argues for the primacy of thinking of development as the freedom to do and be
what one wishes in life (Sen 1999), which was not only influential in creating the human
development concept and Human Development Reports (HDRs) that the UNDP began
publishing, but also in changing the nature of the international debate on development
thinking (Fukuda-Parr 2011). Perhaps the most influential aspect of the human
development idea was the attempt to quantify it in the Human Development Index (HDI).
Human development remains as an integral aspect of policy and project formation in the
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UNDP, guiding decisions. 19 The Strategic Plan 2008-2011 clarifies the focus on human
development by saying that “This means that all UNDP policy advice, technical support,
advocacy, and contributions to strengthening coherence in global development must be
aimed at one end result: real improvements in people’s lives and in the choices and
opportunities open to them” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c, 6)
Human development was to set the stage for the development of the democratic
governance framework later in the 1990s because of the way that it focused on the
individual’s capabilities within a domestic structure rather than on the economic structure
itself. Refocusing required a reordering of conceptual orientations on the kind of structure
that should be in place and how it should affect the individual life, not lives on aggregate.
The foundation for democratic governance is revealed in the first Human Development
Report (United Nations Development Programme 1990). The report continually claims
that “human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. The most critical
ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of
living” (United Nations Development Programme 1990, 10). More to the point, political
freedom is supported predominantly in this document as exemplified in the overview
statement: “additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights, and
personal self-respect” (1). An influential and controversial HDR in proclaiming these
kinds of political structural aspects of human development is the HDR 2002 which

19

Article 17 of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 affirms the Executive Board’s decision to focus on
human development: “Emphasizes that UNDP should take a human development-based approach to
programming” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c).
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considered how democracy was important to increasing the freedoms entailed in human
development (United Nations Development Programme 2002).
This section argued that the democratic governance paradigm that focuses on
individual freedoms, especially as related to decision-making in government, running for
office, and equal access to government, was founded in the human rights regime and in
the democratization literature and experience of the latter 20th century. The UNDP played
a large role in the creation of the democratic governance paradigm through the human
development paradigm and reports.

Good Governance and Public Administration
International development organizations focused on supporting public
administration efficiency and capacity building through projects that provided technical
assistance throughout the developing world in the 1960s-1980s. The reigning
development practice consensus was that technical assistance was most important and
most needed by developing countries. Indeed, technical capacity and knowledge was the
major aspect of running a country that was missing from the developing world.
Development organizations focused on technical training, capacity building, and transfer
of technical knowledge and skills. This was especially true for countries in the 1960s and
1975 that emerged from colonial rule with the need to learn how a state functions and
what kinds of rules, roles, and laws characterized modern states. In the early years of
development, public administration meant supporting states in their administrative and
bureaucratic capacity to function as states that needed to provide goods and services to
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their populations. In the aftermath of World War II, the developed states were concerned
with the ability and capacity of losing states to govern well, thus the heavy focus on
technical assistance (Farazmand 1996).
In the 1950s the World Bank, and the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance
or EPTA (the predecessor of the UNDP), funded projects in which consultants travelled
to developing countries to train people on how to be functionaries, administrators,
parliamentarians, statesmen, politicians, clerks, economists, administrators, and
secretaries (Sady 1973). They trained people on how to run a state (training on holding
elections came later), and on the kinds of public services the state was supposed to
provide to its citizens. They trained people on how to structure their economies with a
vision of becoming competitive in the international market. From the 1960s onwards the
UNDP was in charge of funding technical assistance projects in other agencies of the UN
in order to fulfill their role of helping states develop the capacity to rule, all discussed
under the rubric of public administration (Emmerich 1971).
Funding and implementation practices often pointed to the importance of public
administration reform in development assistance. For instance, writing on the UN
Programme in Public Administration, two authors and former employees of the UN note
that the shift from 1970s to 1980s in public administration was a shift toward a marketbased approach that highlighted the minimalist efficiency of the state in allowing the
market to function (as associated with the Washington Consensus of other UN agencies)
(Bertucci and Alberti 2005). Shifting back toward a focus on the state itself rather than
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the market, the 1990s polices were less market-driven and refocused attention on the
goods and services that the state provides rather than how those are provided.
The focus on public administration shifted to that of a focus on governance and
intuitionalism, less obsessed with functional interpretations of the state, and more
concerned with normative aspects of process and outcome. A trend to enhance the
analysis of delivery of goods and services to a population beyond the state was first
evident in European public administration literature (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004;
Peters and Pierre 1998). In the Americas the New Public Management and new
institutionalism analysis heightened awareness of the extent of governance mechanisms
that existed beyond the state (North 1990; Andrews 2008). These trends in public
administration analysis followed closely with the changes evident in globalization and
international relations historic moments such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
apparent spread of democracy to newly formed post-Soviet states, the extension of multiparty politics and elections throughout Africa and Latin America in the 1990s, and the
effects of a new era of globalization represented in expansion of trade and
interdependence among states.
The World Bank followed the trend to focus heavily on public administration
support in its funding policies and projects, and continues to this day to define
governance in relation to public administration. The trend partially explains why the
World Bank heavily focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of public administration
delivery over the type of polity that is delivering those services. It partially explains the
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focus on anti-corruption and transparency measures that are the highlight of the Bank’s
good governance policy and projects.
This section argues that good governance as a second paradigm can be separated
out from the focus on democratic governance. Good governance developed from a focus
on public administration efficiency and effectiveness, the technical assistance and
knowledge that characterized the first decades of development practice in the mid-20th
century. The public administration concept remains focused on the aspects of how the
state’s government provides goods and services to a population, how a government is set
up bureaucratically, and how a government engages successfully both with its citizens
and with other governments or civil society groups. Thus, the focus is on the supply side
of government which has always been a conscious element of development assistance.
What has changed in the 1990s is a concern that government institutions are set up
appropriately to engage with citizens in a legitimate, efficient, and effective manner.
Since the 1990s this has also meant a radical focus on anti-corruption efforts, a trend first
championed by the World Bank under the leadership of James Wolfensohn.

Two Governance Types: Good Governance and Democratic Governance
The above argues that the governance concept developed out of a long tradition of
liberal democracy in the Western countries, but that this tradition was melded in
particular ways in the development literature and practice in the 20th century to eventually
create two trends in governance promotion, one that upheld democratic principles of
citizen participation in government and representation built out of the human rights
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regime (demand side governance or democratic governance), and one that promoted
efficiency and effectiveness in public service delivery to citizens built out of concern in
the early years of development for public administration efficiency (supply side
governance or good governance).
Building on the literature and practice of development thinking concerning
governance, the following tables identifies the definitions, concepts, and keywords most
often associated with the two trends. These tables are used in the content analysis of
primary documents as shown in the next chapter.
Table 2.1: Good Governance Definition and Keywords
Definition

Key Authors
that discuss
Good
Governance

Key Concepts
Keywords

Good Governance (supply side; outcome oriented) – employing mechanisms of
control over citizens in such a way that provision of public goods and services is
provided to all in an efficient and effective manner while encouraging some
participation in decision-making
Ager (2000), Andrews (2008), Aruzpe (2005, Atkinson and Coleman (1992), Coston
(1998), Bevir and Hall (2011), Brinkerhoff (2005), Cheema (2003), Doornboss
(2001; 2003), Grindle (2004; 2007), Hewitt de Alcántara (1998), Hydén (1992;
2007), Hydén, Court, and Mease (2004), Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009,
2010), Kaufmann and Kraay (2008), Minogue (1997), Nanda (2006),Rodrick (2008),
Santiso (2001), Stoker (1998), Tetzlaf, R (1995), Thomas (2007), van Doeveren
(2011), Weiss (2000), Willliams (2009).
accountability, anti-corruption, anti-nepotism, arms-length business practice,
budgeting, business-friendly, citizen voice to law-makers, civil society inclusion,
competition within civil service, contested elections, decentralization, development,
development growth, disciplined government, documentation, due process rights,
economic growth, effective government, fairness, financial management, fiscal
discipline, fiscal stability, formal checks and balances, formality, formalized rules,
fragility, high health standards and statistics, infrastructure development, law-makers
responsive and accountable, legal checks, limited government, low infant mortality,
management, meritocratic, outcome-oriented, participatory, patronage, physical
structure, poverty reduction, predictability, private sector, pro-business, professional
ethos, protect private property, public events, reform, responsive, revenue dependent,
rule of law, security, service delivery, service provision, stable policies, tax-based
system, technocrats, transparent, voice.
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Table 2.2: Democratic Governance Definition and Keywords
Definition

Key Authors that
discuss
Democratic
Governance

Key Concepts
Keywords

Democratic Governance (demand side; process oriented) – employing mechanisms of
control over citizens in such a way that citizens are able and willing to participate in
decisions that affect the way that goods and services are distributed to citizens, as
well as participate in employing those mechanisms of control
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006; 2012), Barro (1999), Braithwaite and Levi, eds
(1998), Call and Cook (2003), Cooper and Legler (2007), Cheema (2005), Collier and
Levitsky (2007), Crook (2001), Dahl (1998), Diamond (1994), Donnelly (1999),
Feinberg (2008), Feng (2003), Fox and Roth, Eds (2000), Franck (1992), Held (1987;
1995), Held and Politt, Eds (1996), Huntington (1991; 1998), Lake and Baum (2001),
Lipset (1959), Maddick (1963), McMahone and Baker (2006), Neuman and Rich
(2004), Pevehouse (2002; 2004), Przeworski (1991; 2004), Przeworski, Alvarez,
Cheibub and Limongi (2000), Robinson (1998)
accountability, civil society autonomy from state, civil society strong, civil society
holds government accountable, constitution that guarantees civil rights, control of
agenda, dissemination of information by civil society, effective participation,
elections, electoral, electoral cycle, equality, equality in voting, fair elections,
fairness, free elections, freedom, guarantees rights, judicial reform, justice, human
development, human dignity, human condition, human rights, human poverty,
overcoming human deprivation, inclusion of adults, individual, integrity, legitimacy,
literacy, opportunity for participation, peace, pluralism, political equality, political
participation, poverty reduction, processes (parliamentary, judicial, electoral),
prosperity, protection of rights, quality of life, right to political participation, rule of
law, self determination, social trust, social accountability, transparency, trust,
understanding, vote, voting.

Taking from this list and separating out according to the distinction between
demand and supply side governance, the following list of key words emerges. A cursory
review of the concepts and terms associated with each type of governance shows that
many of the terms overlap but that there are some pertinent differences. In order to
analyze the documents, speeches, and writings of the organizations to see which types of
governance are being promoted, this study makes as clear as possible a conceptual
differentiation between “good” and “democratic” governance, also identifying the
mechanisms of control and actors that are focused on in the governance ideology. The
study therefore chooses the keywords and concepts that are considered most often in the
articulation of the idea of governance as identified in the literature as shown in the
following table. The keywords were chosen based on the differences in the way that the
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governance concept was articulated in the majority of the literature. Further, the concepts
fall under the categories identified as crucial elements in the history of the liberal theory
and governance debate: the importance of the individual’s freedoms, the engagement of
government with the market and civil society, and market freedom including business
relationships with government and protection of private property. The next chapter
utilizes these keywords in quantitative content analysis to analyze which key words are
most often used by each organization and under what circumstances.
Table 2.3 Governance Keywords
Democratic Governance
Civil Society
Constitution
Democracy
Elections/Electoral
Equality
Engagement
Freedom
Human Development
Human Poverty
Human Right/s
Information
Opportunity
Participation
Rights
Vote/Voting

Good Governance
Accountable/Accountability
Anti-Corruption/ Corruption
Business
Economic Growth
Economic Development
Efficient/Efficiency
Effective/Effectiveness
Financial Management
Fiscal (as in Discipline or Austerity)
Government
Responsive/Responsiveness
Rule of Law
Services
Transparent/Transparency
Voice

ACTORS, MECHANISMS AND MODES OF GOVERNANCE
Building off of the analysis of the definition of the governance concept above, the
following considers the different types of authorities (institutions), and different
mechanisms of control utilized in governance (ranging from forceful coercion to
persuasion), noting that the governance concept incorporates different principles or
norms depending on culture and historical circumstances (Borzel 2010; Risse 2012).
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Attempts at conceptual clarity in regime types and procedures of government outlined in
the democratization literature (Dahl 1998), suffer from lack of clarity on the definition
and application of democracy (Collier and Levitsky 1997). Collier and Levitsky argue
that the concept either does not achieve enough differentiation between democracies or
regime types, or suffers from such ‘conceptual stretching’ that it applies to all regime
types that become indistinguishable. The authors suggest conceptual clarification
strategies including Sartori’s ladder of generality, diminished subtypes, précising the
definition, and shifting the overarching concept. In order to achieve differentiation and
avoid conceptual stretching on the governance concept the following analysis uses the
strategy of creating ideal types and précising the definition, starting with an analysis of
functional differentiation in governance literature in order to identify categories of actors
and mechanisms of control that are included in the governance process.
Globalization further meant impacting the government’s mechanisms of
controlling or steering society so that an expansion of the concept of governance beyond
the institutions of the government/state was necessary in order to address new modes of
control, new mechanisms of service delivery, and new incapacities of the government
institutions which traditionally had the monopoly of the use of force, control of society,
and provision of public goods to society (Rhodes 1996; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992;
Hewitt de Alcántara 1998; Peters and Pierre 1998; Stoker 1998). “The need to improve
governance and public administration and to enhance the state's capacity to carry out new
functions and roles is now widely recognized” (Rondinelli and Cheema 2003, 8). Such a
discourse has led to various routes in conceptualizing what governance means for an era
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of increased globalization and considering how institutions of governance should be built
on the international level to help states address externalities that they all face as well as
control societal issues that cannot be addressed by the state itself (Keohane 2000;
Rosenau 1995).
At its very core, governance refers to control of society and thus the foci concerns
how a society makes decisions and creates rules, laws and norms that provide stability to
its existence. Beyond controlling how large groups of people interact with each other,
governance is also focused on the provision of goods and services to those people, thus
including decision-making, rules and norms on how groups of people will share public
goods is an essential element of the analysis. A focus on mechanisms of governance
therefore means a concern with how authoritative figures control society and how society
obtains access to public goods and services provided by authoritative figures. Yet, a mere
focus on functional and control elements of governance precludes the important aspects
of normative foundations and theories of governance such as the type of governance
regime (authoritarian, democratic, fascist, totalitarian) or the principles that guide
governance processes and outcomes (efficiency, effectiveness, inclusiveness).
Typologies of governance help identify the various elements of governance, the
most crucial of which are: the authorities (institutions), mechanisms or modes of
governance, the processes of governance, and the outcomes of governance. There are
several reasons why a typology based on functional interpretation of governance proves
illuminating. Focusing on the institutions of governance, sociological systems theory
analyzed control of society, often termed “steering” society, providing a functional,
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autopoietic (self-governance), representation of governance from the purview of
government institutions (Esmark 2011). 20 Functional representations of governance in
governments help identify the process of decision-making and provision of goods, and
the outcome of distributing those goods to society.
Sociological literature on governance influenced much of the governance
conceptualization and tendency for governance scholars to focus on modern societies as
characterized by increasing functional differentiation creating separate and distinct
societal sectors that dealt with specific issues. Under a functionalist interpretation the
different institutions of society deal with different issues and public problems. First, the
state (or government) dealt with politics and was tasked with the delivery of public goods
to society and making sure that society followed rules and regulations (i.e., enforced
societal strictures) to ensure survival. Second, the market works with public sector to
deliver public goods, but goes beyond in a capitalist society with a motivation to compete
(using rational negotiation) with other actors to deliver goods and services to society.
Finally, civil society represents the horizontal, networked groups that create norms to
make up for any lack in provision of goods and services by state or market, and also to
hold governments accountable to citizens (Esmark 2011, 96). 21

20

Rosenau prefers the term steering or control over “command mechanisms” precisely because of the
changing nature of governance to incorporate “bottom-up” approaches from civil society to dealing with
societal problems and delivering public goods (Rosenau 1995).
21

The governance literature that uses this typology of state, market, and civil society to explain and study
modern societies is vast. Esmark offers a good overview of the literature (96). See (Dahl and Lindblom
1953; Williamson 2005; Lindblom 1977; Streeck and P.C. 1985; Ouchi 1980).Robert A. Dahl and C.E.
Lindblom, Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953); Oliver E.
Williamson, "The Economics of Governance," The American Economic Review 95, no. 2 (2005); C.E.
Lindblom, Politics and Markets (New York: Basic Books, 1977); W. Streeck and Schmitter P.C., eds.,
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Further, functional differentiation provides a way to look at the practice of
governance without focusing solely on the institution type or actor that is attempting
control of society (Draude 2007). Function is deeply tied with the concept of outcome,
i.e., that the interesting governance element is what the government or authoritative actor
does for a society (the kinds of goods and services it provides) and the outcome of that
provision. Concerns over efficiency and effectiveness are closely tied to concerns with
outcome in that an inefficient public service delivery mechanism will have poor
outcomes. One author provides a two-by-two continuum of process to results and steering
to rules that offers an interesting way of combining the ideas of process and outcome
together into a framing mechanism (Hydén, Court, and Mease 2004).
Functional differentiation also concerns the methods used in order to carry out
those functions (coercion, competition, and cooperation) which are often conflated with
the three distinct social institutions (government, market, civil society). 22 Börzel’s
typology connects multiple “modes of control” of society with the institutions falling
under three categories that nicely align with the sociological literature: “governance by
government,” “governance without government” and “governance with government”
(Börzel 2010, 9). On a dichotomous scale, governance mechanisms can be either vertical

Private Interest Government: Beyond Market and State (London: Sage,1985); William G. Ouchi, "Markets,
Bureaucracies, and Clans," Administrative Science Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1980).
22

Multiple authors have noted other ways of distinguishing between mechanisms of control including
Gerry Stoker’s "principal-agent relations, inter-organizational negotiation, and systemic coordination"
(1998, 22). Kooiman discusses social interactions as interferences, interplays, and interventions (2003). I
use coercion, competition, and cooperation because it is the simplest and works well in dividing
governance actors (institutions) into a typology along with the mechanisms of control they are most often
associated with (though do not only or even primarily given the circumstances and historical trends that can
be identified in empirical analysis).
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or horizontal. Vertical control indicates hierarchical relationships between those who
have authority, means of control, and (usually) coercive enforcement of rules, or
“governance by government.” Horizontal control is characterized by cooperative
decision-making and creation of rules, roles, and control mechanisms between equals in
society. The latter refers to networked governance or “governance with government,”
multi-level governance, and civil society or “governance without government,” and to
modes of control that range from competition and rational negotiation to collaboration
and relational networks built on trust and norms. Table 2.4 breaks down the functional
differentiation typology by governance type, actors involved, mechanisms of control
typically used by those actors, and the processes of governance (or decision-making
procedures).
Table 2.4: Governance Typologies
Type of
Governance

Authority (Institution)
Governing

Vertical,
Hierarchical.

Government Institution: the
State (executive, legislature,
judiciary) and local
municipal government
authorities
Sometimes includes publicprivate partnerships

In-between
horizontal and
vertical

Market Institution:
corporations, companies,
non-regulated entities,
individual entrepreneurs
Sometimes includes publicprivate partnerships

Mechanisms of Control and
Process of Governance
(Decision-Making
Procedures
Mechanisms of Control:
Coercion: top-down
institution, roles, rules,
regulations
Decision Making:
Top-Down
Legislation
Representative Decisionmaking
Mechanisms of Control:
Competition: rational costbenefit analysis, efficiency,
reputation accountability
(especially competitive
reputation)

Keywords identifying
which type of
governance is being
discussed
Government/ State
Institution
Parliament
Legislators
Control
Coercion
Rule of law
Regulation

Market/ Free market
Business
Company
Corporation
Competition
Accountability
Private

Decision Making:
Organic
Horizontal,

Civil Society Institutions:

Mechanisms of Control:
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Civil society

nonhierarchical

domestic informal groups,
non-governmental
organizations, transnational
civil society organizations,
epistemic communities
State-society relations
important here – extent to
which civil society can hold
government institutions
accountable

Collaboration: negotiation,
relationship, solidarity,
networks, reputation
accountability
Decision Making:
Bottom-Up
Debate
Norms
Socialization

Individual
Community
Society
Non-governmental
Epistemic community
Network
Collaboration

The first type of governance focuses on the institutions of government which
Börzel argues can provide a “shadow of hierarchy” (Börzel 2010, 11) as the dominant
rule structure of a society, guiding the way that actors interact and eventually the way
they govern. The contemporary government structure takes on a particular form including
bodies of executive, legislature, and judiciary. Furthermore, according to international
norms and principles identifying modern governments, it is characterized by four crucial
elements: a bureaucracy, a population, borders (and control over borders) and the
monopoly on the use of force. 23 Forms of government range from authoritarian to
democratic and include a vast array of different institutional structures including
Presidential and Parliamentary Systems (Dahl 1998).
Of primary importance in this typology is the dominating way that governments
control and provide goods and services: by hierarchical, top-down, coercive means.
Development and state-building literature focuses on the institutions of government
(especially as a modern state conceptualization), and on how to increase the capacity and
23

This categorization of the characteristics of the modern state goes as far back to Weber but is also evident
in treaties such as the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States signed on December 26,
1933 at the International Conference of American States by (in order on the manuscript) Honduras, United
States, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, Mexico,
Panama, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Columbia, Chile, Peru and Cuba. It outlines the
definition of a state according to modern international assumptions.
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strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those institutions. Yet, governance does not
only occur through the state and its bureaucratic and coercive institutions. Indeed, while
Max Weber was the first to suggest that modern state has the control over the legitimate
use of force, this does not mean that the modern state is the only institution or entity that
uses such force or has ever controlled the legitimate use of force.
Under the second conceptualization of governance, the market and market
mechanisms control society and provide goods and services to society through modes of
competition, rational negotiation, and largely based on reputation with consumers in a
capitalist system. Such control can occur both with or without government: “gradually,
the international community has come to recognize that economics and politics are
inexorably intertwined, and that the institutions of government have an impact on market
performance” (Feinberg 2008, 160). The market almost never works alone, i.e., there is
always the connection with government institutions however strong or weak. In an era of
globalization government institutions have had to conform and change to new demands
of the integrated and interdependent nature of the international system and work with the
private sector in order to provide goods and services traditionally considered the purview
of the state (Rondinelli and Cheema 2003).
Public-private partnerships are essential here as a mode of governance with the
idea that the state provides the environment in which the market can function well, also
termed the “shadow of hierarchy” (Börzel 2010; Risse 2011). A trend to focus on market
modes of control and the possibility of public-private sector coordination started in
Europe and has slowly made its way to the United States (Peters and Pierre 1998). A
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good example of public-private collaboration is the delivery of health care to the
population in the United States; obviously a public good that has been given out to
private service providers and which is still, at least partially, regulated by government.
These actors can also work outside of the state and act in self-regulating ways. Rosenau
identifies institutionalized self-regulating mechanisms of control over society that appear
in both formal and informal non-state actors such as transnational credit rating system or
transnational criminal organizations (Rosenau 1995, 32)
Third, governments also work with non-state actors in order to fulfill the
functions that it is meant to provide under whatever normative understanding of
governance exists at any given time and place (Aucoin 2012; Braithwaite and Levi 1998).
Some authors conceptualize this as the give-and-take between supply-side governance
and demand-side governance with government on the former and civil society on the
latter side (Coston 1998). Civil society is represented by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), civil society groups, networks of civil society and other private actors, or
warlords and tribal leaders (the latter under the clan categorization of governance) (Ouchi
1980). In Coston’s conceptualization of demand-side, or civil society governance, the
state is still the unit of analysis, however, this is not the case for all literature focusing on
the horizontal mechanisms and modes of governance – in some ways civil society can
provide governance even where states or governments do not exist.
Civil society mechanisms of control include collaboration and constant interaction
in the decision making procedures (Freeman 1997). While Kooiman focuses on
boundaries between the political and social including creating a typology that is similar to
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the state/market/civil society typology, his interaction approach fits well here in that he
highlights the social interactions of individuals in groups and the interactions of
individuals with structure (Kooiman 2003). Civil society actors, for different reasons and
motives and in different ways, often provide the kind of governance over which states are
currently thought as having the monopoly, or they demand better governance from the
government structures (demand-side of governance).

DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE VERSUS GOOD GOVERNANCE
This chapter argued that the governance concept developed out of a Western experience
that emphasized trends in liberal democracy such as individual participation in
government, equality in representation and in access to goods and services provided by
authority figures, and the idea that authority figures must be efficient in delivery of public
services while limited in intervention in the economy. It further argued that while the
definition of democracy and governance are both tenuous and ambiguous in academic
and practitioner research, it is possible to see two trends developed in the 20th century in
development practice as related to governance promotion. Democratic governance, the
first trend, is associated with the human rights regime and democratization literature. It
emphasizes the ability of citizens to interact with government in both having their voice
heard in decision making procedures and in actually running for positions in government
and being actively involved in implementing the mechanisms of government over the
citizen population. The first trend emphasizes demand side governance. The second
trend, good governance, promoted the ideas of public administration efficiency and
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effectiveness in delivering goods and services to a population, and while voice and
participation play a small part in this trend, it is heavily focused on supply side
governance. These two trends continue to influence the way that development
organizations promote governance and implement governance ideology into their
projects, programs, and policies.
This chapter developed an analytical foundation for which to analyze the primary
texts and interviews carried out for this study. In the next chapter, primary texts are
analyzed using content and keyword analysis to determine at which points in time the two
organizations under study (the UNDP and the World Bank) either promote democratic or
good governance, and to determine which mechanisms of control, authorities and
processes of governance are supported by these two organizations.
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III: ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN THE UNDP AND THE WORLD BANK
While the UNDP and the World Bank are both development organizations
seeking to achieve similar development goals, especially poverty reduction, they pursue
those goals in different ways as relates to governance promotion. The UNDP supports
democratic governance and liberal democracy based on the human rights regime that
developed since the 1940s. The World Bank focuses on public administration
accountability and transparency, built out of the focus on supporting public
administrations in development starting with decolonization era. Even though the UNDP
and World Bank’s ideologies have grown similar in recent decades (Joshi and O'Dell
2013; Thérien 2007), they still differ on reaching development outcomes and on
governance promotion.
This chapter considers how the structure of the organizations may give more
power to a leader, providing the context in which the leader is able to push for policy
changes. I argue that the UNDP’s leadership has more leeway and more flexibility to
pursue shifts in policy than does the World Bank. This is because of the structural
constraints of the guiding operational policies of the World Bank (day-to-day functions)
and the greater decentralized nature of the UNDP (giving power into the hands of more
people on making project decisions). These two elements of organizational culture
partially explains the UNDP’s ability to stray from its apolitical mandate in focusing so
highly on democratic governance, but it also explains the conditions under which a leader
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of an organization can make changes to an organization’s policies, and when he or she is
constrained from doing so.
This chapter shows how international development organizations are bureaucratic
entities and argues that the organizational culture and leadership served to create an
environment in which governance norms developed in different ways within similarly
placed organizations. In a large part, the actions of international organizations are path
dependent on the mandates and missions created at their inception or given them by their
member states. At the same time, organizations function on their own once set up to do
so, and create their own missions in line with mandates. In some cases, an organization
reinterprets its mandate to meet changing international needs. In others, organizations
feel tied to the original mandate with little wiggle room. This chapter shows how the
UNDP has reinterpreted its mandate and melded with the UN’s democratic focus while
the World Bank continues to feel constrained by its original mandate.
The development of norms is never simple in any context, least of all in a context
such as an international development organization. Influences on policy creation and
change include individuals working in the organization (from different cultures and
backgrounds and knowledge expertise), lobbying from outside groups, development
partners, member states’ interest promotion through funding or other influences, and also
a need to explain the failures of development projects up to that point. 24 Policy change in

24

This latter point is brought up consistently in the literature and came up consistently in my interviews. It
was not only the structural adjustment programmes from the IFIs in the 1980s that caused a concern for
making development projects more successful, it is also a concern with development from the 1940s up to
that point that elicited new ways of thinking about development. Bad governance became the explanation
for why development did not work and therefore good governance was the answer to that problem.
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these organizations follows specific paths: path dependence on ideas that came before
and were already institutionalized in the organization’s policies and practices; pressures
from important external forces that influence decision-making in high levels of the
organization, leaders on the Executive Boards that specifically influence and write policy;
senior policy personnel (in the context of the UNDP this would be Administrators and the
World Bank would be Presidents); and changes in the nature of the international system
(such that space is opened up for debates on specific issues that then spiral to become
important to relevant actors). Finally the organization has to be in such a position to be
able to accept change and modify itself to the changes that are coming from all these
influences. When an organization begins to define its goals and identity according to
specific principles, those principles stick with it through different leaders and changes in
the international community. Thus, as Berger and Luckmann argue concerning the
development of symbolic universes in cultures that end up guiding individual behavior:
“if one is to understand their [symbolic universes] meaning, one has to understand the
history of their production” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 97). 25

WHY DO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ARTICULATE NORMS
DIFFERENTLY?
Governance discourse and policy in the UNDP and the World Bank is of prime
importance for this analysis because of the connection with the issue of international

25

Simply put, a symbolic universe encompasses the norms, explanations, actions, institutions that go into
the ordering of everyday social life, or is “a social product with a history” (Berger and Luckmann 1966,
97).
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organization autonomy as outlined in chapter one in this dissertation. Nation states
claimed sovereignty over governance and decision-making procedures (also known as
internal sovereignty) as a highly accepted norm of the 20th century. Despite the
weakening of sovereignty in the recent era of globalization, it still remains a distinct issue
for international relations and is deeply tied to political interests.
The UNDP and World Bank have a similar origin, born out of a structural
environment wherein their member states gave them mandates to act in the world to
support infrastructure development and public administration. World War II followed
swiftly after the end of World War I and the economic crises of the first few decades of
the twentieth century, most notably the crash of 1929, negatively impacted growth and
infrastructure development throughout the world. The wars and economic crises occurred
in an international system that was less interdependent in trade, unable to coordinate on
shared threats, and unable to stem off crises by coordinating on market and fiscal
policies. Therefore, in 1944, Western states created the United Nations and the Bretton
Woods Institutions to meet coordination problems with a view to preventing wars and
economic downturns. Both the UNDP and the World Bank are associated with the United
Nations which was created as a collective security organization in 1944, but quickly
expanded to create agencies working on disparate issues of collective importance (Haas
and Haas 1995).
The UNDP and World Bank have their founding in an unstable and uncoordinated
international environment among leaders who suggested that coordination of global
governance problems could be best solved through multilateral and international
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organizations with specific functional purposes. 26 Indeed, the Bretton Woods Institutions,
one of which became the World Bank, were envisioned by United States leaders who had
been planning worldwide coordinating institutions since entering into World War II in
1941 (Toussaint 2008, 9). The UNDP and World Bank both started as organizations to
fund technical assistance, public administration, and infrastructure (re)building
throughout the world in the aftermath of devastation of World War II.
Because of limitations in obtaining the data, in order to identify organizational
culture and its affect on governance norm articulation, in this chapter I focus on the level
of artifacts, interpreted as structural elements of the organization that contribute to the
policy making process. The General Assembly voting procedures indicate that each
member state of the UN has an equal vote. Six principle organs under which subsidiary
bodies, programmes and funds, research and training institutions, committees,
commissions, and other UN entities function provide the policy context to the UNDP and
World Bank. The World Bank Group is one of the specialized agencies of the UN; as
such, it functions autonomously from the UN and subsidiary agencies. The UNDP, on the
other hand, started out as a fund of the UN (the EPTA and Special Fund), but now
functions as a programme under the aegis of the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC). Table 3.2 specifies the important aspects of structure, highlighting more
structural similarities than differences between the UNDP and the World Bank.

26

Functionalist interpretations highlight the creation of international organizations as a rational calculation
made by states in order to address global governance issues while taking the issues out of the realm of
power politics between states.
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Table 3.1: UNDP and World Bank Structure 27
Structural
Element
Executive

UNDP

World Bank

•

•

•
•

Forums

•

Guiding
Documents

•

Executive Board – 36 Representatives
elected by ECOSOC (meets annually)
(GA Resolution 48/162)
Executive Bureau – 5 Representatives
(representing 5 regional groups)
Administrator and Senior Management
(Assistant Administrator, etc.)

Member
Countries
Voting

•

UNDP Administrator serves as Chair
of the United Nations Development
Group – unites 32 funds, programmes,
agencies, departments, and offices of
UN
General Assembly & ECOSOC
Guidance through Resolutions
Strategic Plan
Programme and Operations Policies
and Procedures (POPP)
194 UN member countries

•

Executive Board voting by consensus

Funding from
Member
Countries

•

Voluntary bilateral contributions from
wealthy member countries: regular and
other (earmarked) resources
Multilateral contributions
Country resources

•
•

•
•
Funding to
Member
Countries

•
•

Grants for projects
Trust funds (55 administered by
UNDP)

•

•
•

•
•
•
•

Articles of Agreement
IDA Replenishments
Operational Policies (OP)
Bank Procedures (BP)

•

188 member countries (same as
IMF membership)
IBRD – Share votes (one vote per
share held) plus basic votes
IDA replenishments designate votes
IBRD – Financial Markets
IDA – Voluntary bilateral
contributions from wealthy member
countries (replenishments); IBRD
and IFC income; borrower
repayments.
IBRD – Loans at market interest
rate to middle income and credit
worthy lower middle income
countries
IDA –Interest-free loans and grants
to 82 least developed countries
$35,335 (in millions)

•
•
•
•

•

•
FY 2012
Funding
Employees
and Country
Offices (2011)
Country
Programming

•

$4,074 (in millions)

•

•
•
•
•

8,099
5 Regional Offices
130+ country offices
Country Programme Action Plan
(CPAP) created by country office
Guided by Project Appraisal

•

•
27

Board of Governors –
1Representative (188 total) from
each member country
Board of Executive Directors – 25
Representatives and President of
Executive Directors – 20 rotating
members
President and Senior Management
Development Committee – advises
Board of Governors on
development issues – est. 1974

•
•

9,000 (2/3rd in Washington, D.C.;
1/3rd in country offices)
124 country offices
Country Assistance Strategy (CAS)
developed from Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) or other

The information contained in this table comes from various sources including World Bank and UNDP
documents, websites, and academic literature. All sources are included in the narrative section that
describes the information in the table.
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Accountability •
Structure
•

Committee (PAC) at country level
Evaluation Office
Country/Regional Office Evaluation

•
•

country-owned document (BP 2.11)
Independent Evaluation Group
Country Office Evaluation

Many link the formation of governance policy to the major failures of
development policies in the 1980s (Shihata 1995). After the problems and social costs
associated with structural adjustment of the 1980s (linked to conditionality for receiving
development loans), development organizations suggested ways that governments should
function in order to create the “enabling environment” that would ensure the success of
development projects and outcomes. Such interference in nation-state governance affairs
questions the apolitical status of development organizations and speaks to the prospect of
organizations acting autonomously of member state interests (Stokke 2009, 327-29).

THE UNDP: A MISSION TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
The UNDP’s original mandate approved apolitical technical assistance and
support to be offered through a United Nations agency which was born out of the
development debate following World War II. At the United Nations, the Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) established the Extended Programme of Technical Assistance
(EPTA) in order to offer technical assistance and knowledge to those countries that were
not doing as well as the United States (Browne 2011, 9). After much debate over what
comprised development assistance, the UNDP was created in 1964, a merging of a UN
Special Fund and EPTA under ECOSOC resolution 1020, which came into force in 1965
with Paul Hoffman as its Administrator (Browne 2011, 18). The UNDP functioned as a
fund up until the 1980s, dispersing funds to other UN agencies or country governments to
implement. It was under the leadership of William H. Draper III (Administrator of the
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UNDP from 1986-1993) in which UNDP became an implementing agency rather than
acting solely as a fund. UNDESA, formerly Department for Technical Cooperation in
Developing Countries, was the main implementer for UNDP, especially in public
administration projects. The reason for shifting to implementing and advocacy role rather
than funder was because of the shrinking “portfolio” in the 1980s and especially in the
1990s.
Becoming an implementing agency meant that UNDP also became a leading
development agency, guiding development ideology and norms. Indeed, since it became
an implementing agency the UNDP has been behind the shifting nature of development
goals, playing an instrumental role in defining what those goals are, not only for the UN
system but for the international development community. Yet it still faces constraints: the
UNDP’s mandate is provided by the General Assembly resolutions, making it dependent
on guidance from UN member states, but also allowing for flexibility in labeling the
UNDP’s role in the UN system. In the 2000s, General Assembly mandates encourage the
UNDP as a coordinator of the UN system’s service provision in member countries,
recognizing that the UN agencies must work as one in a policy push labeled “Delivering
as One.” The UN General Assembly suggested in two resolutions that the UNDP should
be helping support South-South cooperation and dialogue on development. 28 It is from
these resolutions that the UNDP gets its mandate, beyond the ECOSOC resolutions and
the UN Charter itself. Because the UNDP is a programme of the Economic and Social

28

UN General Assembly Resolution 59/250 (December 17, 2004) and UN General Assembly Resolution
62/208 (March 14, 2008) focus on the issues of UN as coordinator under the “Delivering as One”
framework and enhancing South-South cooperation.
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Council (ECOSOC), UNDP reports to ECOSOC and ECOSOC guides and justifies
UNDP’s activities following the UN Charter. Any policies that are pursued by
Administrators do need to be approved by ECOSOC and the UNDP’s Board of
Governors and Board of Executive Directors.
Since becoming an advocacy development organization rather than simply a fund
or coordinating agency, the UNDP has challenged the notion of development that the
World Bank championed since its inception. Mark Malloch Brown became the
Administrator in 1999 and immediately worked to hone in the agency’s goals under six
practice areas, as well as deal with the inefficient organizational structure itself. Most
importantly though, which led to the ability for Malloch Brown to make such changes,
was the creation of the Human Development Report (HDR) and the Human Development
Index (HDI) under William H. Draper III (Draper appointed Mahbub ul Haq for the job
of putting this first theoretical framework and report together for publication in 1990).
The HDR became an authoritative report on development from a different
perspective than what was given by the World Bank in its World Development Reports
(WDRs), securing UNDP’s place in the development world in the 1990s, even with a
huge reduction in funding as a result of the end of the Cold War. The creation of
measurable and possibly achievable development goals in the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs) that followed from the Millennium Declaration of 2000 is of prime
importance here for the progress it made toward these Human Development ideals as
well as for the degree to which those ideals were overshadowed by traditional foci on
economic goods and services (Vandemoortele 2011). The MDGs “have been
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misappropriated to propagate an economistic perspective of development. As a
consequence, they have failed in their attempt to shift the focus of the development
discourse from income-poverty to the multi-dimensional nature of human poverty”
(Vandemoortele 2011, 1). Nevertheless, the UNDP’s leadership was instrumental in the
creation of the MDGs and took on the challenge to promote the achievement of the eight
goals through its coordination of development agencies, NGOs, and country-led
development projects.
Table 3.2: UNDP Committees, Departments and Units on Democratic Governance
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Management Development Programme (1988)
Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and Bureau for Development Policy (BDP)
Global Programmes facilitating service from the Bureaus:
o Access to Justice and Rule of Law;
o Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness (Phase I: 2008-2010, Phase II: 20112013);
o Democratic Governance Assessments;
o Electoral Cycle Support;
o Human Rights Strengthening;
o Parliamentary Strengthening (launched 1999)
Democratic Governance Programme Initiative (2001)
The UNDP Legal Empowerment Initiative
Management and Development Governance Division (1995) changed to the Institutional
Development Group and is currently the Democratic Governance Group which functions under
the aegis of the Bureau for Development Policy
Oslo Governance Center (2002)
Democratic Governance Practice Network

The UNDP interprets its mandate as supporting democratic governance and
processes, largely because of the deeply embedded norms of democracy promotion that
have prevailed in the United Nations since its founding but also because of the specific
ideological leanings of its Administrators. This does not mean that the UNDP has strayed
from its apolitical mandate, rather, it created a deeper niche for itself than the World
Bank has done in working with elections, electoral commissions, and parliaments on
instituting liberal democracy governance norms. Following upon the GA Resolution
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59/250, the UNDP argues that its first mandate is “to strengthen its role in supporting the
promotion of coordination, efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations system as a
whole at the country level” through the Resident Representatives, and secondly “to
provide policy and technical support by working on and advocating for the multisectoral
challenges of poverty reduction, democratic governance…” (United Nations
Development Programme 2008c, 10).
The UNDP made a major shift in the way that it conceptualized UNDP’s role in
governance promotion in the 1990s.
In this recent era [the 1990s], more than in the era of decolonization, UNDP has
directly promoted democratic institutions, organizing and helping to set up
parliamentary systems, monitoring elections, and supporting the evolution of new
political parties and the strengthening of older ones (Murphy 2006, 8).
Though the UN and UNDP influenced public administration capacity building for
decades, the 1990s change toward promoting specifically democratic governance
institutions was new in that it did not solely focus on strengthening the state, but rather
was based on ideas of transparency and openness. The early years of UNDP as a funding
agency combined with its focus on technical assistance and public administration
informed and molded later years. However, the path to a focus on governance was not as
clear-cut as just a shift from public administration capacity support to democratic
governance promotion.
The UNDP Executive Board, Administrators, and staff institutionalized the
democratic governance concept over the years through the creation of programs that offer
support in specific governance areas to countries in need. In the 1990s the language was
mostly couched as creating an enabling environment for sustainable human development.
110

Beginning in 2001, “Democratic Governance” became a programme initiative in UNDP’s
national policies and programmes, and in budget allocations. The UNDP Democratic
Governance program 29 argues that “democratic governance is essential to achieving the
Millennium Development Goals. We aim to build effective and capable states that are
accountable and transparent, inclusive and responsive — from elections to participation
of women and the poor” (United Nations Development Programme 2011f). The UNDP
consistently argues for an interrelationship between good governance, democracy, and
development: “In order to achieve and sustain human development, both the ends and the
means of good governance should be ‘democratized’” (United Nations Development
Programme 2009, 15).
Policy documents and guidelines created by the UNDP headquarters on
governance promotion do not require specific governance support to states. The policy
documents provide guidelines for the way that country and regional offices are expected
to give advice and assistance to states. Democratic governance policies are written by the
Bureau for Development Policy (BDP) under which the Democratic Governance Group
(DGG) operates. 30 The other Bureaus that report to the Administrator and create policy
for the UNDP include the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the Bureau of
Management, and the Partnerships Bureau.
29

The programme, at both the UNDP and national levels, includes the following nine focus areas as
instrumental in promoting good governance: Access to information and e-governance, access to justice and
rule of law, anti-corruption, electoral systems and processes, human rights, local governance, parliamentary
development, public administration, and women’s empowerment (United Nations Development
Programme 2011e).
30

The Democratic Governance Group was formerly the Management and Development Governance
Division and then the Institutional Development Group. I will refer to all policies made by these divisions
as created by the DGG since it is the same department only given a different name over the years.
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The Administrator of the UNDP is very influential in guiding the purpose,
mission and practice areas of the organization. William H. Draper III is largely
responsible for the creation of the human development paradigm which focuses on
human freedoms; Gus Speth for instituting the concept of Sustainable Human
Development; and Mark Malloch Brown for overseeing the shifting language to
democratic governance rhetoric. This influence is obvious when we consider in the next
chapter the deep influence that each Administrator had on the way that governance policy
was couched. Yet, the Administrator reports to and is influenced by the Executive Boards
and the UN Secretariat. The Administrator reports to the Chief Executive Board and the
UN Secretary General on the UN Development Group (UNDG) progress (over which the
Administrator is Chair and therefore guides policy implementation and goals for 34 UN
agencies). The Administrator also reports on managing the Resident Coordinator system.
Despite the UNDP’s lack of coordinating success in the past, the UNDP has made
an indelible impact on UN development policy through the UNDG because of certain
Administrators: for example, Gus Speth “restored links with the UN system through the
UN Development Group” (Browne 2011, 73-74), links marred by William H. Draper
III’s tenure, mission and philosophy guiding the UNDP in the 1980s (Draper had wanted
the UNDP to be an autonomous agency from the UN). The UNDG is one of the executive
committees (ExComms) that was created in 1997 by Kofi Annan when he entered office
as Secretary General in order to facilitate horizontal communication and coordination
between UN agencies (United Nations Development Group 2013; Browne 2011, 62;
Griffin 2003, 208).
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While the UNDP has much leeway in its policy writing and creation, it also
reports to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations, and is
monitored by ECOSOC as well as by the General Assembly. ECOSOC appoints the
Executive Board based on General Assembly resolution 48/162, which is the same
Executive Board as two other UN organizations. 31 The Executive Board meets annually,
in planned regular sessions (2-3 per year) that are decided upon at the annual meeting, or
for special sessions called by the President of the Board, the Administrator, or an
Executive Board member. As per the regulations set out in the rules of procedure for the
UNDP Executive Board, last updated January 2011, the Executive Board is responsible
for monitoring the funds and programmes under the UNDP, communicating with
ECOSOC, and deciding upon new programmes, administrative and financial plans, and
budgets (United Nations Development Programme 2011d). This includes endorsing
Strategic Plans that guide the policies and development outcomes which the UNDP
strives to meet. These Strategic Plans are instrumental in guiding policy in headquarters
in the different departments as well as in regional and country offices. The last few
Strategic Plans have markedly increased the use of democratic governance language
which has been approved by the Executive Boards with very little resistance or
questioning.

31

I refer here to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Office of Project
Services (UNOPS).
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The way that the UNDP is structured provides its Administrator 32 with leeway in
creating and implementing policy. First, the UNDP Administrator holds the senior
position as head of the executive office which oversees operations in New York
headquarters, including nine offices reporting directly to the Administrator. 33 The
Administrator serves as one of the Under-Secretary Generals to the UN system as a
whole, reporting directly to the UN Secretary General. The Administrator is in charge of
setting the agenda for the UNDP by articulating and guiding policy, especially through
speeches and statements that become articulated in strategic plans and guidance policies.
The Administrator office is responsible for oversight of the day-to-day operations and for
overseeing the creation of and implementation of the Strategic Plans that guide UNDP
development practice. The oversight includes regional centers, country offices and UNDP
departments. 34 In these roles, the Administrator guides policy as he or she sees fit. In fact,
the Executive Board, which meets only once a year, votes by consensus. Thus, the issues
that are put before the Board on which to vote have been created by the Administrator,
senior officials, and employees without very much input from the Board. The documents
(such as Strategic Plans and financial plans) are created in a way that follows the
32

The office of the Administrator was initially filled by Paul Hoffman who had been the Administrator of
the Marshall Plan for the US Government, thus the advent of the title Administrator rather than UnderSecretary General or President (Browne 2011, 18).
33

At present those operations include nine departments and a special unit: the UN Development Operations
Coordination Office, the Human Development Report Office, the Evaluation Office, the Office of Audit
and Investigations, the Ethics Office, the Bureau of External Relations and Advocacy, the Bureau for
Development Policy, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, the Bureau of Management, and the
Special Unit for South-South Cooperation.
34

There are five regional bureaus: Africa, Arab States, Asia and Pacific, Europe and the Commonwealth of
Independent States, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The Assistant Administrator is also in charge of
the UN Capital Development Fund, the UN Volunteers and the country offices of which there are currently
more than 170.
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mandates of the General Assembly and ECOSOC, but also provides a greater influence
from the Administrator on the kind of policy the UNDP will pursue.
UNDP’s structure allows the organization to be what some have called a “learning
organization,” allowing it to learn new ideas and quickly change its structure or practices
in accordance with what is currently needed by member states. The way that UNDP
responded to governance rhetoric and ideas is a good example of its capacity to learn and
change, an oddity for most bureaucratic organizations (Murphy 2006). Learning, or
consensual knowledge, is a must for international organizations that wish to remain
relevant in a changing world, especially those who rely on donors for their funding.
Discussing the importance of learning organizations, Peter and Ernst Haas define learning
as “a process by which actors, playing roles, engage in institutionalized behavior that
shows their recognition that problems currently on the IOs’ [international organization’s]
agenda are much more complexly linked than was recognized at an earlier time” (Haas
and Haas 1995, 259).
Following such logic, Craig Murphy argues that one of the reasons for UNDP’s
ease of shift in focus toward “democratic” governance is that it is not a typical
bureaucracy that gets bound in rules and hierarchies. Rather, the UNDP is a creative
bureaucracy that is able to learn from its own mistakes and successes, as well as from
outside knowledge, and incorporate that learning into its practices (Murphy 2006, 17).
UNDP’s ability to learn is evident in how it interprets its mandate and mission to achieve
new development challenges and change course when needed in order to meet new
demands. Furthermore, UNDP is beholden to its member countries, and not to its original
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mandate or articles of agreement. If the General Assembly decides that the UNDP will
follow a new goal that it has never taken on before, it will do so. This functioning is an
example of the principal-agent theory in action. UNDP follows the mandates given it by
the General Assembly and ECOSOC, building off the most recent ones. Yet, the language
of democratic governance is a perfect example of the organization (and senior people
within the organization) interpreting the mandate as seen fit, even if it does not in the end
directly lead to achieving the UNDP’s development goals.
While my argument suggests that the UNDP is much more supportive of demandside governance (that is focusing on the ability of citizens and civil society to interact
with their governments and demand goods and services), I do not suggest that the UNDP
is not also concerned with supply-side governance. In fact, the UNDP has been involved
in supply-side governance since its inception, providing technical assistance and advice
on public administration reform. The debate then turns into how goods and services are
supplied to a population and UNDP has focused on the ability of citizens and civil society
to be involved in that process rather than focusing solely on how the government can be
responsible in providing goods and services. For instance, former Democratic
Governance Group (DGG) leader Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi makes a distinction between
“models of governance” of “technocratic” governance or “market or business models”
which she further distinguishes from “democratic governance” (Fraser-Moleketi 2012).
The latter is different from the former because it is based in effective leadership and in
citizen participation in the decision-making procedures of their government. Her
argument is that the technocratic and market/business models of governance are to blame
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for the response failures to natural disasters. Technocratic/market/business models failed
because of their lack of focus on citizen’s well being. An example of this governance
model is the turn to support for public-private relationship has been closely associated
with the “good” governance concept (Utting and Zammit 2009). While Fraser-Moleketi is
speaking for herself and not for UNDP in her piece, her argument for democratic
governance largely aligns with other employees of UNDP and with official UNDP
documents on democratic governance.
The decentralization of the structure of the UNDP creates a situation in which
democratic governance policy as stated in headquarters is not always implemented at
country level. The UNDP has five regional offices and more than 130 country offices that
implement UNDP policy and projects. The country offices coordinate projects between
organizations in country settings with roughly 9,000 employees distributed mostly
through the regional and country offices (United Nations 2011, 16). One of my
respondents suggested that the country offices were more like “fiefdoms” than offices in
that they functioned almost entirely on their own and acted and implemented projects the
way they wanted to do. For the UNDP, decentralization changed somewhat under Mark
Malloch Brown’s tenure because he had a focus of the organization as being a policy
leader and advocate in development. Through his leadership the democratic governance
focus has been further solidified in practice areas and programs that offer direct support
for democratic governance ideals, yet the onus for implementation is still on regional and
country offices.
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The UNDP is set up to be the coordinator of the UN’s work in country settings
under the “Delivering as One” mandate approved by the General Assembly in 2006 and,
and the Administrator is the Chair of the UN Development Group (UNDG) (Browne
2011, 62; United Nations Development Group 2013). Because of this leadership the
UNDP holds particular sway on encouraging democratic governance throughout its work.
For instance, in coordinating peacebuilding operations requests for assistance go to the
Under-Secretary General, and then through the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)
and the Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), which then decide whether or
not the UN will agree to help and be involved in the state to help set up elections or
provide other technical assistance. After this the UNDP becomes involved to provide
technical assistance. Even so, implementing democratic governance policy relies heavily
on the regional and country offices in that these are given leeway to use the democratic
governance polices as guidelines, but in the end they have the ability to push for
democratic governance concepts in their countries and regions. 35 Such a decentralized
system is often argued as necessary by UNDP employees because of the nature of
sovereignty and the original UNDP mandate and UN Charter.
Authorities at headquarters craft governance policy for the UNDP, but because of
changes in the nature of decentralization, they include input from country and regional
offices. On the other hand, decentralization keeps the UNDP from clearly articulating its
policies or implementing them with similar resolve in all countries. One of my

35

This was made evident in my interviews concerning the UNDP. Many respondents expressed their
frustration with the decentralized nature of the system and the lack of firm policy for each country on
implementing policies.
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interviewees noted, for example, that the UNDP and the UN as a whole are not very good
about having clear, calculated policies that will inform all projects on specific issues,
lamenting that there was no overarching policy that suggested where the UN stood on
particular issues, and that it just isn’t the way that UNDP planned. Even when the
Strategic Plan mandates that the Bureau for Development Policy clusters should function
under an organizing principle, individual offices still act as they wish based on leadership
commitment as well as embedded practices within each department and office.
Table 3.3: UNDP Policies on Democratic Governance
•
•
•
•
•

Initiatives for Change (1994)
Governance for Sustainable Human Development (1997) – UNDP’s Governance Policy
Strategic Plan 2008-2012 extended to 2013
Strategic Plan 2014-2017
Country Programme Action Plans

The policies and procedures written down have a large effect on the way that
members of the organization perceive their role in promoting democratic governance,
even when those policies are easily moldable and changeable. The UNDP is guided by
the Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures (POPP). These offer general
guidance to UNDP employees about the structure of the organization, accountability,
functional day-to-day activities and how to implement policies, programmes, and
projects. Rather than strict and unmoving operational and procedural guidelines the
POPPs are flexible. This gives the Administrator and the Executive Board the ability to
change the organization’s procedures and policies rather easily while at the same time
being held to specific standards and beliefs that filter throughout the organization’s
members.
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The following statement introduces the Democratic Governance section of the
Strategic Plan 2008-2011: “To consolidate and deepen democracy, free and fair elections
must go hand in hand with efforts to support all people in attaining the opportunity to
participate in the decisions affecting their lives” (United Nations Development
Programme 2008c, 25). Indeed, statements like the above are re-written and re-articulated
in almost every policy document that guides the UNDP’s work on democratic
governance. The Strategic Plan is one of the most important documents defining the
structure and role of the UNDP, providing guidance from the Executive Board and based
on guidance policies from ECOSOC. The 2008-2011 Strategic Plan follows the guidance
from the Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (United Nations 2007). The plan
outlined promoting democratic governance through “fostering inclusive participation,
strengthening responsive governing institutions, and basing democratic governance on
international principles” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c, 2009).
[The Strategic Plan] Articulates UNDP roles in line with its mandate defined
through the intergovernmental process: (i) To support the coordination and
enhancement of United Nations system efficiency and effectiveness at the country
level and; (ii) To provide knowledge, policy advice, advocacy, and technical
support in four focus areas on the basis of good practice and comparative
advantage: poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and
recovery, and environment and sustainable development (United Nations
Development Programme 2008c, 6).
UNDP representatives and academics associate democratic governance with
achieving sustainable development goals, human development goals, conflict-free
societies, and urban or local governance outcomes in publications, reports, and speeches
(Malloch Brown 2003; Malloch Brown 2004; Cheema and Maguire 2001; United Nations
Development Programme 2003). Though not the first to institute democratic governance
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practices, 36 Mark Malloch Brown, Administrator from 1999-2005, wrote and spoke
extensively on democratic governance and on how the UNDP could incorporate it into
policy. He used the term democratic governance and democracy interchangeably,
showing no conceptual variation between them. For instance, he argues “that democratic
governance is vital not just for ensuring sustainable development, but also for sustaining
peace within societies” (Malloch Brown 2003, 142). Furthermore, making the connection
between democratic governance and democracy he says
The bottom line is that if democracy is understood as not just the occasional
election or a particular set of institutions, but as both of those underpinned by a
deep political culture that encourages accountability and participation, then the
establishment of functional systems of democratic governance in conflict-affected
societies is an indispensable dimension of efforts to build lasting peace (Malloch
Brown 2003, 145).
Moreover, the Strategic Plan 2008-2013 argued that democratic governance
includes key result areas of “fostering inclusive participation,” “strengthening
accountable and responsive governing institutions” and “grounding democratic
governance in international principles” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c,
27-28). The creation of a Strategic Plan, and the service lines that were instituted under
Mark Malloch Brown’s Administration, act as a boon in helping the UNDP define its
governance agenda. However, the plan and service lines can also be constraining,
limiting changes that may be needed in the organization. This was especially evident in
the way that UNDP has defined and continues to define its work in governance, as noted
36

In fact, academics and staff members that I interviewed often credited former Administrator Mark
Malloch Brown with creating and implementing the idea of democratic governance into the UNDP as it
exists today, when in fact he was building off the shoulders of his predecessors, especially James Gustaph
Speth (1993-1999) and William H Draper III (1986-1993). See the next chapter on leadership in the UNDP
for their particular contributions.
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by one respondent discussing the creation of the service line approach in the latter 1990s
under Mark Malloch Brown. Having six to seven service lines or areas of work within
democratic governance, helps UNDP specialize, but it also creates some difficulties
including problems with communication with outside organizations and between the
service lines.
Once created, the service lines have stuck so that getting them out of the
documents and policies is difficult. They become entrenched in the way people function
in the organization. In answer to this question of bringing the service lines together and
creating communication across areas of work, my respondents noted that a discussion
began before the organization wrote the 2008 Strategic Plan, and that streamlining meant
the creation of three clusters under which the UNDP staff on governance now work:
Inclusive Participation, Responsive Institutions, and Norms and Principles. These clusters
have also been evident in the Annual Reports that report on money expenditures under
the three clusters rather than under each of the service lines (although spending on the
latter can be found in the Annual Reports and other reporting documents). They also
currently define what the UNDP means by promoting democratic governance.
The UNDP associates democratic governance with the possible success of
achieving development goals, which in the 2000s has meant instituting democratic
governance in countries in order to make progress toward and fulfill the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs). In fact, the very creation of the MDGs themselves included
debates concerning governance. The Millennium Declaration states in article 13 that
“success in meeting these [development and eradication of poverty] objectives depends,
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inter alia, on good governance within each country” and again in article 24 that “we will
spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect
for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the
right to development” (United Nations 2000, September 8). The 2010 resolution that
upholds the commitment to achieving the MDGs also affirms the connection between
democracy and development (United Nations 2010). Again, in the Secretary General’s
Guidance Note on Democracy the connection is asserted that “the appeal of democracy
stems in part from its association with the advancement of the quality of life for all
human beings, and thus, with the work to reach the Millennium Development Goals” (Kimoon).
The theme of democratic governance leading to less fragile, less conflict prone
states comes up consistently in UNDP documents, in official statements, and in
publications that highlight the work of the organization (Malloch Brown 2003; Ball 2005;
Santiso 2002; United Nations Development Programme 2002, 85; Dijkzeul 1999). For
these authors and reports, the UNDP became involved in peacekeeping and
peacebuilding, especially after the end of the Cold War and after Boutros Ghali forged a
path for the concept of peacebuilding through his “Agenda for Peace” (Ghali 1992; Karns
2004; Call and Cook 2003; Griffin 2003). The UN’s development assistance during the
Cold War required Resident Representatives to work with countries and be asked by
countries for assistance in order to implement development projects. The UN’s work with
developing countries after the end of the Cold War also meant increasing capacities of
government and accountability of country leaders, and increasing the ability of
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individuals to impact their government leaders and decision-making. Thus, leaders at the
UN connected the ideas of governance with development and placed democratic
governance firmly in the purview of the UNDP and other development agencies. Dijkzeul
argues that armed conflicts and violence that occurred after the end of the Cold war
created a confusing situation for development agencies: “All of this [experience] blurs the
traditional distinction between security, relief and development” setting the UNDP up to
be involved with peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts (Dijkzeul 1999, 94).
In sum, the UNDP’s definition of democratic governance incorporates a multitude
of concepts, practices, and connections with development goals and outcomes that are
included in the policy documents and statements that guide UNDP practice. That the
rhetoric around democratic governance has continued for so long is surprising but telling
for its level of institutionalization.
The Annual Reports provide instrumental insight into how the UNDP wishes to
portray itself in the world. They include descriptions of policy and practice of the
organization on democratic governance. Each Annual Report utilizes anecdotal stories
from its project successes to display its impact in the world, both to its beneficiary
countries and to its donors to whom it is accountable for the money that is spent. As
indicated above, the Reports document spending in the practice areas as stated in the
strategic plans (that were crafted and approved by the Administrator and the Executive
Board).
A review of the annual reports using the keywords as chosen in Chapter two
(Table 2.3) shows that the UNDP’s language vocabulary promotes the notion of
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democratic governance or democratization as a citizen-focused project. The quantitative
content analysis of the UNDP Annual Reports 37 shows that the main concern on
governance related issues and policy is on civil society and political participation. Table
3.4 shows the frequency of keyword counts for each of the keywords.
Figure 3.1: Quantitative Content Analysis of UNDP Annual Reports 38
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As shown in the figure, democratic governance keywords were more frequent
from 2001 to 2007, but then the frequency changes to favor good governance terms. The
percentage of democratic versus good governance keywords shows a decrease in the
frequency of democratic governance keywords used over the 2000 decade, and an
increase in the frequency of good governance keywords used from 2008 onward. The
difference between the 2001 and 2013 Annual Report shows a 22.15% decline in the
frequency of democratic governance keywords and increase in good governance
keywords. However, the reports still consistently favor democratic governance keywords
37
38

UNDP Annual Reports are only available beginning in 2001.
See Appendix 2 for data for Figure 3.1.
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with an average of 1.98% distribution in favor of democratic governance keywords. The
democratic governance words that decreased in usage over the 2000s include “human
development” which peaked in 2006 at 40 words and declined steadily to 9 in 2012, up
again to 15 in 2013. The keyword “human rights” showed an even steadier decline in
usage from a peak of 15 in 2007 down to only 2 counts in 2013. The keyword
“information” also peaked in 2001 at 25 and 2008 at 29, reaching a low in 2012 of 3 and
2013 of 6. Finally, “participation” reached a high of 21 in 2007 and 2008, declining to 3
and 4 in 2012 and 2013 respectively. The keyword ‘political participation’ was not
counted in the list above, but is interesting for its presence in the 2002-2008 (between 1
and 4 counts) and complete absence beyond 2009 as well as a complete absence in the
comparative World Bank Annual Reports (see the next section for these frequencies).
The shift in the use of good governance keywords in the 2000s tells us that the
UNDP, while traditionally focused on the essence and language of democratic
governance, has turned to supporting good governance rhetoric in its Annual Reports
more regularly while still favoring democratic ideals in projects and programming, and in
other types of reports. The good governance keyword “transparency” started out with a
low frequency in the beginning of the decade, peaking at 11 in 2008 and declining only to
9 in 2013. The keyword “government” increased significantly in use between 2001 (12)
and 2013 (29) with a peak of 47 in 2011.
The Human Development Report (HDR) is produced every year in order to
provide up-to-date development information to practitioners, academics, and countries.
What is more, these reports give an indication of what UNDP thinks are the most
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pertinent issues in the development field, and gives indications of its own policy changes.
Using the keywords identified in Chapter two to analyze the reports gives us more of an
indication that the UNDP supports a version of governance that is focused on civil
society participation in government.
Figure 3.2: Quantitative Content Analysis of the HDRs 39
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The HDRs show an average of 36.53% in favor of democratic governance
keywords as opposed to good governance key words. As with the UNDP Annual Reports,
the HDRs show a decisive bent toward democratic governance ideas, especially when
compared to the World Development Reports produced by the World Bank (see next
section). Keywords like civil society appear more often than government. The keywords
of democracy, elections, electoral, human development and human rights occur much
more often than keywords of efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and economic
growth and development.
39

See Appendix 2 for data for Figure 3.2
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Table 3.4: Key Findings from Quantitative Content Analysis of the UNDP
•
•

On average, the Reports show that the UNDP is decisively more focused on demand-side
governance than supply-side governance
The UNDP’s statements and practice show a bent toward governance projects that favor
bottom-up approaches to governance change

Table 3.5: UNDP Funding for Democratic Governance
•
•
•
•
•

Capital Development Fund
Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund
Global Program for Electoral Cycle Support
Average of 35.27% of Core-Funding devoted to Democratic Governance practice area
(spending equals an average of $1,236,000,000 per year)
Multi-Year Funding Framework

The UNDP incorporates democratic governance funding in its regular projects
and programmes through what is called core-funding. Yet, in some cases, countries desire
to support new, ground-breaking projects on democratic governance that cannot be
supported through core-funding because of resistance from some core-funding member
states. In such cases, countries and other donors channel their funds through trust funds
that are administered by the UNDP. The UNDP administers 55 trust funds. Those that are
most applicable to governance projects are Capital Development Fund, the Democratic
Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF), and the Global Program for Electoral Cycle
Support (GPECS) (United Nations Development Programme 2012b).
The UNDP created the Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF) in
2001 in order to allow funding to projects that were innovative and outside of the
traditional funding avenues and projects of the UNDP and its country offices. Donors are
allowed to contribute to this fund for special country office projects that have democratic
governance principles. The funding and projects indeed sometimes appear to contravene
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the country demands, though the country always approves the projects before they are
implemented. 40 It is through this fund that much of the gender equality and electoral
cycle support projects are funded. The themes of democratic governance promoted by the
DGTTF are civil society, human rights, and gender issue oriented. 41 The DGTTF is yet
another example of how the UNDP is attempting to “mainstream” democratic governance
into its policies and has to go around traditional methods of funding and project/policy
creation in order to do that, thus acting autonomously of its member states. 42
Beginning with the creation of the practice areas, of which democratic governance
is one, the UNDP Annual Reports detail what the UNDP is doing around the world in
each practice area, as well as how much is spent under each practice area starting in 2002.
Data prior to 2002 and for 2003 is unavailable. As one can see from the table, UNDP
spends a large amount of its budget on projects and programming in support of
democratic governance, though spending reduced from its height in 2005 down to an
average of 25% in recent years.

40

Judged by the following statement that was made in a recent report of the DGTTF: “CO [country office]
staff, including managers, particularly appreciate having access to a fund that can be mobilized outside the
existing programmes agreed with government and one that addresses a key need, democratic governance”
(x). (United Nations Development Programme 2008a, x)
41

Fully half of the projects “addressed gender issues” (x) and electoral cycle support takes up a large
portion of the inclusive participation cluster projects.
42

Indeed, an internal document on democratic governance that was quoted in an evaluation of the
Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund says that “fostering democratic governance is at the heart of
UNDP, as underscored by the September 2000 Millennium Declaration. In signing this document, the
heads of state pledged to spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as
respect all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms” (United Nations
Development Programme 2008, 5).
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Figure 3.3: UNDP Democratic Governance Spending as a Percentage of Total
Spending 43
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THE WORLD BANK: A MISSION TO REDUCE POVERTY
“Good” governance is inextricably linked to development politics. For the World
Bank good governance means public administration efficiency and effectiveness, making
sure to include stakeholders in development projects and planning, and reducing
corruption: pervaded by a focus on the state institutions and supply-side governance. In
its definitive 1992 report the Bank defined governance as “the manner in which power is
exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for
development” (World Bank 1993, 3) and later defined good governance as
predictable, open, and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent processes); a
bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government

43

Information gleaned from UNDP Annual Reports 2002-2012. See Appendix 2 for data for Figure 3.3.
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accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public
affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law (World Bank 1994, vii).
The Bank shifted its commitment on development several times throughout the
twentieth century, to poverty alleviation, away from it, and back again and public
administration or governance has always been a part of that shifting paradigm. Since the
1980s, the Bank has been “wedded to economic development in the neoliberal sense”
with a focus on poverty alleviation and good governance (Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate
2010, 297). For the Bank, the 1980s focused on what John Williamson termed the
“Washington Consensus” (Williamson 1990) and on the implementation of structural
adjustment programs. 44 The collapse of the Soviet Union refocused the Bank’s attention
on middle-income rather than less-developed countries (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997,
373), and allowed the Bank to branch out in its promotion of governance to the new
fledgling democracies.
The Bretton Woods founders created the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD) as a special agency of the United Nations to offer aid in the
form of grants and loans to European countries destroyed by World War II, yet its
practice soon expanded to development for developing countries. 45 The IBRD’s original
44

Structural adjustment policies (SAPs) demanded changes in the economic, and sometimes political,
policies of the state as a prerequisite for provision of funds by the IMF and the Bank. However, the SAPs
further created economic downfall in developing countries. Practitioners in the IMF and the Bank largely
subsequently associated that failure with inefficient political and economic institutions within the country
and they therefore began focusing on changing those institutions (Ndulu 2006, Chapter 6).
45

The leaders took cues from what had happened after World War I when Germany had to deal with
economic and infrastructural destruction as well as repayments for World War I. This created a national
attitude that was anti-international and felt the need for revenge. After Germany rebounded, according to
the realist tradition, its leaders and people sought a revanchist policy because of the devastation that it had
endured after the ending of the war. This narrative guided the Bretton Woods discussions so that the focus
was not on making the “enemy” pay only, but also helping them to enter back into the international
community through offering aid.
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purpose, to which it still abides (last amended June 27, 2012), is set forth in the Articles
of Agreement, Article I (i):
To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of members by
facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, including the
restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of
productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the
development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries
(World Bank 1944).
Expanding its practice, the IBRD added four new agencies over the years, collectively
now called the World Bank Group. The five agencies are, in order of the dates they were
founded, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (1944), the
International Financial Corporation (IFC) (1956), the International Development
Association (IDA) (1960), 46 the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) (1966), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
(1988). 47 The World Bank nomenclature typically refers to the IBRD and IDA (Marshall
2008, 9), a practice I follow in this work.
46

The IDA offers low interest loans, interest free loans, and grants to countries. Countries can only
participate in these services if they meet certain criteria associated with Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The Bank’s founders conceived the IDA during a crisis with developing countries who were unable to
service loans at or near market rates but needed the money for financing development projects and gaining
technical assistance. The IDA Articles of Agreement state in Article I the goals of the IDA: “The purposes
of the Association are to promote economic development, increase productivity and thus raise standards of
living in the less-developed areas of the world included within the Association's membership, in particular
by providing finance to meet their important developmental requirements on terms which are more flexible
and bear less heavily on the balance of payments than those of conventional loans, thereby furthering the
developmental objectives of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter called
"the Bank") and supplementing its activities” (World Bank 1960).
47

The IFC encourages private sector investment in the developing world. MIGA aids donors and other
development agencies in making investments in developing countries which are usually risky investments –
the agency works to guarantee those investments in order to encourage transfer of money to places that
sorely need it through private and public investment and other loans. The ICSID helps settle disputes
between countries and investors on investment disputes. This information can be gleaned from the World
Bank Group Website: www.worldbankgroup.org . Several good overviews of the history of the World
Bank Group agencies provide deeper review of their specific functions and purposes. I recommend the
following: (World Bank 2011a,7-106; Marshall 2008,1-9, 59-92; Weaver 2008,45-59).
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The World Bank agencies have apolitical mandates written into their Articles of
Agreement that are stated almost exactly the same:
The Association and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character
of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially
in order to achieve the purposes stated in this Agreement (World Bank
1960Article III, Section 6).
The apolitical mandate is the most contentions element of the Bank’s Articles, proving
difficult, if not impossible to follow considering the member states that provide the
greatest resources and influence.
Because of the original Articles of Agreement and its apolitical mandate, the
World Bank strives to keep out of influencing politics in any way. Its early focus centered
on macroeconomic policy, on modernization theory and liberalization, on increasing
national incomes, 48 and on industrialization. The World Bank, and the United States
through the Bank, impacted the way that the development community thought about how
practitioners should be following development policies. The focus in the early decades of
development was on the state and whether or not the state was engaging in the right
macroeconomic policies that would allow it to continue to be more integrated into the
international economy, would preclude mercantilist tendencies, and would progress
toward an industrialized economy. Leading economists who wrote on these issues

48

Economists like Samuel Kuznets, closely associated with the United States government and with the
World Bank, created the concept of GDP and GNP, the ability to calculate the progress of countries
according to how much was produced and consumed in a country, and the possibility of comparing
countries to judge progress on the trajectory of macroeconomic growth and consumption. The use of
macroeconomic indicators like GDP instilled in the Bank a long and deep belief that anything that was
important and deserving of focus could be measured.
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impacted thinking on development both in a national and international context; among
them Sir Arthur Lewis, W.W. Rostow and Friedrich Hayek. 49
Because of its status as an International Bank that is supported by the western
world and especially by the United States, the World Bank is very influential in the
development community on the particular policies and practices that are followed. This is
especially evident in the World Development Reports (WDRs) that the Bank produces
once a year beginning in 1980. Each of these reports sums up the most important
development issues that the world is facing during the prior years and is therefore
themed. It also reports on the economic progress of countries around the world (thus
providing a comparative development resource). The changes in its governance policies
are most evident in shifts toward promotion of anti-corruption and work with civil society
on development projects. These changes are reflected in the WDRs, especially in the
2000 and 2004 reports which attempted to expand the Bank’s understanding of its role in
public service support and delivery, and even outlines the Bank’s engagement with civil
society (World Bank 2003; Williams 2009).

49

Development ideology based itself in a study of Western historical trends, arguing that countries
followed a specific path toward industrialization; the path led from agricultural organization to
industrialization and eventually to higher consumption rates and service oriented economies (Rostow
1990). Economists of this era assumed that this industrialization trajectory was a priority for all states and
argued that following specific macroeconomic policies which mirrored the industrialization era of the West
would eventually lead to greater economic growth and prosperity.
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Table 3.6: World Bank Committees, Departments and Units on Good Governance
•
•

•
•

•
•

Task Force on Governance (1991)
Governance and Public Sector Management Group under the aegis of the Poverty Reduction
and Economic Management Network (PREM) (est. 1997)– also includes professionals from the
Development Research Group and the World Bank Institute
o Five thematic groups in the Public Sector Group: Administrative and Civil Service
Reform; Anti-corruption; Decentralization; Law and Justice Institutions; Public
Finance
World Bank’s Corruption Study for Europe and Central Asia
World Bank Institute
o Governance and Anti-Corruption Program
o Governance Group
o Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996-2012)
o Governance Diagnostic Capacity Building
Working Group on Anti-Corruption, Governance and Capacity Building
Independent Advisory Board on Governance and Anti-Corruption (2008)

In recent decades the World Bank is best known for its controversial structural
adjustment programmes (SAPs) that it used to try to get developing countries back on
track in macroeconomic growth after the devastating blow to the world economy felt in
the economic crises of the 1970s. The Bank’s governance policy changed to explicit
support for anti-corruption, encouraging transparent budgeting rules in Ministries of
Finance, and support for privatization (Williams 2009, 608). The Bank, led by an
economist named Elliot Berg, argued that it was the fragility and instability inherent in
the developing countries’ policies. such as import substitution policies and command
economy politics, that had created the reaction to the OPEC increase in oil prices that led
the developing countries into extreme hardship in which they could not repay their loans
and had to continue to borrow from the IMF in greater amounts in the 1970s and 80s in
order to make sure they could pay their creditors. The IMF and World Bank responded by
giving developing countries greater loans in return for concessions on macroeconomic
policies that the ‘neoliberal’economists argued would help countries surmount their
economic crises and bring them back on a development path to greater prosperity and
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progress. Some have argued or noted that good governance was a “second-generation
reform” following the structural adjustment period (Marshall 2008, 35; Santiso 2002,
563-565; Weaver 2008, 98).
Perhaps one of the most controversial reports written by the Bank under the
leadership of Robert McNamara was the first to give an indication of how the Bank
would promote governance in member countries. The “Accelerated Development for subSaharan Africa: An Agenda for Action” or “Berg” report suggested that the crisis facing
developing African countries in the late 1970s was due to inefficient policies related to
macroeconomic instability and corruption in decision-making processes (World Bank
1981). Among other suggestions, the report stated that “African governments must lead
the way because domestic policy issues are at the heart of the crisis” (World Bank 1981,
121). The structural adjustment policies promoted in this report, and subsequently
incorporated as prerequisites into funds given to developing countries from both the Bank
and IMF, received a rash of criticism as well as praise (Tribe 1982; Howell 1985;
McNamara 1985, Nov. 1; Riddell 1992; Stiglitz 2002). 50 The “Washington Consensus”
expanded on the policy changes outlined in the “Berg” report and undermined the antipoverty focus of the Bank. Yet, the “Berg” report still has a major impact on changes in
policy at the Bank (Williamson 1990; Murphy 2006; Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 715720); and may be the most influential in terms of suggesting to practitioners within
50

Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist at the Bank, wrote a scathing critique of 1980s/1990s
development policies of the Bank and IMF in which he posited that the structural adjustment programmes
followed the Western liberalism and free market ideals that became known as the Washington Consensus.
He recognized, however, that the West had long ago tempered the policies within Western countries, but
that the World Bank and IMF to forgot that temperance was needed and pushed SAP policies that drove
developing countries into further hardship (Stiglitz 2002).
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international organizations that the reasons for development failure rest on endogenous,
rather than exogenous, forces (Williams 2009; Howell 1985). That idea contradicted what
African states argued in the “Lagos Plan of Action” (Organization of African Unity 1980;
Woods 2006) and the developing states argued in the call for a New International
Economic Order (United Nations General Assembly 1974).
The Bank’s employees and documents pointed to the problems of governance in
developing countries as one of the main reasons for lack of development. Yet its
employees still could not craft policy that would allow it to assume a role that became
deeply involved in the relationships between citizens and their government beyond
support for public administration capacity. Policy on governance dates back to the
previously mentioned reports such as the “Berg report” but really solidified in the 1990s
in relation to the discussions of ameliorating the difficult social impacts of the structural
adjustment programs. The first policy document formulated Bank’s ideas concerning
getting involved in governance by referring back to the Articles of Agreement. As noted
in the most recent Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy (GAC), the Managing
Development document
Observed that governance includes the form or nature of the political regime; the
processes by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's
economic and social resources; and the capacity of governments to design,
formulate, and implement policy and deliver goods and services…the first aspect
fell outside the Bank's mandate, requiring that it focus on the second and third
elements. This remains the Bank‘s position today (World Bank 2012c, emphasis
added, 9).
The Bank’s governance policy is largely informed by the decisions made and
written down by the Executive Board. Indeed, one of the most influential meetings for the
Bank’s governance policy occurred on December 16, 1993 in which the Bank decided on
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the term “good governance” and debated over how much the Bank should be involved in
governance policy (World Bank 1994, iv-v). The World Bank is more hierarchical than
the UNDP in the sense that its policies and procedures for doing business are very firm,
creating a bureaucracy that follows rules and regulations rather than being easily open to
new ideas and actions. The Executive Board, made up of 5 top donating members of the
Bank (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and 20
rotating members, makes most of the policy decisions for the Bank, including each IDA
funding round. The Board oversees the operations of the Bank by living and working in
Washington, D.C., meeting 2-3 times a week to discuss issues and resolve problems. The
Bank President has a powerful influence on policy making through his (all 12 Presidents
have been males) speeches and influence with the Board.
Like the UNDP, the World Bank has country offices all over the world (124
country offices) and has roughly 9,000 employees, with 2/3rd of its staff stationed at
headquarters in Washington, D.C.(World Bank 2012). Decentralization is being pursued
by the Bank to a greater extent in recent years, yet the hierarchical nature of the Bank’s
inter-relationships is deeply embedded within the organization. Staff must carefully
follow the policies that guide and dictate how staff members interact with member states.
This makes the policies that are written at headquarters influential and relevant for
country offices and practice.
Despite the backlash that the Bank received on the “Berg” report (from the
UNDP, among others), the Bank continued to create reports that significantly challenged
the ideas made popular in the Lagos Plan of Action. However the Bank did begin to
138

incorporate ideas on the political role of the state that differed from the Bank’s original
focus on the state simply as a tool for fostering market efficiency and providing an
enabling environment for markets. For example, “Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to
Sustainable Growth,” published in 1989 was one of the first reports where the Bank
suggested “good” governance in public institutions was the elixir that would fix the
financial crises of sub-Saharan African countries and reintroduce GDP growth, terms of
trade, and an enabling environment for small businesses and entrepreneurship. The 1989
report also incorporated state subsidization agendas (World Bank 1989). The President of
the World Bank at the time, Barber B. Conable, wrote in the introduction that
A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure of
public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are important,
but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance—a public service that is
efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is
accountable to its public (World Bank 1989).
By the late 1990s the Bank fully accepted its role in promoting “good”
governance as a method of development, largely in response to the negative feedback
from structural adjustment programmes, but also as a way to promote macroeconomic
growth (Nanda 2006). Scholars studying the Bank note that it “is not a politically-neutral
institution” anymore (Harrison 2005, 240). A further significant report, “World
Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World,” indicated the changing
nature of the Bank’s promotion of “good” governance by suggesting that the internal
institutions of the state need to be changed in order to bring about development through
markets. Joshi notes at least two important documents that suggest change in policy at the
Bank toward influencing state governance: the Comprehensive Development Framework
of the Bank since 1998, and an influential report of the same year entitled “Assessing Aid
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– What Works, What Doesn’t, and Why” (Joshi 2011; World Bank 1998). In 1996 the
World Bank commissioned a project on comparative governance indicators carried out by
the World Bank Institute that would compare countries in six “dimensions of governance
covering 200 countries since 1996: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and
Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of
Law, and Control of Corruption” (Kaufmann 2010).
Real support for good governance policy in the Bank was institutionalized in the
World Bank Institution (WBI) and took on the form of a greater support for integrating
civil society into development projects in the latter 1990s and 2000s. During his term
James Wolfensohn, then President of the World Bank, pushed for an organizational
restructuring of the Bank that would allow the Bank to become more able to learn from
outside sources and from changing knowledge in the world. He promoted a learning
organization that he called the “Knowledge Bank.” The policies on governance
developed directly out of this period and were very much associated with James
Wolfensohn, both his support for the new anti-corruption efforts and his concern with
engaging civil society in Bank projects and programs.
The Bank is constantly under a program of restructuring in order to make it
relevant to the international context in which it works. One of the most influential
restructuring programs for how the Bank has re-organized its governance policy is the
Strategic Compact of 1997. The Strategic Compact created the 5 thematic networks under
which employees would function, one of which is the Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management Network (PREM) under which the Governance and Public Sector
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Management Group works. The group is made up of Bank employees from all over the
Bank including from the World Bank Institute and form the Development Research
Group. These employees create documents and policies according to how they perceive
the practice changing from input from country offices, their own understanding of the
Bank’s functions and beliefs, and through direct consultation with each other.
The Bank’s governance policy, variously called good governance, good enough
governance, or inclusive enough governance is constantly couched in terms of supporting
the public administration capacities of states and encouraging stakeholder participation in
development projects:
It [The Bank] helps strengthen public sector management systems within the
executive branch, including the management of public finances and public
employment. It also seeks to improve the broader governance environment within
which the public sector operates, supporting institutions for public accountability,
such as parliaments and offices of the ombudsman, and tracking improvements by
measures of the rule of law, state legitimacy and trust in government institutions.
Efforts to reduce the risk of corruption are prominent in both of these (World
Bank n.d.a).
Table 3.7: World Bank Policies on Good Governance
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Structural Adjustment Programs and Policies
Governance and Development (1992)
Governance: The World Bank’s Experience (1994)
Country Assistance Strategies; Poverty Reduction Strategies
Operational Policies and Bank Procedures on Governance
Managing Development: The Governance Dimension: A Discussion Paper (1991)
Public Sector Strategy - Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World
Bank Strategy – Implementation Update,” March 28 2002.
Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy (GAC) (2007)
New Access to Information Policy (2010)
Strengthening Governance, Tackling Corruption: The World Bank’s Updated Strategy and
Implementation Plan (2012)

The Bank’s first attempt at norm articulation on governance came in the form of
the 1989 report on Sub-Saharan Africa and by a memorandum written by the General
Counsel on the limits of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement in reference to governance
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(Shihata 1995, 12; 56). Certainly the General Counsel’s memorandum on governance
provided to the board in 1990 (ibid, 12) helped to guide how the Board would articulate
its involvement with good governance. Following both the concern from Bank employees
who wrote the 1989 report, and the General Counsel’s advice, the Bank carved out a nonpolitical stance on governance in an influential 1994 publication, Governance, the World
Bank’s Experience. The publication argued that the Bank could be involved in “(i) public
sector management; ii) accountability; (iii) legal framework for development; and (iv)
transparency and information” (World Bank 1994, viii).
Over the years, following its practice, the Bank has written and implemented
Operational Policies (OP) and Bank Procedures (BP) that guide and direct the practice of
all Bank employees on governance promotion.
Operational Policies (OPs): are short, focused statements of policy that are based
on the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the General Conditions, and policies
approved by the Bank’s Executive Directors. OPs set out the mandatory policy
requirements for the conduct of Bank operations…Bank Procedures (BPs): are
statements setting out the general mandatory procedural requirements necessary
for Bank staff to carry out the policies set out in the OPs. They are designed to
ensure Bankwide consistency and quality in Bank operations (World Bank n.d.e).
In 1999 the World Bank, in partnership with the IMF and the UNDP, initiated
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) for the least developed countries who
received loans through its IDA branch (IMF 2011). The International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) and UN recognized the social costs of structural adjustment and sought
to step in, not to change the system or promote another attempt at a New International
Economic Order, but to consider how to implement structural adjustment with less social
cost. The UNDP’s “Social Dimensions of Adjustment Project,” the UNDP Policy Paper
on Poverty Eradication, and the 1995 World Summit for Social Development served as
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foundations for the creation of the PRSPs (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997; Murphy 2006,
290; United Nations Development Programme 1995). The PRSPs were meant to instill
national ownership and civil society participation in development projects and included a
component of planning the internalization of good governance in government institutions
(Ndulu 2006). 51
Developing its governance policy further, the World Bank created its first
Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy in 2007 which it updated in 2012. These
documents show a shifting understanding of its governance policy work. Previous
articulations had made it clear that participatory development was an essential aspect of
the way that countries and the Bank should work with beneficiaries. Yet, despite making
statements that suggested participation is important, the Bank’s primary focus has been
on engaging governments and making them efficient, effective and transparent. This
focus is changing in recent years as the Bank opens up to engaging with civil society and
communities that benefit from projects and programs. The Bank, through its policies, is
beginning to articulate that the focus on civil society and working with civil society is not
against its mandates, and it is even acceptable for the Bank to encourage and support
citizen engagement with government. The recent GAC update shows how the Bank is
continuing to support governance promotion and project implementation on transparency
and accountability, and works with civil society in many projects to enhance governance.

51

Critics of the PRSP process maintain that it does not instill national ownership or civil society
participation because the drafters of the PRSP are elites who fail to internalize the policies they have signed
in the PRSP.
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The Annual Reports are important for the World Bank in that they represent the
organization to its shareholders in a similar way that companies use Annual Reports to
ensure transparency and trust among shareholders. Shareholders in this context mean the
wealthy, developed countries who contribute the most to the Bank’s IDA and IBRD
funds. But it also means private investors who work with the IFC and MIGA, and
developing countries who are receiving the funds. Thus the Bank has to be very careful
about the language and examples it uses to demonstrate its effectiveness as a
development organization. The following represents the distribution of keyword counts
of good versus democratic governance keywords in the World Bank Annual Reports from
2001-2013 (the same keywords as listed above with the UNDP).
The World Bank’s Annual Reports show a decisive tendency to favor good
governance keywords over democratic governance keywords. The reports showed an
average of 47.68% in favor of good governance keywords. The highest keyword counts
in the World Bank Annual Reports were “services,” “government,” “fiscal,” “effective,”
“effectiveness,” and “business.” The Annual Reports had a heavy emphasis on the ability
of government to provide goods and services to a population, as well as on the services
that were offered by the World Bank Group in conjunction with government.
Surprisingly, there were some years in which efficient and efficiency of public service
delivery was a major priority (2001-2004), and other years in which the keywords and
discussion did not even come up at all (2005, 2006, 2010, 2012).
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Figure 3.4: Quantitative Content Analysis of the World Bank Annual Reports 52
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Next, the World Bank’s production of the World Development Reports (WDRs)
is crucial to its standing as a development organization. The WDRs can be analyzed for
setting the Bank’s agenda, for distributing key findings and statistics on development
around the world, and also for “their task as communicating major themes and
disseminating major ideas in development economics” (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997,
577). Figure 3.5 shows that in the World Bank’s case, almost every year’s language leans
heavily toward the use of good governance words with the exception of 1998 and 2012.
Overall, the average percentage difference is 48.26% in favor of good governance
keywords. Opposite of the UNDP, the percentage use of democratic governance words
actually increased over the two decades, starting with 9.93% in 1990 ending with 33.83%
in 2013 with highs in 1999, 2007, and 2012. This indicates that while the World Bank
generally favors good governance, it has been shifting in use of language and therefore
52

See Appendix 2 for Data for Figure 3.3.

145

governance policy toward favoring more democratic governance ideals. The average
percentage of good governance words shifted downward from 2001 (17.83%) to 2013
(25.6%) by 7.77% and up with the use of democratic governance words by the same
number.
Figure 3.5: Quantitative Content Analysis of the World Bank Development
Reports 53
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The use of the keyword “civil society” occurred less frequently throughout the
decade from a peak of 47 in 2003 to 0 in 2012 and only 10 in 2013. This is somewhat
surprising given the recent increase in concern at the Bank with working with civil
society through encouraging governments to engage in development project planning and
implementation, and through recent funds that support civil society networking. Over the
years there was zero use of the keyword “constitution” and only 1 use of the word
“democracy” (in 2001). The keyword “participation” remained somewhat steady, though
53

See Appendix 2 for data for Figure 3.5.
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its use dwindled by 2012 and 2013 as well and the use of “political participation” only
occurred once in 2005. The Bank’s use of words shows its support for the concepts
associated with good governance over and above those associated with democratic
governance. Yet, the trend is toward incorporating more democratic governance terms
into the Annual Reports in more recent years.
Table 3.8: Key Findings from Quantitative Content Analysis of the World Bank
•

•

On average, the Reports show that the World Bank is decisively more focused on supply-side
governance than demand-side governance. In other words, the World Bank supports the
efficiency and effectiveness of government institutions to provide government services more
often than it encourages participation from groups affected by government projects to engage
with government on the provision of government services.
The World Bank’s statements and practice show a bent toward governance projects that favor
top-down approaches to governance, however this focus is changing in recent years, especially
in the most recent changes to the GAC Strategy

The Bank is currently working on articulating a new governance and anticorruption strategy and “stock-taking” on implementation of the Bank’s governance
strategy up the present. The Bank had to compromise on the original governance and
anti-corruption strategy according to one respondent, not only because of the challenge of
incorporating governance rhetoric into Bank policy, but because of the various opinions
of how the Bank should be involved in governance, from the champions of governance
like Wolfensohn, to those country representatives on the Executive Board who disagreed
that the Bank should be at all involved in a country’s governance structure. The Bank is
on the ground impacting the way that states govern and virtually doing the same thing to
support democracy as does the UNDP, yet its rhetoric regarding democracy has been
difficult to change.
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Table 3.9: World Bank Funding for Good Governance 54
•
•

Public Sector Reform/Public Administration Sector
Global Partnership and Trust Fund – World Bank Group administers $29.2 billion in trust funds
28% of which are in the Public Administration and Law Sector

The Bank also increased the amount of loans for the specific purpose of funding
public administration capacity for good governance. Table 3.16 represents the Bank’s
governance spending according to sector. The Bank traditionally lends by sector. Since
1998, with the creation of the Comprehensive Development Framework, the Bank
carefully plans and provides development loans to countries by sectors. The financial
information by sector is provided in the Annual Reports. The sector that best represents
governance spending is that of public sector reform whose name changed to public
administration in 2001. Law and justice projects where added in 2001.
Contradictions in the annual reports make financial analysis difficult. For
example, while the individual Annual Reports only account for public sector spending
each year in the 1990s between one and five percent, the 2002 Report suggests an
average of 15 percent for the years 1992-1997 without discussion of why this statistic
changed between Reports. Other changes between reports note the difference between
planned and actual spending on public sector reform or public administration; where
possible I used the most recent data on actual spending rather than planned spending.
Looking at trends in governance project spending for the available years provides
evidence for the major shift toward promoting governance reform in the 1990s and 2000s
in very different ways than the Bank had done in prior years. First, a major shift is
evident in the amount of funding provided to the public sector management/public
54

2012 Trust Fund Annual Report (World Bank Group 2012).
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administration sector. The 2000s show a stable percentage of total spending forwarded to
public administration, law and justice (ranging from around 21 percent to 29 percent).
The 1990s represented support for public sector reform in much lower percentages of
total spending (ranging from nearly one percent to nearly five percent per annum).
The World Bank now administers over 1,000 trust funds and is the largest
multilateral channel for trust funds next to the World Food Program and the UNDP
(World Bank 2012a, 5). The World Bank has consistently outpaced UNDP in the amount
of money that it sends into the developing world to fund projects backed by policies.
Indeed, while both organizations continue to ‘fund’ projects in their own ways, projects
that are led by a results-based-framework, there is a push to lend according to policy
based outcomes and ideas rather than project based results. This organizational culture
change occurred in the mid- to late-1990s and has been influential in the way the two
organizations conceptualize development and the role of their governance portfolios.
The push comes from an understanding based in empirical evidence that lending
and granting for development projects will more likely be able to meet certain
overarching development goals if that work is done in a comprehensive way to meet
policy goals rather than for simply obtaining project outcomes. In other words, it is not
just the outcome of having built a functioning well in a village that allows villagers to
access clean water, it is the idea that building that well is contributing to a society that is
sustainable, increasing in growth, and meeting development goals that increase human
freedom and livelihoods. For example, the building of a well must be connected with
projects that increase the capacity of local government to deliver goods to citizens, that
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increases citizen participation and ownership in the well, and that increases the ability of
the private sector to respond to needs such as parts for the well that may break down in
the future. Policy based lending and granting is the new trend in the development
community and both the UNDP and World Bank follow this trend.
Figure 3.6: World Bank Good Governance Expenditure as a Percentage of Total 55
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNDP AND THE WORLD BANK
The UNDP and World Bank argue that they only provide advice when countries
ask for it, as all of my respondents made clear. Working in a country office means that
staff members are trying to meet the needs of the country at any given time. Yet it is
obvious that even when states ask for the technical assistance, advice or loans for
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Information gleaned from World Bank Annual Reports 2000-2012. See Appendix for data for Figure 3.5.
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infrastructure development they work in concert with the organizations that provide such
services.
Development organizations do indeed have input and influence in the kinds of
“requests” they get from states. Indeed, my respondents noted that influencing states was
of major importance to the work of the organizations. Influencing states to implement
certain changes, following certain norms that are promoted by the international
community and UN, or considering alternate points of view on sensitive issues, means
being in the right place at the right time in order to make that influence and push for
change. The role of the international community of states and other organizations is
important too, but access to governments and local authorities and elites is the key to
making change. The UNDP and World Bank are both largely advisory organizations.
Their job is to understand the complex system and situation in which states have to make
policy decisions. They must be on the ground with those states in order to provide
governments with the appropriate and relevant advice that is needed. These organizations
make recommendations to government authorities on the types of policies they should
follow. In order to do that, they must not only master the political, economic, and cultural
situations given them – they must also be in the right place at the right time – close to
governments and ministers – in order to make those recommendations.
This chapter argued that though the two organizations under study create policy
that is heavily influenced by member states and the path dependence of the organization,
leadership and organizational culture still play an instrumental role in policy formation on
governance norms through normative as well as strategic influence. It further argued that
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UNDP’s leaders promoted democratic norms that focused on citizen participation and
empowerment. The World Bank leaders supported government institutional efficiency
and effectiveness. Leaders influence policy by promoting their ideals in speeches and
statements. Such speeches include those given to the Executive Boards at the Annual
meetings which detail the plans and goals for the next year of the organization. They also
include speeches that simply guide the policy articulation that is then used in subsequent
policy documents. Leaders furthermore meet with heads of departments and executive
boards, pushing their own agendas for change in the organization. Finally, through
sanctioning or rewarding appropriate ways to articulate policy, the leaders guide the
organization in the path they see fit.
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IV: UNDP AND WORLD BANK LEADERSHIP PROFILES
This chapter argues that top leaders in the UNDP and the World Bank impacted
the way that governance norms were articulated for each organization despite pressure
from outside sources like member states or transnational civil society. Further, it shows
how leaders are also constrained and guided by the extant organizational culture and
belief systems surrounding what governance means within each organization. Two
leaders stand out as the most influential in the creation of governance policy since 1985.
James Wolfensohn supported the anti-corruption agenda at the Bank in such a way that
the focus on corruption and addressing its detrimental practices became a major practice
of the Bank in the latter 1990s. William H. Draper III supported the need for equality in
development outcomes at the UNDP. His influence in the UNDP helped to create the
human development paradigm that focuses on the rights and freedoms of the individual in
society to both have a say in government decision-making and structures, and partake in
the economy freely. Such leaders restructured their respective organization as they saw
fit, and influenced policy outcomes by promoting their own sense of what development
meant. At strategic points, the leaders set the agenda for how their organizations would
pursue governance policies and activities. Yet, the formation of governance policy was
also impacted by the organizational beliefs of the UNDP and World Bank members and
culture that had built up over the years.
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Leaders normatively influence policy creation by promoting their ideals in
speeches and statements and meetings with heads of departments and executive boards.
They also sanction or reward behavior they think is appropriate. The UNDP’s leaders
became heavily invested in promoting democratic norms beginning in the latter 1980s,
and it is through the process of influence from leaders that the UNDP started to turn to
democratic governance promotion. The World Bank had leaders that thought liberal
democracy important, but not as essential for meeting development outcomes, and
therefore included liberal ideals with little reference to democracy in policy statements
and leadership strategies of sanctioning and reward. Leaders also work with organizations
that have stanch and sometimes unmoving organizational cultures. In such cases, the
content and clarity of the beliefs about development and governance held by members of
the staff and already articulated in policy acts as a guide in the development of new
policy. Shared beliefs influence the day-to-day functions of these two organizations.
Shared beliefs place pressures on the leadership and staff to act and think in certain ways.
Using Schein’s second organizational cultural level of beliefs and assumptions,
each leadership profile below assesses the beliefs and ideas of each major individual
leader in the UNDP and World Bank from 1985-2012. I analyze speeches, statements,
policy initiatives, organizational change initiatives, and publications in order to determine
how each leader impacted the articulation of governance norms within each organization.
While recognizing that other leaders influenced the formation of the norm, especially
authority figures in specific departments or on specific issue areas, this analysis reduces
the number of subjects to the leaders of the organization on the basis of the actor-specific
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foreign policy analysis which asserts that leaders at high positions in authority make
decisions that affect the way that organizations and states act.

WHY DO LEADERS INFLUENCE NORMS DIFFERENTLY?
Administrators and Presidents made a greater impact on governance policy
outcomes than traditionally thought. The evidence from interviews, document analysis,
and process tracing shows that leadership impacts policy to a greater degree under three
structural conditions. First, when the organization is a learning organization in which the
members share knowledge and beliefs about the organization’s role in development and
know how to achieve its development goals, but are also open to change, it is more likely
that leaders will be able to work within the organization to promote change and influence
policy. On the other hand, when the organization is too stanch in its beliefs about
development goals, it is difficult to change entrenched beliefs and policy structures.
Second, being open to change means that the organization at all levels, from the people
working in the field to the Executive Board, are willing to reinterpret the mandate and
mission of the organization to meet changing world needs. When such an organizational
culture is extant in an organization, it is more likely that leaders will influence policy
changes and outcomes.
Third, leadership style that is collaborative, providing chances for organization
employees to offer their own voice and ideas concerning particular policy outcomes,
allows the leader to more positively affect change and influence policy. Policy creation,
change, and even implementation depend on individuals and on leaders from all levels.
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Notably, the leadership may have been influenced just as much by policies that existed
before coming into office, as by his or her own cultural ideals about the governance and
development nexus. There are both corporate barriers and there are corporate facilitators
to change. My interviewees noted often that individuals both at the top leadership levels,
and at lower levels, had an enormous impact on the articulation of policy. In fact, this
dependency on leadership for policy articulation and change can cause problems in
organizations like the UNDP and World Bank which are so decentralized from
headquarters. It means that departments and sectors are constantly pursuing different
tracks and goals. It also means that policy articulated in some venues of the organization
may not be implemented in other venues since it depends on whether or not the leaders of
sectors, country offices, and other venues would actually agree with the policy.
Others noted how personal the policy process is and how change and influence
really depend on individuals pressing their own interests and ideas. Guidance notes on
particular issues, for instance, are dependent on the particular expertise of the people
involved in their creation. If the people creating the guidance notes do not have specific
expertise on certain issue areas, it is likely those issue areas will not be included in the
guidance notes. Further, sustaining gains that have been implemented in the organization
is of incredible importance for gender equality, democracy, and any other contested
norms. But much of the gains and sustainability of these ideas resides in the individuals
who push them forward and promote them. In other words, the articulation and
implementation of policies into practice is dependent on leaders at all levels of the
organization because of how it is so decentralized.
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THE UNDP ADMINISTRATORS: LEADING IN DEMOCRACY
In recent decades, UNDP Administrators created a vision and advocacy role for
the organization, ranging from support for and promotion of development concepts such
as human development, sustainable human development, the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), and governance. The following provides an overview of the last five
UNDP Administrators’ espoused beliefs and values as well as the important
characteristics and elements of each one’s leadership style and what each one did to
influence governance policy articulation in the organization.
Table 4.1: UNDP Administrators (History and Background) 56
Administrator

Citizenship

Background

Ideals/Vision on Governance

William H.
Draper III

Years in
Office
19861993

United
States

Businessman, Venture
capitalist, US-Export Bank

James Gustaf
“Gus” Speth

19931999

United
States

Mark
MallochBrown
Kemal Derviş

19992005

United
Kingdom

20052009
2009present

Turkey

World Research Institution
founder, Chairman of Carter
Administration Council on
Environmental Quality
Businessman, UN High
Commissioner for Refugees
1979-83
World Bank, Turkish
Parliament
Prime Minister of New
Zealand (1999-2008),
Minister in Parliament,
Deputy Prime Minister,
Academic (U. of Aucland)

Inclusiveness, Human
Freedom, Venture Capital/
Private Sector, Women in
Development (WID),
Environment
Environment, enabling
environment for good
governance, participatory
focus
Democratic governance,
legitimate states, capacity
building
Delivering as One, AntiCorruption
Political party support
(administrative, capacity
building)

Helen Clark

New
Zealand

56

Information for this table gleaned from several different sources on the history of UNDP including online
and historical texts (Brown 2011, 36).
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William H. Draper III (1986-1993)
When Draper came to the UNDP in 1986 it had no central paradigm, mission,
understanding of its function in development, or even its place within the UN system.
Draper asked of his new colleagues: “What does the UNDP believe in?” and “Should it
not be advocating what it believes in?” (Weiss and Thakur 2010, 194; Murphy 2006). By
mobilizing people within the UNDP, and by changing the structure and practices of the
organization, Draper was instrumental in providing a foundation in UNDP programming
for an “advocacy role” (Murphy 2006; Browne 2011). This culminated in what become
incredibly influential ideas for development and its connection with governance policy
found in the human development paradigm. Draper’s introduction in the first Human
Development Report (HDR) exemplifies this change.
An irresistible wave of human freedom is sweeping across many lands. Not only
political systems but economic structures are beginning to change in countries
where democratic forces had been long suppressed. People are beginning to take
charge of their own destiny…In the midst of these events, we are rediscovering
the essential truth that people must be at the centre of all development (United
Nations Development Programme 1990).
The UNDP supported technical assistance capacity that was couched in democratic terms.
Yet, because of Draper’s influence, UNDP’s development assistance practice changed so
that it was now focused on the individual and his or her choices and freedoms both in
development and in government structures. 57 The nascent governance concepts included
the gender-governance-development nexus. Governance concepts focused on women’s
57

Murphy cites Arthur Holcombe on this dual track strategy that the latter called “running on two tracks”
(Murphy 2006, 238). The first goal of funding technical assistance measures to enhance government
capacity was left over from the inception of the organization; the second goal represented the change to an
organization that advocated development beliefs, ideas, and norms in international relations, as evinced
with the creation of the Human Development Reports that represented a change in the ideals and definition
of development from purely economic to that based on expanding human choices and freedoms.
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inclusion and participation. The governance policies supported neoliberal policies that
encouraged privatization and free market economies, sustainable development of the
environment, and democratic civil society incorporation and participation as important
for development.
Draper sanctioned practices that did not support the human freedom ideas, and
rewarded those that did. On gender equality policy, Draper made sure that each project
considered how women would participate and what the effects of the policy would be on
women. “One of the [project] approval criteria which was receiving growing emphasis
was an attention to the concerns of women, which Draper championed” (Brown 2011,
47). As a venture capitalist, Draper supported decentralization, a free market and
liberalization of developing economies; otherwise known as the “Washington
Consensus” policies in this era. 58 He encouraged his colleagues to collaborate with the
private sector as a development partner. Many of his colleagues at the UNDP gave him a
hard time for this focus, since the prevailing feeling about the private sector’s influence
on development was quite negative at the time (Brown 2011, 43). Yet, Draper persevered
and set precedence in the UNDP for engaging with the private sector which largely
turned into engagement with civil society organizations.

58

Draper was appointed by the Reagan administration after having served in the US Export-Import Bank
(Browne 2011, 36). The connection with the Reagan Administration and Draper’s own background in
investment and business as a venture capitalist is important for the changes that Draper made, both
surprising and unsurprising, in the focus or paradigm of the organization. The characteristic development
paradigm of the 1980s in the US and other powerful bilateral donors, and in the World Bank, was one of a
focus on neoliberal economics with a high respect for the market’s free functioning, reigning in state
intervention in the market, and highlighting the need for private business and investment. Draper was no
stranger to such ideologies and was appointed to the UNDP largely because of his background in venture
capitalism and the hope that he would push the neoliberal development agenda in the UNDP and promote
coordination with the private sector, which indeed, he did.
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Even before introducing the human development report in 1990, his language
increasingly supports the notions underlying the new human development paradigm as
evinced in his speeches and statements to the UN General Assembly, ECOSOC, and
Executive Boards (United Nations 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990, 1992). He
thought that people should have choices and the capabilities to function in society and
market as they wished and was supportive of the UN and UNDP’s role in “assisting
countries in their transition to democracy and free enterprise systems” (United Nations
1992, section 15, p. 5). Draper was an idealist with a pro-poor view of development.
Draper believed that development practice was not impacting the individual and that a
drastic change was needed in development thinking. It was because of Draper’s vision,
ideals and leadership that human development became one of the most influential
development paradigms. “Draper will be remembered by many people in the UN…as the
person who insisted on giving the organization something to stand for, thus helping to
complete its transformation into a more comprehensive development agency” (Murphy
2006, 48).
Draper’s influence on governance policy articulation was instrumental in the
UNDP. First, he successfully restructured the organization to make it function as an
advocacy organization. Second, he mobilized individuals to create the human
development paradigm, centering development focus on human choices and freedom.
Human development informed the way that the UNDP then thought about governance, it
was essential to focus on individuals’ ability to participate in government in ways that
gave them voice and power, emphasizing participation of the individual in almost every
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aspect of UNDP’s work with governments. Third, Draper sanctioned and rewarded
behavior that he thought complimented human development so that employees always
considered equality and participation as essential to development projects, essential
aspects of democratic governance. Finally, Draper’s speeches and statements influenced
the way that UNDP moved forward as an advocacy development organization. It is easy
to see how he left a heavy imprint on the development of UNDP governance policy and
we see his ideas in every subsequent Administration in differing ways.

James Gustaf “Gus” Speth (1993-1999)
The phrase “creating an enabling environment for sustainable human
development” is attributed to Gus Speth’s leadership on environmental sustainability
during the 1990s. Sustainable human development needed an “enabling environment”
that would allow development projects to succeed in implementing projects that did not
harm the environment and were sustainable for future generations. Indeed, it was during
this time that the UNDP started to think strategically about democratic governance and
even to use the language much more often.
Speth took up the notion of participatory development in a way that proposed a
particularly democratic ideal for good governance. Through a long process of pressuring
the Executive Board of the UNDP to include good governance ideas, Speth remembered
that “we - both me personally and UNDP - spent a lot of time and energy making 'good
governance' a legitimate theme…and then building it up as a major focus of country
programming…including the big issues of corruption and human rights” (Murphy 2006,
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268). It had been a trend in the 1990s to focus on governance in development agencies.
However, the UNDP’s particular governance focus was connected with democratic ideals
and principles founded on both Draper and Speth’s leadership. Indeed Murphy notes that
many of Speth’s speeches on good governance made an explicit connection with
democratization (Murphy 2006, 276-277).
During the 1990s the UNDP grappled with what the human development
paradigm meant and how to continue to advocate for it through its development practice.
The topics that were most controversial were the use of the term “good governance” and
the problem with encouraging states to comply with governance norms, and
environmentally sustainable human development. Speth’s impact on the changing nature
of and understanding of human development in these two areas was greatly marked by
his experience as an environmental researcher, activist, and lawyer (Murphy 2006, 269271). Speth used language like good governance, human rights, and gender equality. On
gender equality he focused on gender parity, talking about increasing female
representation among the UN employees, especially among Resident Coordinators
working at the country level. Speth’s focus on the environment and sustainable human
development emerges in all his speeches and writing; in one speech he notes that the
UNDP gave a fourth of their resources to sustainable environmental development (United
Nations General Assembly 26 June 1997).
Speth was concerned with continuing UNDP’s connection with the UN system by
enhancing its coordinating role (Browne 2011, 61). Speth made sure that the UNDP
fulfilled its mandate as the coordinating organization between all other UN agencies
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through the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), thus strengthening the
UNDP’s position in the UN system as well as the Administrator’s position as the Chief of
the Executive Board.
Yet Speth’s leadership also proved to be lacking in many areas including his
inability to gain more funding for the UNDP in an era when funding for development
declined at a significant rate after the end of the Cold War. He attempted to raise morale
within the organization but found it increasingly difficult, and his leadership style lacked
the character that would inspire people to follow him and his ideas. Murphy characterizes
him as shy and intellectual, noting that the benign picture drawn of UNDP has a flying
elephant with glasses was an apt representation of Speth’s leadership. Speth traveled
extensively, talked with employees, and was concerned with the UN’s relationship with
the rest of the UN system. Yet because of his shy demeanor, most of his legacy has been
attributed to Mark Malloch Brown (Murphy 2006, 264-277).
The particular strategies that Speth used in impacting the way that governance
was framed by the UNDP were somewhat different than Draper’s strategies. Indeed,
Speth relied on collaboration and cooperation between employees in the organization to a
great degree. He certainly used his intellectual and collaborative capabilities to expand
his influence over the Executive Board to ensure their support for democratic ideals. His
speeches and statements did not use the same outright support of democracy as Draper
had done, but all his language on environmental sustainability, human development,
gender equality, and human rights betrays that focus. Indeed, my interviewees said that
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Mark Malloch Brown simply came into the organization and changed the language from
“enabling environment” to “democratic governance.”

Mark Malloch-Brown (1999-2005)
Mark Malloch Brown is the Administrator most often credited with making an
impact on UNDP programming, and creating the democratic governance concept (or at
least promoting the rhetoric of democratic governance in a different way than his
predecessors). Malloch Brown was certainly influential in the UNDP’s deepening focus
on governance as support for liberal democracy norms and principles rather than
governance as simply focused on efficient and effective institutions. However, Malloch
Brown built on his predecessors’ impact and influence on the UNDP’s direction in
promoting governance ideology to states. Most notably in his administration is the focus
on communication to a large audience, changes in the organizational structure and in staff
postings, and in the changes to terms rather than to actual principles or concepts.
Following in Gus Speth’s footsteps, Malloch Brown used the enabling
environment idea. He argued that an enabling environment was needed for sustainable
human development as well as for achieving all developmental goals. Thus, the term
“enabling environment” was changed to “democratic governance” (Browne 2011, 66).
Malloch Brown was an influential communicator and what he did for the democratic
governance concept was to put it up on the web. Despite his predecessor’s success,
Malloch Brown had his own ideas and vision concerning governance. He supported
democratic changes in Cambodia and the Philippines: “Democracy, I became convinced,
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might have saved the million or more lives lost in little Cambodia” (Malloch Brown
2011, 80). He backtracked later in a book written about his experience when he writes
that he realized that democracy was not a panacea for meeting development or human
rights goals, rather, that it had to be coupled with economic success: “Good economics is
a precondition for good politics” and he concludes with “my personal crusade for
national democracy as the cure for a country’s backwardness had run up against its limits.
It was a vital but not sufficient condition for development” (Malloch Brown 2011, 9697).
The ability for the Administrator and the UNDP as a whole to begin using the
terms “democracy” and “democratic governance” was founded in the speeches and
publications of the Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali
(1992-1996) and bolstered by Secretary General Kofi Annan (1997-2006). The latter
coincided with Mark Malloch Brown’s tenure as UNDP Administrator. Boutros Ghali
made a large impact with his three “Agendas” that informed, and still inform, policies in
the UNDP on democracy promotion. 59 In fact, it was Boutros-Ghali that led the UN to be
more involved with peace-keeping missions than it had previously been (Karns 2012). 60
Boutros-Ghali’s leadership into post-conflict peacebuilding reignited a focus on
democracy promotion in the UN. Kofi Annan’s support for the democratic principles that
Boutros Ghali articulated was more institutional than normative; Annan continued the
59

These were “Agenda for Peace” “Agenda for Democracy” and “Agenda for Development” (Ghali 1994).
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Margeret Karns explains how the UN General Assembly had asked Boutros-Ghali to create a policy
document that would guide the UN in its efforts to help in conflict situations in the new international
structure after the end of the Cold War. She shows that Boutros-Ghali included, without being asked, the
notion of post-conflict peace-building and therefore created a new role for the UN in post-conflict
situations.
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changes and support for democracy initiated under Boutros-Ghali’s tenure (Haack and
Kille 2012).
Malloch Brown represented an Administrator whose public persona and business
sense redefined and changed the structure of the organization to position itself with
comparative advantage in the international development system. Malloch Brown’s
Administration was characterized by vast changes to the structure of the organization, to
its marketing capacity, and to its way of doing business. He argued that democratic
governance ideals should be the development goals of the organization.
Malloch Brown suggested in several speeches that the UNDP was trying to create
a niche for itself with a business plan. He noted that the UNDP seemed well placed to
support governments in drafting laws and constitutions, provide electoral assistance, and
work in areas that development traditionally avoided. “UNDP views itself as a
campaigning organization, committed to stoking the demand for change, but we are also
a policy advisory agency, helping Governments craft policies and institutions that drive
gender equality and women's empowerment” (United Nations General Assembly June 9,
2000, 68). Moreover, Malloch Brown argued that the UNDP’s vision should be different
from other organizations:
An unambiguous message needed to be taken to the highest political level. The
business vision of the UNDP would be sharpened, determining where it belonged
in the fight against poverty, with its broad coalition of partners. It would
prioritize the capacity-building and governance role that was emerging as its most
differentiated future function (United Nations Economic and Social Council July
22, 1999, 4).
Malloch Brown’s strategies for influencing governance policy articulation were
different from his predecessors. His business and marketing background made him
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influential in couching the governance rhetoric and marketing it to the public. He was not
afraid, as his predecessors had been, to use the word “democracy,” or to publish the idea
of democratic governance as widely as possible. He also worked collaboratively with the
UN Secretary General in a way that solidified the use of the democratic governance
language for the decade to follow. Malloch Brown’s collaborative leadership style and
his vision to guide the organization like he would a business venture helped the UNDP to
articulate its policy for the world.

Kemal Derviş (2005-2009)
Kemal Derviş’s entry into the UNDP administration in 2005 was novel for several
reasons including the fact that Derviş was the first UNDP Administrator to represent a
country who had actually received development funds from the UNDP (Murphy 2006,
90). Derviş had a long and esteemed development and academic career. Because of his
experience Derviş came to the UNDP with a stronger and better understanding of
development and economics than his predecessors (Browne 2011, 80). Furthermore
Derviş had a vision of change for the United Nations following on what many of his
predecessors had envisioned for the UNDP (Murphy 2006, 331). Derviş was one of the
people behind the Delivering as One report and initiative that had been started by Kofi
Annan at the end of his tenure as Secretary General. The Delivering as One document
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suggested ways that the United Nations could become a more unified system (United
Nations 2006). 61
Derviş did not make many policy impacts or changes on governance. Several
crises occurred during his administration that called into question his leadership and the
structure of the UNDP has a whole. The crises included the problematic nature of
supporting the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK), the Executive
Board’s dislike of the first draft of the 2008 Strategic Plan and call for revisions, and the
lack of reform that the UNDP needed and that Derviş had promised. Browne notes that
Derviş was absent from key Executive Board meetings in 2007. Further,
It was apparent to the UNDP staff that [Dervis’s] heart had never really left
Washington… There was an unfortunate irony in the fact that the first UNDP
administrator to have been chosen on a meritocratic basis, and with the strongest
resume of any of his predecessors, had been so short-lived (Browne 2011, 80).
Derviş had very little impact on the way that UNDP couched governance policy.
All of the work that Malloch Brown had done helped the UNDP glide through the
troubled years of Derviş’s tenure. The Strategic Plan of 2008-2011 still incorporated
democratic governance as one of the main areas of UNDP work. UNDP development
support and practice continued to support democratic governance projects, knowledge
products, and assistance to states. Thus, everything that had been institutionalized by
former UNDP Administrators continued on unhindered in the Derviş years.

61

Speth and Malloch Brown had been arguing for with the reform of the Resident Coordinator system, both
of them suggesting that the Resident Coordinators should not only represent the UNDP in the country
offices but should also coordinate for and act as representatives for the whole UN system.
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Helen Clark (2009-Present).
As with any new Administrator it is difficult to say what the Administrator’s
focus and changes will be on the organization while they are in office. Helen Clark
started in office in 2009 and is there at the time of this dissertation’s publication. One
thing that is notable about Helen Clark’s appointment as Administrator is that she is one
of the first women to take on the role as Under-Secretary General, and is the first woman
to be a UNDP Administrator. She also comes from a strong parliamentary background
and my interviewees thought that pushing the UNDP on concern for parliamentary
strength, training, and support would be one of Clark’s legacies in the governance policy
realm.

THE WORLD BANK PRESIDENTS: LEADING IN GOVERNMENT
EFFICIENCY
Even while the Board of Governors 62 hold the final responsibility for policy
articulation and creation at the Bank, the Presidents of the World Bank have a large
influence on the policies that are articulated and implemented, the daily functions of the
Bank, and the way that projects are funded through the Bank.

62

Member countries of the Bank appoint a governor to the Board of Governors who are completely
responsible for policy at the Bank, however, the Board of Governors, in practice, gives authority for most
decisions to the Executive Directors which is made up of 24 representatives. “They are responsible for
making policy decisions affecting the Bank Group’s operations and for approving all loans” (World Bank
Group 2007, 9).
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Table 4.2: World Bank Presidents (History and Background) 63
Administrat
or
Barber
Conable

Years in
Office
19861991

Citizenship

Background

Ideals/Vision on Governance

United
States

US Marines (WWII and
Korean War), lawyer, Served
in New York State Senate and
US House of Representatives

Lewis
Preston

19911995

United
States

US Marines (WWII),
Commercial/international
banker (J.P. Morgan); lawyer

James
Wolfensohn

19952005

Banker, Officer in Australian
Air Force, Lawyer

Paul
Wolfowitz

20052007

Australian,
Naturalized
Citizen of
the United
States
United
States

Robert
Zoellick

20072012

United
States

Banker (Goldman Sachs), US
Trade Representative, US
Deputy Secretary of State,
positions in the US
Department of Treasury

“Greening” the Bank, focus
on Gender and Development
(GAD), Macroeconomic
growth as the way to reduce
poverty
Poverty Reduction, clientoriented focus, inclusion of
social and economic issues in
lending and projects
Anti-Corruption focus,
Poverty Reduction, need for
efficiency in development
delivery, participation in
development planning
“Good Governance Banker,”
Anti-Corruption, World
Bank’s role in Africa
highlighted
Gender Equality as smart
economics, increased focus
on democratization as
essential for development,
importance of
macroeconomic stability

US Government, Academia
(Johns Hopkins, Yale)

The President’s speeches and statements influence the way that the Board votes,
the policies and actions pursued by the employees of the Bank, and how Strategic Plans
and IDA funding replenishments are couched. Indeed, the President is chairman 64 of the
Boards of Executive Directors and is responsible for day-to-day functions of the Bank,
making sure that the Bank is pursuing its mandates appropriately, and ensuring that all
projects and policies conform to the most recent articulations of the mission and focus of
the Bank (World Bank n.d.h). Further, “within the IBRD and IDA, most organizational
63

This chart (especially column two on governance and development vision) is developed from Katherine
Marshal’s chart on a summary of the World Bank’s Presidents (Marshall 2008, 32-33), and World Bank
publications (World Bank 2011a, 203).
64

While the president is the chairman and chairs all meetings of the IDA, IBRD, MIGA, and the IFC, he or
she does not have a vote in the decisions made (World Bank Group 2007, 8).
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units report to the president and, through the president, to the executive directors” with
the exception of the Independent Evaluation Group and the Inspection Panel (World
Bank 2011a, 9-10; World Bank Group 2014).
When Robert McNamara was President of the Bank (from 1963-1981), the
Bank’s focus shifted to poverty alleviation and McNamara’s vision guided the Bank on
this front (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997). The Bank that McNamara molded during his
Presidency is still largely the Bank today, both in process and structure (Marshall 2008,
39). He contended that poverty could be measured and poverty could be reduced.
McNamara was able to counteract the decade of minimization of the work and purpose of
the Bank that had occurred in the wake of the Marshall Plan by increasing capital flows
through the Bank. This was a shift from the focus on development to a greater focus on
poverty reduction that occurred early on in the organization’s history (Marshall 2008, 3739).Yet near the end of McNamara’s Presidency the 1970s economic crises inspired a
turn to focusing on macroeconomic stability which became evident and controversial in
the structural adjustment programs that placed macroeconomic policy conditionalities on
low and middle income countries for receiving Bank and IMF loans (Marshall 2008, 40).
After McNamara left the Bank in 1981, poverty reduction took on less importance in the
Bank’s development practice, though poverty reduction was still a major goal of the
Bank’s development practices. The new administrators favored a macroeconomic focus
to development. Yet, in the 1990s the focus on poverty reduction reemerged, especially in
light of the negative impacts of the SAPs.
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Barber Conable (1986-1991).
When Barber Conable came to the Bank in 1986, the organization was heavily
involved with the IMF in implementing SAPs to low and middle income countries whose
economies had been struggling since the 1970s debt crises. The governance rhetoric for
most of the 1980s can be summed up in one quote from Conable’s speeches: “Economic
growth is the cornerstone of successful development and poverty reduction” (World Bank
1991, 149). Conable was instrumental in his efforts at reorganizing the Bank and in
encouraging a development focus to organize the governance rhetoric around market
oriented freedoms. He was very supportive of the SAPs and the market economy,
considering poverty reduction a special focus of the Bank done through support for
macroeconomic growth. In a speech to the Board of Governors at the 1987 Annual
Meetings, Conable endorsed the market-based approach.
The World Bank is ready to play a reinvigorated role in the fundamental tasks of
development-to promote economic growth and to combat poverty. We will give
strong and reliable support to the adjustment efforts of our member countries. We
will work to preserve the open global and financial trading system, which is
essential for growth. And we will vigorously promote the market-oriented policies
and reforms that best mobilize private capital flows and encourage the creative
energies of millions of people for efficient growth (World Bank 1991).
Barber Conable spent much of his time defending the SAPs and the focus of the
Bank on macroeconomic growth and stability as the best way to encourage a country to
development and reduce poverty.
The first lesson is that adjustment is not a quick fix and the debt crisis cannot be
resolved overnight. It must be done; failure to change failed policies leaves the
poor without hope. But…the process of stabilization and structural reform has
been, and will continue to be, painful for many (World Bank 1991).
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Figuring out how to handle criticism and how to make changes to SAPs was a highlight
of Conable’s Presidency. Conable desperately tried to revive the reputation of the World
Bank in an era that created the Fifty Years is Enough Campaign that tried to put it to an
end.
It was not until near the end of his term as President that Conable started
integrating the language and term of “governance” into his speeches and discussions with
a large group of institutions including the Board of Governors of the World Bank, but
also with other Banks and regional organizations such as the Organization of African
Unity, now the African Union. The governance discussion in the Bank revolved around
the ability for governments to provide goods and services to its citizens, and engage its
citizens in free political and economic systems, sometimes even endorsing democracy. At
the same time, aware of its apolitical mandate, its Presidents and employees tend to couch
governance in apolitical terms.
The World Bank is not about to involve itself in the internal political affairs of
any country or to introduce any new political conditionalities in its work. We are
a development institution, and we will continue to focus our attention only on
those aspects of governance that directly affect development--accountability,
transparency, predictability, adherence to the rule of law, and so on. These are not
new issues for the Bank…we will be paying increasingly more attention to them
in the years to come" (World Bank 1991, 170).
During his tenure the Bank certainly increased its focus on poverty reduction.
Indeed, the Bank’s goals were to lead in development, to increase the consideration of
women in development, and to focus on environmental issues (World Bank 1991, 172173). He was a politician, so his tactics for engaging the Bank in governance and
development were those that politicians would use. He encouraged the Congress to work
with the Bank and give it aid, and he also created alliances in the Executive Board right
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after he came into the organization in a way that allowed the Board to approve the
budget. His political acumen allowed him to communicate with others in a way that won
them over to his arguments, as in the discussions he had with African Presidents on
implementing SAPs (Kapur, Lewis, and Webb 1997, 192), an element of his good
governance approach.
One thing that may have made Conable successful in his reformation efforts at the
Bank was that he was an outsider. Everyone expected a banker from Wall Street to be
appointed to the position so when Conable was appointed there was great surprise, even
on his own account. Because he was new to the organization he had more sway in
changing it (Saxon 2003). The reorganization that he instituted was painful for many and
lasted several years longer than he had wished (from 1987-1989), but in the end he felt
that the Bank had a better sense of its mission in the world: to reduce poverty by
supporting macroeconomic growth and an enabling environment for a free market in
which all citizens could participate.

Lewis T. Preston (1991-1995)
Lewis T. Preston’s most influential impact on the Bank’s governance policy was
to encourage the mutual inclusion of social issues with economic issues in the entire
Bank’s project planning and lending programs. Lewis was concerned with the Bank’s
place and role in the World, especially in the time of international turmoil of the early
1990s. The Fifty Years is Enough campaign to end World Bank lending was at its height,
and severe critiques of the World Bank’s impact on social living because of SAPs
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threatened to make the World Bank a relic of the 20th century. Preston entered the scene
and tried to overcome these major problems and debates in which the Bank was
embroiled, while also influencing the way that the Bank saw its place in the world. The
break-up of the Soviet Union and the entry of a multitude of states into the Bank’s
membership in the 1990s encouraged a heightened integration of the Bank into public
administration work, i.e., in helping new states set up their bureaucracies and public
service policies, in increasing social sector lending, and maintaining an important focus
on poverty reduction (World Bank n.d.d). Preston made sure that the social issues of
development were also at the forefront of how the Bank dealt with these new countries.
The shift in governance policy to focus more specifically on social issues was very
different from his predecessors and changed the vision of governance policy for the Bank
henceforth.
Preston’s presidency would be best classified as cultivation because of his ability
to work with colleagues and make them feel welcomed and respected, although this
collegial relationship did not always transfer to his relationship with the Executive Board
(Binder 1995). Yet, he was reserved, lacked a personal understanding and vision for
development, and lacked the necessary ability to project a public persona that would reinspire trust and respect for the Bank. Mallaby (2004) argues that on the mission of
poverty reduction Preston “utterly failed to deliver this message with punch or
conviction” (57) and that furthermore “Preston's qualities—his reserve, his modesty, his
gentlemanly style—were no match for the theatrical talents of his NGO critics” (63).
Furthermore, his speaking abilities and public persona in large groups left him wanting in
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his abilities to change the organization to overcome the major problems it was facing
with its programming and the criticism from outside sources (Ramsamy 2006, 175).
Preston struggled to make changes in the organization. His tactics consisted of
engaging with individuals and small groups. He tried to rebalance the bureaucracy and
minimize the differences in staffing that he saw as problematic (reducing the number of
high paid staff and encouraging gender parity in higher positions in the organization). He
was concerned with the Bank’s lack of focus on social issues and instituted some changes
in project lending that would ameliorate this problem. While he set the Bank on a path to
incorporate social issues with economic, his legacy is tattered with the vast amount of
changes in the international system that overwhelmed the Bank in the early 1990s, and
with the intense criticism coming from NGOs, countries and civil society groups that
would have liked to see the Bank destroyed.

James D. Wolfensohn (1995-2005).
Just as Mark Malloch Brown was most influential in the UNDP for making a
presence for governance on the UNDP’s agenda, and for marketing democratic
governance to the world, so President James Wolfensohn marketed good governance as a
focus on anti-corruption for the World Bank. Wolfensohn represents one of the
controversial Presidencies of the Bank. He was charismatic, called the ‘Renaissance
President’ for his extensive interests, and determined to make the changes that he thought
necessary; Mallaby characterizes Wolfensohn as “a charmer, a seducer, a force of nature"
(2004, 79). The first few months and years of his Presidency represented a controlling
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culture in which he replaced senior management and attempted structural change with
passion. He worked hard with a resistant organization to change the structures of the slow
and intractable bureaucracy. Yet while he had a vision of poverty alleviation that rivaled
Robert McNamara’s vision, Wolfensohn struggled to make the changes to the
organization that would allow for a re-focus and definition of policy and projects onto
individual poverty alleviation in a more meaningful way that that which was already
embedded in the organization. “Wolfensohn did have a vision for the organization as an
organization dedicated to relieving poverty, but failed to put in place the management
systems that would support and reinforce that vision” (Denning 2011).
He succeeded in changing the structure of how the organization loaned money
which became a crucial aspect of the Bank’s governance policy. The Comprehensive
Development Framework (CDF), written by Wolfensohn and adopted as policy in
January 1999, focused on the idea of country ownership of development projects. 65
Wolfensohn was very supportive of inclusive participation of each community and
country in the planning and implementation of development projects that affected them.
The CDF represented a change in the way that the World Bank went about creating and
implementing projects. It placed the communities and countries at the center of the
development and poverty reduction strategies, creating mechanisms in which they
participated and in which the social as well as economic aspects of development were
combined.

65

Ramsamy writes that Wolfensohn drafted the CDF by long hand (Ramsamy 2006, 201 fn.4). This was
presented to the World Bank Board of Governors in 1998 (World Bank Group 2014).
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[Wolfensohn] reflected that complexity by constantly reaching out to groups
previously remarkably neglected by the Bank, notably youth, cultural leaders, the
disabled, and faith leaders and communities…He was also deeply moved by what
he saw of poverty, and often echoed the influential Voices of the Poor work
(Marshall 2008, 50).
Including participation as a fundamental aspect of how the Bank loaned money to
countries was not an easy feat to make. Changing the organization’s traditional ways of
doing country assessments, of creating the development policies and projects, meant that
the employees of the organization who had been working one way for so long revolted in
some ways. The new ideas about participation certainly built off the long trend of the
Bank to encompass social development issues into its projects and to encourage
participation, yet it also challenged traditional development practices for the Bank. The
changes culminated in the Poverty Reduction Strategies.
In contrast to past approaches, which were applied to countries by donor
organizations, developing countries now write their own strategies for reducing
poverty. The resulting Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) then become
the basis for IDA lending from the World Bank… (World Bank 2011a, 52).
Crucially, the way that PRSPs are created is by including civil society groups and
representatives in the discussion. Thus, Wolfensohn helped craft the Bank’s governance
participation policy and put it into practice through the CDF.
Wolfensohn was very concerned with governance and was continuously advised
not to use the “c” word, i.e., corruption, because of its political implications (Marshall
2008, 50). Wolfensohn famously discussed corruption in his address at the 1996 Annual
Meetings, arguing that corruption was a “cancer” that hindered development (World
Bank n.d.b). Corruption was thought to be too connected to a government’s political
structures and while the Bank certainly focused on encouraging transparency and
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accountability in its previous work (especially starting in the 1980s with the SAPs), it had
maintained an aloof discussion on corruption up until Wolfensohn’s Presidency and his
speeches and statements that did not shy away from pointing out corrupt practices of
member states. While his colleagues pressured him not to discuss corruption, he
pressured them back, arguing that corruption was one of the main reasons for lack of
development and inability to address poverty in many developing countries. Since
Wolfensohn, the Bank almost sees good governance and anti-corruption as
interchangeable words – it is the heart of the good governance agenda.
Making changes toward “mainstreaming good governance” represented a huge
barrier for Wolfensohn, partially because of the intractability of the operational culture
and partly because of the political nature of focusing on corruption (Weaver 2008, 11).
Wolfensohn’s impact on the changing nature of the Bank’s paradigm to incorporate a
good governance agenda with an anti-corruption tint (Marshall 2008) created a defining
moment for governance promotion within the Bank that focused it on efficient and
effective government transparency, accountability, and public service provision.
The difficulty of making policy or structural change in the Bank becomes evident
even when Presidents are interested in changing the focus of the organization in order to
become more efficient and effective in the World Bank’s operations. For instance, when
James Wolfensohn became President he had a vision for poverty reduction and
development that he wanted the Bank to follow and was therefore committed to a
particular vision of development. He is most well known for initiating a focus on anticorruption at the Bank, but he also pushed the concepts of good governance, poverty
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alleviation and reduction, and achieving the MDGs. In order to achieve the changes that
he thought necessary on policy and implementation at the Bank, Wolfensohn initiated an
organizational and structural change that became known as the Strategic Compact.
The structural changes were meant to change the nature of the Bank to create
what he championed as a “Knowledge Bank” both creating new knowledge and learning
from other’s knowledge. However, the Strategic Compact reorganization proved to be too
unwieldy and broke against the rigid hierarchy and rules of the Bank. Though many
changes were actively instituted, such as the creation of knowledge sharing platforms and
establishing distance learning centers, the lofty goals of the change were never really
implemented. “Where newly espoused theories differ greatly from long-standing
theories-in-use, the sheer complexity of transforming norms, mindsets, and habits will at
best produce slow and incremental change”(Weaver 2008, 42). Even so, Wolfensohn’s
strategies of organizational change, his influence through statements and speeches, and
his sheer personality allowed him to influence the articulation of Bank governance policy
in ways that increased the link between rhetoric and reality on both participation and on
anti-corruption.

Paul Wolfowitz (2005-2007)
Paul Wolfowitz came to the Bank from the United States Department of Defense.
He was very concerned with African countries, especially heavily indebted countries, and
was supportive of democracy. Indeed, during his time at the Bank he supported
strengthening the Bank’s support for African countries and strengthening the Bank’s
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work on anti-corruption (World Bank n.d.f). Yet, Wolfowitz’s Presidency proved
tumultuous for the Bank, first because he did not get along well with his new colleagues
at the World Bank and even clashed on particular issues (DeYoung 2007). The distrust
was in some part because he was perceived by some to be doing the bidding of the United
States government. 66 Second, he became engulfed in his own corruption scandal when it
came to light that he had arranged for large pay and promotions to be given to his
girlfriend, Shaha Ali Riza, a World Bank employee (Weisman 2007). It was the scandal
with Ms. Riza that led to Wolfowitz’s early resignation from the Bank. Through this
process, he drew the Bank back into the distrust and public relations crises it experienced
in the 1980s and 90s and many developing countries voiced their displeasure with the
long tradition of having the United States appoint the President of the Bank, a practice
that, though challenged, has not changed.
Wolfowitz had a clear vision to make the Bank abide more closely to the
neoconservative stance on government intervention and the free market, including
supporting African countries by reducing their debt and encouraging the reduction of
corruption within those countries. He pursued a reorganization in which he brought in
outsiders as senior management staff, which many Bank employees became upset about
(Denning 2011). Wolfowitz’s initial strategy on anti-corruption was to clean up the
corruption problems in a way that was much stricter than the Executive Board was
66

According to Cassidy “He has suspended loans to developing countries that he regards as corrupt—
among them Chad, Kenya, and Bangladesh—while expanding the bank’s activities in places where the
United States and its allies have intervened militarily, including Lebanon and Iraq. “Karl Rove would be
proud: the man whom the world associates with the war in Iraq has recast himself as the crusader for good
governance and development,” Manish Bapna, the executive director of the Bank Information Center, a
not-for-profit organization in Washington that monitors the bank’s activities, said. “But inside the bank
there is still a perception on the part of some staffers that his real agenda remains hidden, and that it reflects
priorities from the Bush Administration” (Cassidy 2007).
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willing to support. For instance, Woflowitz pushed the board to have a stricter stance on
loans to those countries that had corruption problems. Wolfowitz interpreted the anticorruption agenda as punitive. Wolfowitz was attributed with connecting good
governance with democracy (Cassidy 2007), the latter concept traditionally being
minimized by the Bank because of its political implications, though it is evident in most
publications and discussions with Bank employees that they support democracy and
participation in government.
Wolfowitz’ tenure was characterized by a control environment that led to lack of
influence on most issues. Despite his concern with anti-corruption and poverty in Africa,
his influence was largely impeded by his own controlling behaviors, by his background,
and by his actions as President in making decisions connected with his girlfriend, Shaha
Ali Riza, that some regarded as corrupt. Indeed, Wolfowitz slightly undermined the
governance and anti-corruption agenda that Wolfensohn had supported. Wolfowitz
showed how embroiled into corruption scandals the World Bank and its employees could
be.

Robert Zoellick (2007-2012).
Zoellick’s tenure was characterized by quietude after the extravagancies of
Wolfowitz, but during this quiet a change wrought in the organization strengthened the
governance policy in ways that Zoellick’s predecessors were unable to bring about. A
focus in IDA16 replenishment 67 on results based lending and the inclusion of goals and

67

Every few years the International Development Association or IDA conducts meetings to plan for
funding sources and development themes for the upcoming funding round.
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targets for getting to development outcomes meant that the World Bank redefined itself
to accommodate the world’s environment. Zoellick was just as concerned with
governance issues, especially anti-corruption, as his predecessors. Partly because of
Wolfowitz’s problems, Zoellick ramped up the Bank’s investigative arm, the Institutional
Integrity (INT) Department.
Though Zoellick’s Presidency was not the first evidence of gender equality norms
in the World Bank, it did spark a concern that had not been evident to the extent that it
became in planning for the IDA16 funding round. That funding round included
measurable outcomes, such as the writing of the WDR 2012 that focused on gender
issues. It also focused on specifically measurable ways to assess gender equality. In the
same way that Draper’s Administration in the UNDP influenced planning of gender
mainstreaming into policies, Zoellick’s Presidency tapped into the ability of the World
Bank to increase its focus on gender equality even with the deep divide that exists
between states in gender equality practices.

Jim Young Kim (2012-Present).
Jim Young Kim started his tenure very recently in the World Bank and thus it is
very difficult to gauge what his impact on governance policy will be. However, he is
certainly making strides in pushing for change in the organization. As per usual, he is
concerned about poverty reduction. The 2013 Annual Meetings and World Bank Group
Strategy that he presented, and which was approved by the UNDG and the Executive
Board, shows his leadership in this area. He has committed the Bank to “end extreme
poverty: reduce the percentage of people living on less than $1.25 a day to 3 percent by
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2030” and to “promote shared prosperity: foster income growth of the bottom 40 percent
of the population in every country” (World Bank 2013a). For Jim Young Kim, as
exhibited in the World Bank Group Strategy, governance is closely associated with anticorruption and efficient, effective public institutions.
Kim’s Change Management Initiative and science of delivery theory of
development suggest a particular version of governance that is different from what
Presidents have articulated in the past. Many of my respondents are impressed with how
Kim is listening to staff on particular issues instead of marching ahead with his own
agenda as had been the experience with previous Presidents, especially with Wolfowitz (a
strategy that proved unsuccessful).

LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE ON NORM ARTICULATION
As the evidence shows, leaders have a powerful influence on policy outcomes
under certain conditions and using specific mechanisms. On the whole, as others have
noted before me, when the organization is a learning organization that is open to new
ideas and change, it is more likely that it will change or modify its policies to meet
changing needs and conditions. It is also important for groups with consensual
knowledge who understand the organization’s role in development and know how to
achieve its development goals to work together on formulating new policy. Thus when a
leader has a more collaborative leadership style in a learning organization along with a
drive to push those ideas through the intractable organizational culture, the leader is more
likely to be able to press for change, both within the Executive Board of the organization
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and among employees working in different departments at headquarters and in country
offices. We saw this kind of collaborative leadership style most often with Gustaf Speth
at the UNDP and Lewis Preston at the World Bank, though the others exhibited
collaboration in different ways at some points in their administrations.
Control policies, such as staff reorganizations and structural changes in how the
organization does business, often get the organization moving in the direction of change
but meet significant barriers in fulfilling the ideals of the leadership and in making
significant changes in the organization on policy and practice since it is necessary to have
buy-in from those who will be making the changes. Staff can become bitter and upset
when their roles are downplayed, when they are asked to re-apply for their position
because the structure of the staff has been re-organized, and especially when they see
their colleagues losing their jobs. Such drastic re-ordering of the organization’s hierarchy
and practice can cause a loss of morale and thus distract from the efficient and effective
practices of the organization. We saw these problems in the restructuring of the World
Bank pursued by Barber Conable (1987-1989 with lingering effects into Lewis Preston’s
Presidency), in James Wolfensohn’s change to World Bank practice in the CDF of 1999,
and even in William H. Draper III’s significant changes to the UNDP in the 1980s.
All of these leaders exhibited elements of sanctioning and rewarding behavior
among staff and even with the Executive Board to get through the changes that they
wanted, especially in terms of governance and development policy. Most often we see
reward, not punishment, in the way they pushed people in their organization to make
changes to governance policy. They used their speeches and statements as influential
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ways to impact policy and projects in their respective organizations. The Strategic Plans
and the Strategies that the Boards of each organization approve have the ineffaceable
influence of the leader of the organization, and in some cases completely written by that
leader without much input from staff.
The barriers to leadership influence on governance policy are most evident the
“silo” effect between the departments. When departments do not share knowledge, do not
know what the other departments are doing or articulating, and do not have a shared
vision of development, the leader is less likely to be able to influence them because of the
disparate nature of the organization. We see this in the World Bank more than in the
UNDP because the UNDP attempts to overcome this with an overarching Strategic Plan
that all departments are supposed to follow, as well as instituting knowledge sharing
platforms in which employees have become highly engaged. The World Bank has had
less success in this, as shown in Lewis Preston and James Wolfensohn’s desire to bring
the organization together on poverty alleviation as the main development goal, as well as
implement efficiency within the organization. It was difficult, and the Strategic Concept
was only partially successful at the time, though the idea of the Knowledge Bank
continued after his tenure.
When the organization is able to reinterpret its mandate, the likelihood that the
organization will follow new trends pushed by the leader is greater. This is most evident
in the UNDP’s ability to take a mandate to coordinate the development activities of the
UN community under the “Delivering as One” scheme, and the mandate to facilitate
South-South cooperation, into a mandate to promote governance in order to alleviate
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poverty. The UNDP further has an advantage because its mandate is flexible and changes
according to the desires of the General Assembly and ECOSOC decisions, giving it more
leeway than the Bank to change in order to adapt to a new international environment and
make itself relevant.
The extensive literature on successful leadership highlights the importance of a
leader being able to listen to employees and work together and alongside them rather than
command their obedience. The evidence from my interviews and historical analysis of
the UNDP and World Bank bolster this claim. When the leadership style is collaborative,
providing chances for organization employees to offer their own voice and ideas
concerning particular policy outcomes, the leader will be more successful in guiding the
organization and in making and implementing changes, whatever the changes may be.
However, the most successful leaders also exhibited aspects of the control leadership
style along with collaboration. Gaining cooperation and ownership among employees is a
necessity if any major change, whether procedural or substantive, is to be made in large
organizations.
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V: PARTICIPATION
The idea that individuals should be involved in the decision-making procedures
and actions that affect them is as old as the development of governance ideology. Indeed
it is at the heart of the governance debate. Concern with state-society interactions
pervades governance literature from ancient to contemporary times. Considerations of
how state-society interactions should be carried out changed over the years, especially in
relation to the shift in the nature of the rule starting in the seventeenth century Europe and
culminating in what we now consider a modern Weberian state. However, the underlying
principles of what is accepted in this debate continue to this day and guide the way that
liberal democracies formed in the contemporary era.
This chapter considers how participation became a norm in development policy
planning and implementation, how leaders in the World Bank and UNDP promoted this
norm in different ways, and how it has impacted the realm of development policy and
planning to such an extent that development practice changed inextricably since the
1990s when development organizations first introduced participation policies. I show
how the participation norm was both institutionalized in the organization at various times
and how leaders were influential in establishing the norm in each organization in their
own ways. I argue that leaders like James Wolfensohn in the Bank and Gustaph Speth
and Mark Malloch Brown in the UNDP impacted how each respective organization dealt
with new ideas of development practice built on inclusion and participation.
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PARTICIPATION AS A GOVERNANCE NORM IN DEVELOPMENT
In international development literature the terms for participation vary widely.
One encounters stakeholder participation, popular participation (Mupedziswa 2010),
participatory governance (Golooba-Mutebi 2004), civil society participation, inclusivity,
collaboration, voice and accountability (Kaufmann 2009), transparency and anticorruption (World Bank), and empowerment. These concepts, especially when
considered in the development and governance nexus, focus on the importance of
individuals’ or civil society representatives’ involvement in decision-making procedures
in some way. As one World Bank document wrote early on,
participatory development is the process by which people, especially
disadvantaged people, influence decisions that affect them…'participation' means
influence on development decisions, not simply involvement in the
implementation or benefits of a development activity, although those types of
involvement are important and are often encouraged by opportunities for
influence (World Bank 1992, 27).
Development practice in the 1950s and 60s closely connected participation
practice with nationalism. The newly created, decolonizing states not only needed public
administration aid to develop bureaucracies, they needed people to pledge allegiance to
the state and become its citizens. The focus on participation in development had to do
with legitimizing the states that emerged in the international arena in the 1960s and 70s
under decolonization, including a legitimization of their boundaries and newly
administered governments. 68 Community development meant creating a connection

68

Indeed the Western colonial powers together decided that the only way they could give up their
administration was to institute multi-party elections and push for liberal democracies in these new
emerging polities and economies. Of course, after the colonial powers left in the wake of their ill-conceived
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between people and government in a modern state. Practice included bottom-up efforts of
improving livelihoods, local development projects (in rural communities even while
international development primarily focused on urban industrialization), and education in
changing social and cultural systems (United Nations and Social 1971, 6-7).
Community development and modernization theory went hand-in-hand for
development practitioners and theorists in the 1960s and 70s (Hickey and Mohan 2004;
Stiefel and Wolfe 1994). Modernization is the notion that traditional societies move in
phases from traditional, agrarian societies toward modern, industrialized societies
(Rostow 1990). Community development projects engaged people’s participation in the
economic and industrial advancement of society and largely encouraged creating liberal
democracies. As a part of its program, community development focused on training men
and women to politically participate in their governments through voting and other forms
of political participation. Yet societal trust in those governments was not strong and
continues to fracture along traditional/modern lines (Ashford 1965).
Up to the 1990s development practitioners and theorists increasingly accepted the
connection between development, governance, and the participation norm. The end of the
Cold War allowed the Western states to claim ideological success and continue to spread
liberal democracy norms through international organizations (Fukuyama 1992). The
number of states that espoused liberal democracy and republican norms continued to
increase. Furthermore the conflicts that emerged around the world, in which the UN
became more involved, engaged international development organizations in politics in a
elections most of the post-colonial countries turned to authoritarian regimes, one-party regimes, and
experienced one coup after another in the 1960s and 70s.
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new way, inciting a trend to encourage participation in government through multiparty
elections. Boutros Boutros-Ghali crafted out a space for the UN to engage in democracy
building and peace building, activities that would have been criticized as too political
during the Cold War (Ghali 1992, 1994, 1996; Karns 2012). Some argue that the support
for peace building and democracy is directly linked with the mandate of the UN to
support human rights promotion; making sure that people participate through elections
instills human rights in a society and thus should be supported by the UN (Fox 2003).
The backlash against the structural adjustment programs and associated social
costs encouraged a renewed look at participation for international development
organizations, especially the World Bank (NGO Working Group on the World Bank
2001; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Covey 1998, 97).
In a very general sense the revival of participation reflects the dismal failure of
past development efforts to solve basic problems of poverty and human survival
and reflects new hopes that more participatory approaches may provide a way out
of otherwise insoluble crises of human relationships and livelihood (Stiefel and
Wolfe 1994, 221).
For the Bank, the focus has been largely on connecting with the vast number of
non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations that emerged in the 1980s
and 1990s. Further, identifying the negative impacts of conflict and civil war on the
success of development, the World Bank very recently started to support the ideas of
participation through what it has called inclusive-enough or inclusive-governance in
which governments make sure to include minorities and marginalized voices in
government decisions (World Bank 2011b).
Thinking of civil society as a separate entity from the state serves as the
foundation of the modern understanding of state-society relations. It focuses on the
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importance of the individual and his or her ability to be involved in decision-making
procedures, challenge the status quo, or legitimate authority. The concept of civil society
developed over the long process of the creation of modern states. In the contemporary era
it was prompted by a need to explain the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence
of new states in Eastern Europe with seemingly strong opposition to the state apparatus
(Buttigieg 1995). Theorists think of civil society as the state apparatus itself (Hobbes
1651; 1982), as separate from the state and economy (Hegel 1821;1991), and as
legitimizing the state (Rousseau 1762; 1997). Civil society is supposed to challenge the
state and hold it accountable (Diamond 1994). In this way civil society is inextricably
connected with the notions of democracy and democratization. Civil society is made up
of voluntary formal and informal institutions and includes individuals from society who
purport to represent group’s interests to government (Diamond 1994). “Civil society is
an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state” (ibid., 5) and
represents society’s interests. Civil society changes organizational forms constantly
within and between societies and does not directly lead to state transparency and
accountability (Ahrne 1996).
Proponents of participatory development argue that including beneficiaries in the
planning and implementation process of development projects is the only way that
development will be successful. Advocating this idea since the 1960s, they suggest that
when individuals are involved in their own development projects, investing in their
communities rather than receiving goods and services from others, then they are more
likely to accept the changes to the community, make those changes sustainable, and result
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in successful development projects (Ashford 1965; Apter 1955; Hayward 1973). Indeed
current evidence suggests that including individuals of a community in the creation and
implementation of development projects does indeed mean a greater chance of its
sustainability and success than otherwise (Adefila J 2012).

ARTICULATING THE NORM OF PARTICIPATION
Both the UNDP and World Bank included the participation norm as the main
foundation of their governance policies and projects in recent years. Through governance
promotion both organizations became more involved in political structures rather than
primarily economic structures of their member states in the post-Cold War era (Stiefel
and Wolfe 1994, 224). The prevailing agreement among these development organizations
was that the neoliberal policies that were promoted through the structural adjustment
programmes (SAPs) of the 1980s were implemented too quickly without sequencing and
pacing (Stiglitz 2002). Development organizations agreed that the failures and social
costs associated with the SAPs were not inherent in the neoliberal policies that guided
them; rather, they were the outcome of implementing them incorrectly. Further,
development organizations blamed member governments for the lack of political
structures that would ensure that the policies be implemented correctly. Citations of
government failures included corruption at high levels and lack of transparency about
how governments implemented the SAPs and how they spent their money. Development
organizations began arguing that the social costs of the SAPs were associated with bad
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governance and that in order for these sound theories to work to achieve development
goals, changes in the political structures of member countries were needed.
Participatory development and governance concerns took over in the rhetoric of
the development organizations, not only as a way to fight against poor public
administration, but also to continue support for neoliberal policies that pervaded both
organizations. Yet, the participatory development and governance norms that emerged in
the UNDP and the World Bank took on very different focal points for both the
organizations; though in many cases their work on participation overlaps and definitely
complements the other. The UNDP couches participation in liberal democracy terms,
arguing that individuals must be involved in the political decisions of government. UNDP
supports citizen engagement with political structures of government by offering advice in
the writing of constitutions, supporting the electoral cycle, and supporting grassroots
organizations to engage in politics. In this sense, much of the UNDP’s policy and practice
on participation circles around advice and technical support for governments to
implement free, fair and regular elections. The World Bank has retained the community
development approach of the 1950s and 60s arguing that participation in development
(and ostensibly in politics) should be about engaging society in nationalistic identity
formation, national growth, development at the local level as well as the national level,
and in transparency and accountability measures instituted in government that
presumably helps civil society hold government accountable for its actions.
In what follows I explore the development of these two norms in these two
organizations from the mid-1980s to present. I argue that leadership in both these
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organizations at the highest levels had an indelible impact on the way that participation
has been couched since the end of the Cold War and the decade of the 1990s. That impact
is based on the leader’s ability to articulate policy, but it also depended on the
organization’s ability to accept a change in the way that the norms that had already been
articulated in the organization and in development in general. Both these organizations
argue that the focus on participation is apolitical and does not mean that the UNDP or the
World Bank would ever become inextricably involved in a political debate or issue in
country. A good example of this claim is that made by Barber Conable in a memorandum
to the Bank made on August 29, 1991 in which he said,
There remains some apprehension among our borrowing members that our staff
might exceed the Bank's mandate in ways which could be interpreted as
interfering in the political affairs of our borrowers. This concern, given the
difficulty of drawing the lines in this area, is understandable. I am confident that
we will respect the sensitivities and concerns of borrowers while not shying away
from issues relevant to development performance when these need to be raised
(Conable 1991, quoted by Stiefel and Wolfe, 225).
Using the theory of norm articulation as laid out in chapter one, I ask two
questions of each organization on the development of the norm of participation. How was
participation articulated by these two organizations? Second, how did leaders influence
the participation norm in each organization? In each case I find that the extent to which
the norm was embedded in policy and practice of the organization had an effect on the
ability of the leadership to bring it forward and push it onto the agenda of the
organization.
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THE UNDP’S DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION
The UNDP’s articulation of the participation norm closely followed its shift in
development paradigm that came under William H. Draper III’s Administration. During
that time period Amartya Sen and Mahbub ul Haq created the human development report
and index to offer a counterbalance to the reigning macroeconomic theories of
development. The human development paradigm closely associated development goals
with choices and freedoms of the individual (Sen 1999, 2000; Haq 1995). In this sense,
the emerging focus on democratic governance is about participation, and it is difficult to
separate the two concepts. However, participation could have been couched in very
different ways by the UNDP. Why did the UNDP define participation in governance and
development as making sure that every citizen had the ability and choice to participate in
elections (vote and run for office) rather than simply focusing on participation in
development projects as the World Bank has done?
Resolutions from the General Assembly on this issue were influential in guiding
the practice of the UNDP. The shifting nature of international relations in the aftermath
of the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the end of Apartheid in South
Africa caused the UN to take a stance for democracy and human rights promotion in a
way that it had not done before. In greater numbers member states began to ask for
support for elections and instituting political systems that were more transparent and
accountable to all citizens. General Assembly Resolution 46/137 (United Nations General
Assembly 1991), passed on December 17, 1991, tasked the UNDP and other UN agencies
with providing electoral assistance and support to member states that were asking for it.
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However, UNDP’s participation norm does not date to that mandate. The focus on citizen
participation in governments and equality of all citizens in participating in governments
dates to the creation of the human development reports and index, informed by a concern
to support the UN human rights agreements, and by support and influence of leadership
in that organization.
The Human Development Reports supported the importance of participation by
promoting the notion that human development means freedom and that freedom means
access to government and the ability for individuals to partake in decision-making that
affects their lives. 69 The idea of participation is not only an aspect of democratic
governance for the UNDP it also is an integral element of development goals and
outcomes. 70 Further, support for participation in government decision-making procedures
is directly related to the ideas of sovereignty and legitimacy of government that
developed in the West under liberal democracy. The UNDP has been an essential agency
of the UN in supporting elections and what is now termed the “electoral cycle” since the
1970s. It relates direct support for elections and the electoral cycle to its mandate, to its
vision of human development, and to support for human rights. As the UNDP
Democratic Governance Group states, “in recent decades, there has been a rapidly
expanding reliance on electoral processes as the principal way to legitimize governance at
national, regional, and local levels” (United Nations Development Programme 2012f, iv).
69

Of special note are two HDRs that focused on the role of the state in development and what that meant
for human freedom and access. (United Nations Development Programme 2002, 1992)
70

Some argue that this kind of connection and definition makes the relationship tautological and that
concepts like human rights, development and democracy cannot be fully disconnected from each other to
make any acceptable claims about the effects of one on the other (Donnelly 1999).
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How did the UNDP articulate the participation norm in policy?
Table 5.1: UNDP Committees, Departments and Units on Participation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Management and Development Governance Division (1995), Replaced by the Institutional
Development Group, Replaced by the Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development
Policy
Civil Society Division, Partnerships Bureau with Oslo Governance Center, Bureau for
Development Policy
Communities of Practice: Democratic Governance Practice Network; Capacity Development
Network; Electoral Community of Practice
Civil Society Advisory Committee to UNDP (2000)
Sustainable Development Networking Programme in participating countries (since 1989)
Communication for Empowerment Initiative (pilot launched Madagascar and Mozambique
2008)
Collaboration on Electoral Assistance with other agencies and organizations: Support for
Building Resources in Democracy, Governance and Elections (BRIDGE) curricula on electoral
administration; EC-UNDP Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance (2007); Member of the
Inter-agency Coordination Mechanism on Electoral Assistance; Member of ACE Electoral
Knowledge Network (est. 1998)

The UNDP’s engagement with participation supports democracy as is stated in
the Strategic Plan: “The ultimate UNDP goal is to deepen democracy and accelerate
sustainable human development by giving all people the ability to participate in the
decisions that affect their lives” (United Nations Development Programme 2008c,
paragraph 1; United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office 2012, ix).
UNDP works with all the other agencies of the UN, especially in its mandate as
coordinator of the UN development system entitled “Delivering as One.” The UNDP’s
interpretation of participation in governance and development focuses on the ability of
the individual to (1) interact with his or her government through elections or running for
office, (2) obtain equality of access to government goods and services by holding
government authorities accountable, and (3) be included in the project planning and
process phases of development.
UNDP’s concept of participation focuses highly on the individual. Connected
with its human development paradigm, the vision encourages the individual to be
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involved in government policies and processes through voting and running for office.
With this in mind, the most important elements of the UNDP’s participation policy are
associated with its work in supporting elections and the electoral cycle. UNDP works in
partnership with the UN Electoral Assistance Division and many other agencies and
electoral non-governmental organizations to provide countries with the knowledge and
capacity they need to run free and fair elections. The other element of the UNDP’s work
on participation involves its connection with civil society organizations, which has been
rather weak to date. However, on this latter issue the UNDP has been making progress.
The most influential departments in the UNDP on the concept of participation are the
Democratic Governance Group, Bureau for Development Policy and the Civil Society
Division, Partnerships Bureau.
As part of its development of the idea of participation in its own projects and
policy-making, the UNDP started what it calls ‘communities of practice’ in the latter
1990s, groups that engage in online platforms to discuss issues of importance and share
knowledge and lessons learned. The communities connect individuals working in the
New York headquarters, especially those in the Bureau for Development Policy working
on policy formation, and individuals working in country offices and regional offices.
Current formulations on participation are informed by these communities. Giving policy
advice or technical assistance advice to countries is not just a matter of headquarters
responding to requests, but is a matter of interaction between all players involved. For
example, the democratic governance practice network has about 1000-1500 participants.
These participants share their knowledge, glean from others, and interact through the
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online platform. Policy documents are even created based on the online discussions. As
an example, UNDP staff created a handbook on political party support that encouraged
the inclusion of women in political parties which was very successful because of all the
informative practical experience that was included based on discussion and response in
the online platform (Ballington 2011). Although not all policy documents are created this
way, the UNDP has an excellent precedence for engaging its community of practitioners
and scholars in policy formation.
Having all that community feedback is sometimes not as much of a boon to policy
creation as it sounds. The reason it may be a hindrance is because of the sheer number of
people communicating on a particular issue, making it extremely difficult to mold all
their voices and responses into one coherent policy statement. One respondent noted that
sending out documents for review is required in order to make sure that documents
created by any one person or office cohere with the beliefs and policies of everyone else
in the organization. The practice can and does hinder efficiently producing documents in
a timely manner and becomes incredibly cumbersome for those who have to edit the
document after review by hundreds of eyes, including everyone’s ideas and concerns.
The document or policy then becomes a combination of so many different interests and
perspectives that it can be interpreted in all kinds of ways and have no defining set of
proposals or action plans.
Support for participation through electoral assistance ranges across a broad base
of practices in which the UNDP engages in order to assist countries in elections. “On
average, UNDP is engaged in supporting an election somewhere in the world every two
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weeks. Yet, UNDP does not only concentrate on particular election events but embraces
an integrated, long-term election-cycle approach to electoral assistance” (United Nations
Development Programme 2010, 17). 71 The UNDP has to manage a fine line between
support for elections and the electoral cycle and actually interfering in the politics of a
country. Support for Electoral Management Boards (EMBs) is one area that has gained
increasing attention because it is one of the specific elements of the UNDP electoral
assistance approach and it has become a norm to have EMBs as a part of offering
elections. Indeed, “helping to build the institutional capacities of electoral management
bodies between electoral events, [is an] increasing focus of the organization’s work”
(United Nations Development Programme 2011f, 6).
The UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) is the agency that is most
involved in the post-conflict and transitional areas, and is more politically involved with
countries than other UN agencies. For the UNDP, for example, country requests for any
kind of support first go to the UNDPA and the Department for Peace Keeping Operations
(DPKO), i.e., through the under-Secretary Generals. These agencies make the decisions
about whether or not to help and offer aid, and then the UNDP is charged as a
coordinating agency, to create policy and programming for the request and to coordinate
the implementation between multiple agencies working in the country.
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The electoral assistance support that the UNDP coordinates and implements include “legal reform;
independent and permanent electoral management bodies; systems for planning, monitoring and budgeting
to ensure credible and cost-effective electoral processes; voter and civic education for democratic rights
and responsibilities; coordination of electoral assistance among donors and international and national
partners; and women's participation in elections as voters and candidates” (United Nations Development
Programme 2011a)
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In the 1990s the General Assembly gave UN institutions a greater mandate to be
involved in elections. The UNDP’s involvement in electoral assistance dates back to its
inception through technical support (funding other programs providing electoral
assistance), but has ramped up since the 1990s (López-Pintor 2000; Rich 2001; Newman
and Rich 2004; Ponzio 2004).
The idea that citizens should and do have a right to participate in their
governments is becoming an uncontested principle in the democratic governance practice
and literature. Indeed the phrase speaks to the idea of participation. Governance as the
element of an authority controlling society and providing certain societal goods, and
democratic as the means by which the choices and decisions for providing those goods
are made. The bulk of the argument that development practitioners and theorists make for
the right to participation in government decision-making rests on the human rights
regime; i.e., the instruments and documents that have been written over the last few
decades and accepted by most states as international law, especially the initial documents
of the Universal Bill of Rights (Rich 2001; Franck 1992). Fox argues that the “emerging
body of international law strongly supports democratic institutions and has not to date
made exceptions for nondemocratic politics even in the most fragile postconflict states”
(Fox 2003, 192). Further, Rafael López-Pintor suggests that “the existing consensus on
how to organize multi-party elections is not solely the outgrowth the end of the Cold War
[sic]; it stems from earlier provisions of international law” (2000, 87). 72
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Those international law provisions are cited as follows in the texts indicated. Article 21 of Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; UN General Assembly Resolution 46/130; the
Conference on Cooperation in Europe in 1990; Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights
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The concept of democracy is deeply connected in the contemporary era with the
idea of elections. Indeed, elections are now seen as necessary for a democracy (Lipset
1959; Dahl 1998). Recent democratization literature makes much of this trend of
democratization and instituting multi-party elections (Huntington 1993; Fukuyama 1992).
Those who criticize the practice of elections note that elections do not mean that a
government is democratic, and that elections can be a straw man set up by an
authoritarian regime to make it appear legitimate to outside observers (Collier and
Levitsky 1997). Yet, the notion that participation is best offered to a population through
elections abounds in international development practice.
The practice of countries asking for and obtaining technical assistance from the
UN in order to hold elections spread across the world as a form of legitimation of
sovereignty; in this respect the UN has been instrumental in supporting and teaching this
norm to states (Rich 2001, 26). 73 As of 2012 Freedom House has declared that the
number of electoral democracies has reached 117 out of 195 countries, thus 60 percent of
the states in the world are electoral democracies, a drastic change considering that the
(López-Pintor 2000, 87-89). G.H. Fox argues that the "normative roots of democracy promotion" are in
human rights regime (2003, 181-82) and he notes that regional organizations have accepted the idea of
democracy, and that the shift is obvious in UN with statements of leaders from Trygvie Lie to Boutros
Boutros Ghali. Fox cites four "core requirements" coming from international organizations: universal
suffrage, secret voting, fair elections, and no voter discrimination (183). Roland Rich cites the following as
the foundation for democracy as a right in international law: OAS, UDHR; 1949 Charter of Europe; ICCPR
Article 25 and general comment 25; Commission 2000; adopted Resolution 2000/47; 1988 Manila
International Conference on Newly Restored Democracies; 1995 International Conference of New and
Restored Democracies in Managua and the Managua Declaration and Plan of Action; and the 1997
Bucharest Conference (2001, 25). Note that some of the documents cited are not legally binding treaties,
yet they are human rights treaties and regional agreements that have been accepted by most if not all
countries of the world.
73

In saying that the UN has “taught this norm to states” I follow the work of Martha Finnemore who has
argued that the international organizations have become teachers of norms in particular instances, teaching
states how to act according to the accepted norm. See (Finnemore 1993)

203

same table reports 41 percent in 1990 (Freedom House 2012). The UN has offered
technical assistance for elections to 100 states since 1991 at the request of those states.
This assistance has been provided by a coalition of UN agencies led by the UNDP as the
“implementing body” (United Nations Department of Political Affairs 2012). 74
The first instance of electoral assistance in its current policy implementation
began in Namibia in 1989 (Fox 2003, 185). Certain UN peacekeeping missions acted as
election monitors in the past, including in Cambodia in 1992/93 and in Timor-Lest in
2001and in Cote D’Ivoire in 2010 (United Nations Peacekeeping Missions 2012). The
UNDP supported observer missions and domestic observer groups in the past; indeed, the
UN can and has observed and monitored missions under the UNDPA when given a
mandate by the Security Council (United Nations Democratic Governance Group 2007,
1). Yet the UN agencies including the UNDP reject electoral monitoring and validation
activity when at all possible because of implications of being political. Meanwhile the
UNDP and other UN agencies continue to support the whole electoral cycle from the
creation of legal documents (constitutions) that delineate how elections will be
implemented, to providing training and support in electoral management, systems,
education, and gender equality in the electoral cycle (United Nations Development
Programme 2014).
The UNDP claims that while it is involved with supporting the electoral cycle, it
remains a neutral organization, meaning that it does not support any one political party or
74

Other UN agencies involved with most if not all electoral assistance projects are the Electoral Assistance
Division (EAD), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the United Nations
Volunteers (UNV), and the United Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS).
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political system, and is apolitical in nature, only providing objective technical assistance
to states that ask for such support. Indeed, the UNDP has a very different relationship
with member countries because it offers grants and funds projects in developing countries
whereas organizations like the World Bank usually lend money to governments for
projects and development in the member country.
The UNDP is now very concerned with supporting civil society engagement in
politics and in development projects. One reason is its intense focus on the individual and
whether or not the individual can participate and engage with his or her government. Yet,
UNDP’s policies have caught up with the trend in development. In 2000 the UNDP
followed the World Bank’s example and set up a Civil Society Advisory Committee to
the Administrator (CSOAC). This group of CSO representatives, initially 14 individuals
chosen by the UNDP Bureaus, advised the Administrator and Board on how the UNDP
could be more involved in civil society, what the UNDP could do to strengthen its
engagement and track record on civil society. The CSOAC was conceived as a way to
engage the high-level UNDP representatives with CSOs so as to obtain valuable
information about CSO concerns with UNDP projects and programs. The CSOAC has
been largely unsuccessful and did not even meet with the Administrator from 2006-2008
(UNDP Partnerships Bureau CSO Division 2008).
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Table 5.2: UNDP Policies on Participation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Resolution 46/137, December 17, 1991 on UN Electoral Assistance to member states
Human Development Index and Report, first published (1990)
Resolution 55/2, September 18, 2000 on the UN Millennium Development Declaration
Human Development Report 1992: Global Dimensions of Human Development
UNDP and Civil Society Organizations: A Policy of Engagement (2001)
Joint Guidance Note on Electoral Assistance: Department of Political Affairs of the United
Nations and the United Nations Development Programme (2001, updated 2009)
Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World
Practical Guidance Note on Communication for Empowerment (2006)
Supporting Capacity Development: A UNDP Approach (2008)
Voice and Accountability for Human Development: A UNDP Global Strategy to Strengthen
Civil Society and Civic Engagement (2009)
Priority Areas in the Strategic Plan (2008-2011/13)
UNDP Corporate Strategy on Civil Society and Civic Engagement (2012)

While UNDP does have POPP policies on participation, many of the policies and
guidance notes are informal. In fact, before the Administrator, Executive Board, or other
authorities write a norm into policy, the practice is usually already implemented at the
country level through projects and programs. This becomes evident every time the
Democratic Governance Group creates a new policy guidance note. It starts by
connecting with the community of practice to see what is going on in the country offices,
and then using its own resources and knowledge, creates a cohesive guidance note that
represents practice as it is, and practice as it should be according to UN human rights
principles. The UNDP emphasizes that it creates policy in response to country demands.
These informal documents catalogue the current best practices regarding
participation, and they publish these as documents that are meant to guide and inform the
rest of the organization’s employees on how they can implement participatory practices.
Yet, because of the decentralized nature of the UNDP, it is difficult to identify clear and
coherent practice across the whole UNDP. For the most part, the policy documents and
statements support the idea that democratic governance is about individual participation
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in their governments and that all citizens should be able to vote and run for office
equally. However, not all member countries agree with these ideas despite them being
incorporated into General Assembly Resolutions like 46/137 which created the UN
Electoral Assistance Division and gave the UNDP a coordinating role in the delivery of
electoral assistance and advice, or 55/2, the Millennium Declaration, which said that “we
will spare no effort to promote democracy and strengthen the rule of law, as well as
respect for all internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the right to development” (United Nations September 18, 2000).
UNDP policy statements encourage staff to engage with civil society
organizations (CSOs) as equal partners in development rather than simply representatives
of civil society or implementers of development projects. This is quite different than how
the World Bank and most other development organizations view their relationship with
civil society. “The underlying purpose of the CSO Advisory Committee was to promote a
partnership based on “genuine reciprocity” that would offer guidance to the
Administrator and senior management on key policy and programming issues, leading to
more consistent and practical forms of civil society engagement” (UNDP Partnerships
Bureau CSO Division 2008, 5).
Furthermore, setting it further apart from other intergovernmental development
organization’s policies on civil society, the first policy document on UNDP’s relationship
with CSOs says that the
Partnership with CSOs is founded on the principle of horizontal relationship
between parties which, while institutionally different, are of equal standing in
promoting the same development objectives, especially poverty reduction through
sustainable human development. The relationship is premised on mutual trust that
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must be earned by both sides (United Nations Development Programme 2001b,
8).
The UNDP considers its relationship with civil society just as important as its
relationship with the state. It suggests that its target audience is not only to support
government in the pursuit of human development goals, but to make sure that each
society has a functioning and “vibrant” civil society. Thus, “interacting with civil society
is a duty and not an option for UNDP at all levels of its work” (ibid., 9).
The UNDP also engages civil society in the creation of Common Country
Assessments (CCAs) and in the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF),
both documents that are created by country and regional offices in conjunction with the
member country government. These documents guide how the UNDP, and the UN
agencies as a whole, will work with that country in order to achieve goals. They also
guide how the country itself will support and implement the development projects that
are funded by the UNDP and other UN agencies. Having voice and participation from
civil society and from citizens in the CCAs is crucial for the UNDP in order to make sure
that it is supporting democratic goals of participation in all processes. Although the
UNDP is not successfully implementing this participation policy across all the countries
with which it works, the new policy on civil society engagement mandates that it be done
(United Nations Development Programme 2012c).
Table 5:3: UNDP Funding for Participation
•
•
•

Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund (DGTTF)
UNDP works with the UN Democracy Fund est. 2005 by Secretary General (110 million dollar
fund per year to support civil society)
Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS) (Launched 2009)
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The UNDP emphasizes that promoting democratic governance is articulated at
UNDP headquarters or country offices, but the impetus for actual projects and support
comes from donor demands or requests from states. The Democratic Thematic Trust
Fund (DGTTF) provides a perfect example of the organization acting autonomously in a
situation in which the institutionalized organizational practices move too slowly for some
states. The DGTTF was created in 2001 so that countries and other donors could make
donations that would be handled outside the regular donation funding practices and
donors could earmark their donations for specific democratic governance projects in
specific countries. It is considered a “venture capital fund” that supports UNDP’s
Strategic Plan governance practices and the Evaluation Office suggests that it should be
seen as a fund that “tests innovative approaches to difficult democratic governance
issues” (United Nations Development Programme 2008a).
The DGTTF is interesting because it offers an example of how the organization’s
culture is slow to change to meet the demands from donors as well as from receiving
countries who are asking for more support for specific democratic governance projects.
Here, the DGTTF was created to fill that gap as a venture capital fund, showing the
autonomy of the organization, that the UNDP was willing to go outside its bounds to
change course when its main areas of funding would not be flexible enough. 75
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The UNDP support for the electoral cycle has culminated in the Global Programme for Electoral Cycle
Support (GPECS) started in 2009 with a $35 million initial budget, and continuing on after its three year
mandate in supporting the electoral cycle outside of the electoral events like elections. The DGTTF 2011
Annual Report reported that it had supported 18 countries with electoral assistance and 200 advisory
services in 60 countries (United Nations Development Programme 2008, 28).
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Trust funds devoted to specific democratic governance inputs enable the UNDP to
create a role for itself that would otherwise be much more difficult considering the
variant voices on the Executive Board and General Assembly. For instance, in support of
electoral assistance, the Global Programme for Electoral Cycle Support (GPECS)
launched in 2009 has increased the capacity and ability of the UNDP to offer electoral
assistance and advice to countries in need. Mostly funded by the Government of Spain
and through European organizations, GPECS enabled the UNDP to assist “more than 80
countries through approximately 400 projects, investing well over $2 billion” (United
Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office 2012, 1).
Finally, as part of its civil society engagement, the UNDP funds and directly
works with civil society in some cases, rather than working through the state government
and getting CSOs involved in implementation or participation. The UNDP argues that
this direct connection and support of CSOs, while contradicting the way that the UN
works in fundamental ways, is essential in building a fully functioning democratic
society. CSOs can now be directly engaged in execution of policy not just as subcontractors through government. “Since the introduction of the modality in 1998, some
300 projects totaling over $100 million have been executed in this way” (United Nations
Development Programme 2012c, 18).
Civil society organizations are directly funded by the UNDP through trust funds
as well, circumventing the government as the beneficiary. CSOs benefit from small
grants through the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the Local Initiative Facility for
Urban Environment (LIFE), the Poverty Trust Fund, and the Governance Trust Fund.
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While the UNDP administers many funds, these are most involved in supporting
participation and CSO engagement (United Nations Development Programme 2012c, 18)

How did leaders articulate the participation norm in the UNDP?
Draper is perhaps the most influential leader on the way that participation was
articulated as a governance norm and became institutionalized in the organization. His
support for the idea of human freedoms that comes out in the human development
paradigm is evident in everything he did and every change he made in the UNDP.
Crucially, his support for participation was specifically focused on women’s ability to
participate in development projects and in making sure that there was gender parity in the
organization itself. These two trends have run through the organization so that we
continue to see them today in the way the UNDP thinks about participation. Draper’s
support for democracy and a free market in which people could freely participate is
intricately felt in UNDP’s participation policy today.
After Draper, Speth was instrumental in creating the language of “sustainable
human development” and creating an “enabling environment” for achieving development
goals. Although enabling environment terminology is very abstract, it meant support for
elections and changes in the political system to incorporating democratic principles for
those who used that language. Speth was instrumental in pulling this language out of the
human development reports and crafting the movement of the organization toward
promotion of democracy. He connected the idea of good governance with democracy and
democratic ideals. He was also concerned with enhancing the ability of organizations,

211

both CSOs and other UN agencies, to work with the UNDP on projects and programming
in country offices, an essential component of UNDP’s participatory development vision.
Rhetorically, it was Mark Malloch Brown who pioneered the use of the term
democratic governance and continued to push the UNDP toward support for elections and
electoral assistance. His speeches were consistently in support of democratic governance
and the UNDP’s advocacy of that concept and associated principles. Furthermore, it was
under his leadership from 1999-2005 that the UNDP institutionalized the governance
practices that had been first developed by William H. Draper III and Gustaph Speth.
Draper was certainly influential in making sure that participation, and especially
inclusion of individuals in governments through voting and running for office, were
supported by the UNDP. Without his leadership the UNDP may have taken a very
different route in supporting participation. The leadership of Boutros Ghali in support for
democratization, which includes elections, was instrumental in the institutionalization of
support for elections in the UNDP and allowed Malloch Brown to pursue further electoral
assistance for the UNDP.
Despite their influences, we do see some restrictions on how far the leadership
was able to go in getting the UNDP to support participation in government, especially
through support for elections. Electoral cycle support offers an alternative to support for
elections and thus gives a neutral aspect to the projects in which UNDP engages.
Furthermore, the creation of the DGTTF is an example of the organization restricting the
ability of leaders to shape the funding practices of the organization, and offers an
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example of leaders and the organization circumventing that process in order to act
autonomously and support democratic governance where demanded.

THE WORLD BANK’S STAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION
The World Bank came through a series of phases on the norm of participation in
support of including stakeholders in policies and projects in ways that differ from the
UNDP. Certainly, the UNDP supports inclusiveness in policies and projects, but as we
have seen, the UNDP’s version of participation includes a larger version of democratic
participation in government, rather than focused almost exclusively on inclusion in
development projects. The World Bank’s stance is changing in recent years with new
efforts in the World Bank to support democratic governance ideals on participation, but
has not always been the case, at least rhetorically.

How did the World Bank articulate the participation norm in policy?
Table 5.4: World Bank Committees, Departments and Units on Participation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

NGO-World Bank Committee (1982) Replaced by the Civil Society Team (2004); Parallel
NGO-Working Group on the World Bank (1984)
World Bank-Civil Society Working Group and the Joint Facilitation Committee (JFC) (20032005) tasked with defining the Bank’s relationship to Civil Society Organizations.
Social Dimensions of Adjustment Project (SDAP) – launched 1987 to address social costs of
adjustment programs
Bankwide Learning Group on Participatory Development (1990)
Worldwide Governance Indicator Project (1996) – one of the governance indicators focused on
Voice and Accountability
Participation and Civic Engagement Group (Social Development Department)
Social Development Network
Global Partnership for Social Accountability
Social Accountability and Demand for Good Governance (DFGG)
Civil Society Specialists placed in Country Offices
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The World Bank work in the 1970s and 1980s on participation and inclusiveness
reached out to the burgeoning mass of organizations that were also working in similar
development circles and on development issues. In the 1970s and 1980s the participation
norm largely had to do with getting the appropriate input from these organizations on
project implementation. In fact, the World Bank quickly figured out that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), often church groups or mission groups, could
implement projects in a much cheaper way than private sector contractors, and therefore
World Bank employees encouraged governments to work with NGOs in implementing
projects funded by the Bank. It was this inchoate relationship with such organizations that
fostered the participation norm in the World Bank. Though, while some argue that the
NGOs themselves were the reason for the World Bank’s changing ideas on participation,
I argue that their involvement with the Bank and influence on the participation norm
could not have progressed as it did without the support of staff and leadership (including
the Presidents and Executive Board).
The first committee created in the World Bank to address the issue of
participation was named the NGO-World Bank Committee (hereafter the Committee),
established in 1982 to facilitate dialogue between the World Bank and the large group of
emerging NGOs working on development (Covey 1998). Up until that point the Bank’s
bulk of experience was working with governments, and mainly Finance Ministries, as
stipulated in the Articles of Agreement that created the World Bank. Once set in place,
the Committee that represented the Bank’s desire and willingness to work with NGOs
provided a foundation for continued cooperation and concern with participatory
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development practice. The Committee, comprised of authorities from the World Bank
and from NGOs, encouraged the World Bank on policy-making and practice through
meetings held twice a year, and in assessing and evaluating the impacts of the structural
adjustment programs on the lives of the poor. The Committee became the ad-hoc meeting
arena for Civil Society Organization (CSO) and NGO voice and engagement with World
Bank operations, projects and policy that facilitated dialogue between the independent
NGO-Working Group on the World Bank (NGOWG) and key World Bank staff.
Much of the impetus for the inclusion of participation in World Bank
development policy and practice dates to the latter 1980s and the concern with figuring
out why structural adjustment programmes had been such a failure in the 1980s. Many
pointed to the lack of ideal governance in member state countries. This reason was
included in the WDR 1991 as quoted by Seamus Cleary “success in promoting economic
growth is most likely when governments complement markets” (Cleary 1996, 67). After
much debate, the Bank created a new way of assessing the needs in developing countries
which focused highly on participation and inclusiveness: needs assessments. Needs
assessment meant that those who are directly affected by proposed projects should be
consulted on how the project would affect them. The NGOWG, through its dialogue with
World Bank staff in the Committee, was influential in the World Bank’s propensity and
concern with including participation through assessments. It was also influential because
of its connection with the Operations Policy Department (OPD) which was tasked with
NGO-World Bank relationship oversight, and was also tasked with creating operational
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policies on participation (Covey 1998, 97). However, without OPD staff and the support
coming from various Board members, the changes may never have been institutionalized.
The assessments identified alternatives to negative effects and ways to ameliorate
any negative effects of policies and projects. The assessments include the Country
Assistance Strategies (CASs), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), and other
assessments for individual issues such as gender equality or sectoral assessments (though
the latter two have not been as successful as the CASs and the PRSPs). The assessments
also meant considering the best way forward on any project through consultation. The
Bank’s consultation capabilities had increased since the 1980s when consultation on
projects mostly consisted of discussion with government and finance ministers. Indeed,
the Bank is very concerned now with making sure that there is community input and buyin for any project that is implemented.
The Bank’s relationships with NGOs, focused on Civil Society Organizations
(CSOs) more often than NGOs, continued to grow through the use of and implementation
of the needs assessments. However, it was not until the Comprehensive Development
Framework (CDF) was implemented fully that the relationship really took on a more
integrated and institutionalized aspect. In fact the Bank has received much criticism to the
effect that its so-called concern with participation and relationships with NGOs is just a
front for pushing NGO criticism to the side. But the CDF shows instrumentality in
engaging NGOs in each of the assessments that are required before a project is
implemented.
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The Bank’s commitment to participatory development blossomed in the 1990s
under the leadership of President James Wolfensohn. It resulted in the creation of several
different working groups and departments that were devoted to understanding how
participation could be a boon for the World Bank’s development policy. The World Bank
was also concerned with the new rhetoric on participation because it did not want to
become politically involved and suggest policies to governments that it felt were outside
of its mandate. Thus, in the 1990s the Bank started a Learning Group on Participatory
Development to determine how the Bank should be involved in engaging stakeholders
and participation of civil society in the work they do with governments in countries
around the world. A few years later in 1996 the Bank published the World Bank
Participation Sourcebook with an introduction by James Wolfensohn endorsing the ideas
of stakeholder participation in development. The sourcebook is not a policy document but
rather a work that provides guidelines for helping Bank staff include a focus on
participation in the work that they do, and provide them with examples from Bank work
already being done on participation. The Sourcebook articulates participation as “a
process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development
initiatives and the decisions and resources which affect them” (xi). James Wolfensohn
himself, in the introduction to the Sourcebook, said,
I am convinced that [in-country stakeholders’] involvement and collaboration can
not only make our development efforts more effective and sustainable, but can
also foster ownership and a sense of belief in the relevance and value of our
programs right down to the community level…I personally believe in the
relevance of participatory approaches and partnerships in development and am
committed to making them a way of doing business in the Bank. (World Bank
1996, ix).
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The creation of the idea of stakeholder participation in the Bank, both through
institutionalized support in the form of committees and departments, and through the
influence of NGO pressure, was contentious as represented in the Learning Group on
Participatory Development’s discussions and decisions. One example is that of choosing
the term “stakeholder participation” rather than “popular participation” the latter noting
the participation of the poor and most vulnerable in the project creation and
implementation. The Learning Group settling on supporting the former term of
“stakeholder participation” which is including powerful stakeholders who have a lot to
say and much to lose if they are not included in the decision making procedures and
processes. Such stakeholders include the government authorities, NGOs that are directly
or indirectly affected, and the Bank staff themselves because “attempts to bypass
powerful stakeholders often resulted in opposition from them” (World Bank 1996, 6-8).
Once the Bank institutionalized communication and coordination with community
leaders through relationships with NGOs, there was little to stop that influence. However,
the changing nature of NGOs and CSOs in the 1990s led the Bank to reconsider how it
worked with these organizations through the NGO-World Bank Committee. Indeed, the
Bank had more experience working with NGOs by that time and was able to expand its
connection throughout the country offices, rather than just in a meeting twice a year with
the NGOs that were on the docket (Covey 1998).
The Bank dealt with the need to engage NGOs and new CSOs by reorganizing.
First, the NGO-World Bank Committee was replaced with a more permanent department
called the Civil Society Team in 2004 in the wake of a conference that discussed a draft
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working paper on the Bank’s relationship with CSOs (Aycrigg 1998). The Civil Society
Team worked in different ways with CSOs, actually funding CSOs by encouraging and
supporting governments to engage with and fund CSOs with World Bank loans. The
Small Grants Program, later the Civil Society Fund, and now the New Global Partnership
for Social Accountability, offers small grants (usually under $10,000) to CSOs. Secondly,
civil society specialists were deployed to country offices in keeping with the
decentralization mission and the notion that the best way to engage with CSOs is through
country offices rather than through headquarters in Washington, D.C.
Table 5.5: World Bank Policies on Participation 76
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

GP 14.70 (1981)
BP Development Policy Lending
Strategic Compact
OD 4.30 Involuntary Resettlement (1990)
OP 4.15 Poverty Reduction (1991); OD 4.20 Indigenous Peoples (1991)
GP 4.36 Forestry (1993)
Participation Action Plan (1994; BP 10.00 Elements of a Project Implementation Plan (1994)
and Outline for a Staff Appraisal and Outline for a Memorandum and Recommendation of the
President
BP 2.11 Content of a Country Assistance Strategy Document (1995); OP 8.50 Emergency
Recovery Assistance (1995)
Comprehensive Development Framework (1998)
OP 4.01 Environmental Assessment (1999); OP 4.20 The Gender Dimension of Development
(1999); GP 13.55 Implementation Completion Reporting (1999)
World Development Report 2000: Attacking Poverty
OP 4.02 Environmental Action Plans (2000); OD 14.70 Non-Government Organizations (2000)
Country Level Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs)
GAC Governance Strategy (2001)
World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the Poor
OP/BP 8.60 Development Policy Lending (2004) Replaced former Policy Lending OP/BP
Social Development Strategy (2005)
OP/BP Indigenous Peoples (2005)
OP/BP 4.11 Physical Cultural Resources (2006)
Governance and Anti-Corruption Strategy Phase I (2007), Phase II (2011)
Guidance Note on World Bank Multi-Stakeholder Engagement (2009)
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The list was compiled from various World Bank website sites and the 2003 Draft of Issues and Options
for Improving Engagement Between the World Bank and Civil Society Organizations, Annex A.
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Operational policies (OPs), bank (business) procedures (BPs), operational
directives (ODs) and good practices (GPs) constrain and guide the behavior of staff in
their various duties from development policy planning, administrative work, and
implementation. What has gone before will, like a mandate, dictate the kind of behavior
and norms that are accepted. To the extent that there is decisive practice connected to the
policy statements, it becomes even more difficult for ideas to change and new practices to
develop. Over the years, beginning in 1981, the Bank developed policies intended to
guide the way that citizens and civil society organizations are included in policy-making
and implementation.
The CDF, adopted by the Board in 1999, served as a new guide for implementing
development. Organizational and structural changes instituted during Wolfensohn’s
tenure served to increase the institutionalization of participation practice in the Bank,
especially in the development projects that the Bank funded. Engaging CSOs through
funding projects and implementation, in concert with expanding the number of people in
the World Bank working or designated as civil society specialists, instituted a more solid
foundation for encouraging participation. One analysis of World Bank participation
experience suggests that when CSOs received grants from the Civil Society Team (now
the New Global Partnership for Social Accountability) they were more likely to engage in
the needs assessments. Because of that, they would be more likely to be able to represent
citizens in development projects (World Bank NGO Unit 1998, 5). Further, the Strategic
Compact reorganization and the implementation of the CDF led the Bank to engage with
participation in a much more structured way through the required needs assessments.
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The CDF reoriented the way that the Bank worked with countries on funding
development projects, encouraging the government authorities and stakeholders to take
the lead on planning and implementing development strategies and projects. “The CDF
advocates: a holistic long-term vision; the country in the lead, both "owning" and
directing the development agenda” (World Bank n.d.i). The CDF requires that Poverty
Assessment Strategies and Papers (PRSs and PRSPs) are undertaken by government in
consultation with Bank staff as well as civil society stakeholders before the Bank funds
development projects. The Assessments guide the type of development project and the
way that the project will be implemented over the next years. The CDF shifted the Bank’s
activities from “donor-led development assistance strategy…to the development of a
country strategy led by a country itself” (Owusu 2003, 1657).
Yet poverty assessments and needs assessments implemented and used by the
Bank have come under a lot of criticism for their lack of support for participation in
development and government. Some works, especially those commissioned by the Bank,
suggest that the poverty assessments have been successful at engaging the people who
will be affected by a development policy (Robb 2002). There is some evidence that
suggests that the assessments have allowed countries and citizens to take more ownership
of development projects. Yet, the assessments also leave out the important “primary
beneficiaries” and allow governments and wealthy, informed stakeholders to channel
development projects and funds to benefit the wealthy rather than the poor.
PRSPs remain steadfastly part of the neo-liberal agenda and are simply a new
'technical framework' which does not address uneven power relations within
countries and between them and donors. Importantly, underlying processes of
development remain shielded from view (Hickey and Mohan 2004, 161).
221

Despite the criticisms, the Strategic Compact reorganization represented a sea change in
the Bank’s policy shaped by the lessons learned from participatory development. It was
strategically crafted by President James Wolfensohn and his staff in his speeches and
statements.
Even the very influential WDRs shifted the rhetoric on participation, specifically
the 2001 and 2004 WDRs. Social Development policy blossomed out of the movement
for supporting participation in government as essential to creating more efficient
governance and development. The Social Accountability and Demand for Good
Governance Department now encourages governments on instituting the important
elements of participation, such as engagement with CSOs and encouraging elections in
each country. The Bank has defined Social Development as “transforming institutions to
empower people” through creating “inclusive institutions, cohesive societies, and
accountable institutions” that serve the needs of all citizens (including both men and
women) and are open and responsive to citizens (World Bank 2005, 1-2). Participation
has been the focus on development policy and projects for the Bank, yet governments
stand in the way of allowing the Bank to fully integrate the stakeholders and beneficiaries
into projects and policy design and implementation. Any work that is done with civil
society needs the country’s approval, whether finance minister or other person in
authority. Such necessity to cater to the government limits the ability of the World Bank
to implement its participation policies and practices.
During Wolfensohn’s Presidency a focus on anti-corruption measures as an aspect
of governance abounded, especially as relates to his anti-corruption speech which he
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delivered in 1997 and to which every person discussing the focus on anti-corruption in
the Bank points. The issue of bolstering anti-corruption policies in the Bank is
inextricably related to participation because of the issues of transparency and holding
government accountable. The exchange inspired a dialogue within internal management –
but it also created contention among Bank employees because Wolfensohn’s concern
with corruption was associated with how money was not reaching the beneficiaries.
The original idea about corruption was that money from the Bank was not getting
to its intended recipients; instead people at various levels of the funding process were
siphoning the money for themselves. Loans are lent through a complex process for
funding projects. An implementing agency opens a national bank account in the country
of the intended project. Then there is a deposit from the Bank treasury which goes into
the new account. Thereafter, the implementing agency and those implementing the
project have access to those funds and at that point can fund their friends or foes.
Anti-corruption remains the key factor of governance that the Bank focuses
highly on, and is related to participation in that anti-corruption assumes transparency and
openness toward citizens of a country. Indeed, during the creation of the GAC strategy
there was an understanding among the Bank’s board that the Bank needed to outline how
it would interpret these two governance ideals—the Board eventually sided with focusing
on anti-corruption. The GAC strategy that was eventually created and guides policy for
the Bank was created based on consultation from people all over the world.
The Bank’s support for stakeholder participation remains closely tied to
development projects rather than political, making them very different from the openly
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supportive UNDP. Indeed, some Bank employees argue that it would be completely out
of the Bank’s purview and expertise to support elections in any way as the UNDP does.
The lack of support for elections or the electoral cycle does not mean that the
Bank does not actively promote equal representation in decision-making procedures. The
Bank is constrained in its rhetoric concerning participation in government and free and
fair elections although, in some cases the Bank supports these practices in the country
office and in projects that it funds and implements.
Table 5.6: World Bank Funding for Participation
• Small Grants Program (1982) Replaced by the Social Development Civil Society
Fund (CSF) (1983), Replaced by the New Global Partnership for Social
Accountability (2012)
• Communication for Governance and Accountability Program (CommGAP)
(2006-2011 Trust Fund)
The New Global Partnership for Social Accountability focuses on direct support
for CSOs and NGOs and engaging them with Bank lending project planning and
implementation. It also encourages governments to work with CSOs in all capacity of
development planning, both in creating national development strategies (such as in the
PRSPs) and also in hiring CSOs to implement development projects that are funded by
the Bank. The Social Development Civil Society Fund (CSF) built off years of working
with and funding CSOs through the Small Grants Program and the CSF whose mission
was to
…strengthen the voice and influence of poor and marginalized groups in the
development processes, thereby making these processes more inclusive and
equitable. To this end, it supports activities of civil society organizations whose
primary objective is encouraging and supporting civic engagement of these target
populations. By involving citizens who are often excluded from the public arena,
and increasing their capacity to influence policy and program decisions, the CSF
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helps facilitate ownership of development initiatives by a broader sector of
society (World Bank 2010b).
The Bank’s main customer is the national government and it works with Finance
Ministers and offices, but the Bank has taken a stance on the importance of engaging and
funding CSOs. The funding itself is not a large amount compared to what the Bank funds
governments. For instance, from 2001-2008 the CSF distributed approximately $2.8
million per year to fund-worthy organizations. It has served to engage CSOs more in their
governments and allow respected CSOs and NGOs to be closely connected in a way that
encourages their participation in PRSPs.
As with the UNDP, some countries have overcome the obstacles inherent in the
Bank’s mandate and regular funding by creating trust funds that serve particular purposes
associated with governance that would be controversial if the Bank engaged in the
practice in some countries. Thus, trust funds are set up in order for governments to fund
what they think are ideal development-governance policies. The Communication for
Governance and Accountability Program (CommGAP) was set up by the government of
the UK to fund governance interventions through the World Bank in countries that asked
for governance assistance. Though it is still focused on providing aid to governments to
make them more accountable to citizens (the supply-side approach), trust funds like these
represent a new mode of communication and intervention for the World Bank in asserting
democratic ideals to governments.
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How did leaders articulate the participation norm in the World Bank?
Participatory approaches must be reflected in the attitudes and behavior of all
actors at all levels…Again and again a new authoritarian manager has set the
clock back, ruining the participatory culture and practices patiently nurtured by a
predecessor. Sustained leadership and support from a high level are critical—
progress is often made by incentives and example. The bottom line in
participatory change is individual and personal (Blackburn, Chambers, and
Gaventa 2000, 10).
While other Presidents in the Bank certainly supported participation in
development projects, it was James Wolfonsohn who was most influential on articulating
the norm of participation. He did this through direct support for existing policy,
encouraging participatory development practice in statements and speeches, and engaging
with the Executive Board and country office and regional office employees on how to
articulate and implement participation. Most importantly the CDF was Wolfensohn’s idea
to deal with the criticisms the World Bank had been fielding since the latter 1980s.
Including communities and country authorities in the projects and development planning
of their own countries was essential to making sure that development projects and
lending were successful.
Wolfensohn’s anti-corruption agenda was another important norm that
intermingles with participatory development. At its heart, anti-corruption measures are
set up to encourage governments to be open and honest with their citizens, being
transparent and accountable to them concerning budgeting and policy-making. This in
turn encourages participation by the citizenry in decision-making procedures, or simply
in having a voice in their government. Wolfowitz also supported the anti-corruption
agenda and encouraged governments to engage with CSOs in their societies in order to
reach people in the most need. Despite the latter’s lack of successfully leading the
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organization, his focus on democratic governance was intractable. Even while he talked
in the good governance language, he was the President with the least fear of discussing
democratization openly. Perhaps, in this latter instance, Wolfowitz has had more of an
impact on the Bank’s policy than some would like to admit. We have seen that the
Bank’s policies have increased attention on social issues and free societies, both
economic and political. Much of that support has come directly from leaders like
Wolfensohn and Wolfowitz, with much backlash from those in the organization who
want to maintain a very closed and structured apolitical stance on the Bank’s lending and
development assistance policies.

PARTICIPATION IN ACTION
Identifying the culture of the organization under study provides a way of
understanding why some norms are highlighted more than others but leadership in this
context of participation is obviously an instrumental part of the story. Leadership
provides that impetus to focus in particular ways on a norm. Thus, in the UNDP the
leadership of all the Administrators, backed by the Secretaries General of the 1990s and
2000s, proved influential in promoting a concept of development that encapsulated
human freedom and rights, thus promoting a rights-based understanding of development.
In that conceptual context it would have been difficult for any of those leaders to deny the
importance of a country having a government in which people participate in decisionmaking procedures and are actively involved in politics through some form of voting in
elections. While focusing solely on elections as the impetus for democratization is
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negative, the UNDP overcomes this by supporting civil society in a multitude of ways,
especially by including them in decision-making procedures of both project-based
development and government decisions.
The World Bank took a different route on focusing on stakeholder participation
through practices lie the CASs and PRSPs which are meant to include civil society
concerns by having their representatives stand in as part of the process. Stakeholder
participation, however, is much less all inclusive and does not have as much of a focus on
inclusiveness of all in the political decision-making of a country, though many of my
interviewees argued that while the Bank does not support that kind of inclusion in
rhetoric or publicly, Bank projects and country level activities certainly provide such
support.
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VI: GENDER EQUALITY
International development organizations included consideration of women’s
issues and rights in development rhetoric and policy since the 1950s, especially as
evidenced in the committees and treaties of the UN. Gender equality in international
development includes a greater focus on women in development and a shift to funding
projects that take account of women, gender sensitive budgeting, gender mainstreaming
in domestic and international organizations, increasing focus on the nexus between
women and violence (including focus on rape as a weapon of war), and acceptance and
institutionalization of gender quotas. 77
This chapter discusses how international development organizations articulated
gender equality norms and implemented those norms into operational policies and
projects. Gender equality in international development builds off of 60 years of human
rights documents and treaties that articulate the rights of women. 78 The 1970s UN
Decade of Women, and the movements in development implementation and policy
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This is only a partial list; there are many ways in the international system in which gender equality issues
have been incorporated in recent years.
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Gender equality norms started with the agreement on women’s equal rights guaranteed in the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 1950s UN Commission on the Status of Women, UN
General Assembly Resolution 56, the 1979 Convention Against All Forms of Discrimination of Women
(CEDAW), the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the 1995 Beijing
Platform for Action, and UN General Assembly Resolution 1325 (Krook and True 2012).
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formation highlighted women’s issues and rights in development: Women in
Development (WID); Gender and Development (GAD); and Gender Mainstreaming.
The UNDP began articulating gender equality policies in the 1980s but
implementation into practice, both in operational policies and in implementation through
projects, has proved slow. The World Bank has furthered the implementation process in
recent years and has been at the forefront of implementation into operational policy since
its inception. The World Bank’s success emits from its practical application of gender
mainstreaming policies in sectors, through operational statements, and by including
gender equality targets into funding goals. The World Bank has made a clear argument
for what gender equality means for the organization and has even, in recent years, spoken
out about women’s political participation in reports and publications, including support
for women’s participation in politics and legislative areas (World Bank n.d.g). However,
in the latter area, the World Bank is a bit more hesitant than the UNDP to create projects
related to political participation because of article 20 of the Articles of Agreement that
states that political activity is prohibited by the World Bank. This does not, however,
mean that the World Bank does not support political participation of both men and
women in government, especially in holding government accountable for its actions.
Because of their contested history and implementation, gender equality norms
provide illustrative examples of how norms are articulated in international organizations
to become diffused within the organization itself (among leaders, staff members, and
consultants of the organization). Based on the findings here, I suggest that there are two
critical elements to advancing gender equality in an international development
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organization. First, it means a strong commitment to gender equality and gender
mainstreaming by the whole organization: “in research, legislation, policy development
and in activities on the ground, and to ensure that women as well as men can influence,
participate in and benefit from development efforts” (United Nations 2001). This largely
means education on how to implement gender equality and gender mainstreaming tactics
and why they are important. Second, leadership and management at all levels of the
organization (from headquarters, to sector areas, to regional, and finally to country level
offices) must support gender equality and mainstreaming efforts in tangible and
thoughtful ways if any progress is to be made on gender equality both in development
practice and in these organizations themselves. 79
In other words, it is not enough to create brochures, pamphlets, research, gender
departments, or commitments to gender equality. Both the organizations studied here
have done this to an exceptional degree. What is needed is strong leadership support at all
levels, and a commitment to understanding how to make sure that gender equality and
gender mainstreaming tactics should be implemented in the practices of the
organizations. This chapter introduces gender equality as a governance and development
norm, discussing how and why it has become influential in development studies and
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The theme of encouraging leadership and management to support gender equality and gender
mainstreaming appears consistently in assessments of international organizations’ work in gender equality.
For instance, the 2006 assessment of UNDP’s gender practices said “UNDP management has created
ambiguity and decreased visibility, in the way it has moved gender mainstreaming structures around, and
has allocated insufficient staff and financial resources” (vi). Concluding remarks argue that “leadership at
all senior management levels in the organization is necessary if gender mainstreaming is to succeed”
(emphasis in original) (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006, 46).
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within the internal practices as well as development thinking and projects of international
development organizations.

GENDER EQUALITY AS A GOVERNANCE NORM IN DEVELOPMENT
Gender equality inclusion in international development followed three trends
since the 1970s: (1) introducing gender mainstreaming policies into development
organization’s operational policies and development projects; (2) increasing women’s
equal participation especially in political representation (represented by the Beijing
Platform for Action); and (3) increasing women’s access to goods and services especially
evident in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) with goal number three
specifically identifying women in the goal and targets. 80 In what follows I explain how
the first trend has been incorporated by both organizations, and how the UNDP zoned in
on the second trend while the World Bank developed the third trend. Even so, each
organization has promoted all aspects of gender equality at various times.
Gender equality in politics has a long history dating back to the fight for political
freedoms and emancipation itself. Extending the franchise beyond property-owningwhite-males in Europe from the 15th to the 20th centuries spilled over into an equally
historical struggle of extending the franchise to women. Despite their predecessors’
successes, in places all around the world women are still severely limited in access to
political processes and positions, in training for politics, and in being able to participate
in the political process (Kristof and WuDunn 2009). At the beginning of the second
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“Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women” with a Target 3.A to “eliminate gender disparity in
primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015.”
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decade of the 21st century the world average for women holding places in parliament is
roughly 20 percent, with developing countries generally falling to the bottom. 81
Statistics of gender divisions in parliaments give an indication that the world, and
even the developed world, has only slowly moved forward on gender equality in issues
relating to governance and political participation. In recent years the gender equality
issue has moved onto the development scene as an essential way to reach development
goals, culminating somewhat in the MDG number 3 to “Promote Gender Equality and
Empower Women” with a Target 3.A to “eliminate gender disparity in primary and
secondary education preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than
2015” (United Nations 2014).
In the area of human rights, women have garnered much attention, especially in
UN discourse (Krook and True 2012). The UN promoted gender equality and the rights
of women to have equal status to that of men in its founding documents, in treaties
promoting and ensuring that the rights of women be protected by states, in worldwide
conference and meetings, in speeches and statements of its leaders, and in gender
mainstreaming in its own organizational settings. The UN Charter (1945), the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and UN Resolution 56 all contain language that
promotes the equal rights and protections of men and women (Krook and True 2012).
81

However, when one looks at individual country comparisons a new trend emerges. The countries at the
top of the list for gender equality in parliamentary representatives is highest for developing countries,
especially those who have received a high amount of aid in recent decades, such as Rwanda at the top of
the list with 56.3 percent in the lower house, however only with 38.5 percent in the upper house overtaken
by developing countries such as Senegal and just barely by Argentina. Developed countries, other than
Nordic countries and Belgium, fall far down on the list with the United States coming in at 16.9 percent in
lower house and 17 percent in the upper house, comparable to developing countries like Turkmenistan. The
Inter-Parliamentary Union regularly collects information on the number of women participating in politics.
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/world.htm Accessed September 26, 2012.
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The UN formed the Commission on the Status of Women in the 1950s. In 1979 the UN
General Assembly adopted the UN Convention on the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), a remarkable document for its vision of
equality; it entered into force only two years later in 1981. Further documents include the
1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, the 1995 Beijing
Platform for Action, and UN General Assembly Resolution 1325 (United Nations
Development Programme 2014).
The UN further promoted gender equality through efforts such as ECOSOC’s
Convention on the Status of Women, the International Women’s Year of 1975, and the
directly following UN Decade for Women that resulted in four conferences on gender
equality (largely focused on women’s empowerment) and a Platform for Action in the
most cited Fourth Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995 (Krook and True 2012,
113). The United Nations started an International Women’s Day to celebrate women. The
UN has been a catalyst in the promotion of women’s rights through ECOSOC as well as
through the multiple agencies of the UN including the UNDP. The UN has a major
influence on the ways that the international community thinks about issues like gender
equality, even while the implementing power of the UN is limited.
When the governance concept took its nascent form in the 1990s in the UNDP,
the World Bank, and other international development organizations, gender equality
became one of the leading governance principles. Gender equality is sometimes
subsumed under participation and elections and it is therefore not as obvious that it exists
as a target outcome, especially in indexes that measure governance. Yet increasingly
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development organizations include the focus on gender, both in the activities of the
organization through gender mainstreaming, and in the projects that the organizations
fund. The gender-governance-development nexus has consistently been an important
element of study for feminist scholars who note that power has been and remains in the
hands of the male gender and that male governance privilege should be challenged
(MacKinnon 1983; Preece 2002).
Global governance literature focuses on the nexus between governance and
gender through the issues of public policies of state governments (Brush 2003), violence
against women, corporate governance (Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagné 2008),
globalization (Shepherd and Ferguson 2011), women and the global political economy
(Griffin 2010, 2009), women and democratization (Waylen 1998; Beer 2009), women
and poverty, and women and migration (Benería, Deere, and Kabeer 2012). Governance
literature focuses on increasing women’s participation in various ways, from increased
participation in development projects to increased participation in decision-making
procedures of governments, either by voting or holding governmental posts (Jabeen and
Iqbal 2010; Burnet 2008; Haque 2003; Rezazadeh 2011).
The four UN Conferences on Women made an indelible impact on the
development community’s perception of the issues that women face in development, and
on the importance of incorporating a gendered focus to development. The Conferences
(Mexico City 1975, Copenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985, and Beijing 1995) shifted the
gender focus to specific issues that affected both men and women in development, but
especially outlined the negative effects of development projects and programming on
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women and how to overcome them. The first conference in Mexico pushed women in
development on the agenda and opened up a dialogue for such discussions. It was the
impetus for the creation of a research organization that would focus specifically on
women’s projects, as well as a UN agency devoted to women in development. The
United Nations International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of
Women (INSTRAW) was originally set to have a base in Tehran until political instability
made it impossible. Thereafter the Dominican Republic offered office space and support,
and it found its base in the Caribbean until 2012 when it merged into UNWomen. The
second organization, the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM),
functioned as a fund of the UNDP until it merged with UNWomen in 2012. This
organization funded projects specifically devoted to women’s development needs such as
support for gender budgeting.
The second conference in Copenhagen focused on specific women’s health needs,
not just maternal health. The third conference in Nairobi brought about issues of human
settlements and the environment as related to women’s experience. Finally, the fourth
conference in Beijing focused on women’s participation in development projects and
planning, and in decision-making procedures and positions in government. While there is
a lobby for a fifth UN Conference on Women, many reasons exist for its delay and
possible nonexistence. These include lack of funding, lack of support in conservative
Western political administrations, and the argument that women’s development issues
should be dealt with under issue-specific conferences or agreements (i.e., that they should
be mainstreamed) rather than as separate issues.
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In the 1990s the focus on gender equality in development projects was combined
with the rising governance debate by suggesting the men and women both should equally
benefit from good governance, and should participate equally in their governments.
Gender mainstreaming techniques became the accepted way for including gender equality
into organizational corporate governance, development and governance policies, and
projects. Much debate exists over the impacts of gender mainstreaming techniques
(Jacquot 2010; Page 2011; Hafner-Burton and Pollack 2002a, 2002b; Prugl 2009; True
and Mintrom 2001; Zalewski 2010). Yet gender mainstreaming continues to be the status
quo for including gender equality in governance policies and outcomes. Indeed, the
argument that gender equality should be a major focus of development policies is taken
up by development professionals and academics with increasing fervor (Kothari and
Valodia 1998). Gender equality continues to be an important focus in the governance and
development literature and practice, especially in terms of equal participation of both
genders in politics and government decision-making procedures, and in terms of equal
access to goods and services.

ARTICULATING THE NORM OF GENDER EQUALITY
Both the UNDP and World Bank have worked hard to articulate the norm of
gender equality into policy and projects. The UNDP created a multitude of different
departments within the UNDP tasked on creating a gender policy for the UNDP as well
as teach employees on the importance of gender equality in projects and programming.
Both these organizations are concerned with achieving gender equality in all areas of
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development including access to health care, education, political representation, and
economic mobility. They both implement a version of gender mainstreaming, defined by
the UN General ECOSOC 1997/2 Resolution as
The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned
action, including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels.
It is a strategy for making women’s as well as men’s concerns and experiences an
integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of
all policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that
women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated (United Nations
Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006, v).
The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality. As related to governance the two
organizations differ in the way that they articulate the focus of gender-governancedevelopment nexus. The World Bank is concerned with the supply-side governance,
making sure that governments are equally serving both populations. The World Bank’s
gender equality policies and strategies focus on en engaging women in the economic
sectors 82 in which the World Bank works (Gender Action Plan 2007-2010). Certainly the
World Bank supports women’s equal participation in social sectors such as health care,
education, and in society in general (Gender Mainstreaming Plan 2001). Support for
equal engagement in policies is, on the other hand, rather indirect based on practice,
Articles of Agreement, and path-dependence of how the World Bank set up gender
equality strategies to be incorporated in current sectoral projects and programs.
For the UNDP, the concern is with demand-side governance. In relation to
governance, the UNDP has been very clear about how gender equality fits in. Women
should be able to access government resources, have an impact on decision making
82

“Economic sectors include agriculture, private sector development, finance and infrastructure (energy,
transport, mining, ICT, and water and sanitation). (Gender Action Plan 2007-2010, footnote 2, p. 1).
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procedures and policies through active engagement, and be able to exercise the right to
vote and run for office. The UNDP seeks to achieve gender equality through “vigorous
action to ensure women’s expanded participation in all branches of government, nongovernmental organizations and the private sector, at all levels, including local and
decentralized levels, and especially in decision-making positions” as one of the four
focus areas of the Gender Equality Strategy 2008-2011 (United Nations Development
Programme 2008b, 11, emphasis in original).
Using the theory of norm articulation as laid out in chapter one, I ask two
questions of each organization on the development of the norm of gender equality. First,
how was gender equality articulated by these two organizations? Second, how did leaders
influence the gender equality norm in each organization? In each case I find that the
extent to which the norm was embedded in policy and practice of the organization had an
effect on the ability of the leadership to bring it forward and push it onto the agenda of
the organization.

THE UNDP AND WOMEN’S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
UNDP’s concern for women’s participation in politics is evident as one of the
four areas of the Gender Equality Strategy 2008-2011. For the UNDP, the nexus between
gender equality, governance and development centers on making sure that women have
the same choices and freedoms as men in their societies. This means having equal access
to goods and services, but crucially for the UNDP, it means that women access the
political processes. In this tradition, the UNDP supports the direct participation and
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inclusion of women in the political process through voting and running for office.
“Inclusive democracy implies the participation of all social actors, including women, in
public policy dialogue and decision-making” (United Nations Development Programme
2008b, 22 n. 63)
Since the 1980s the UNDP focused very closely on equal participation of women
in the UNDP itself, with the projects and programs it implements, and also in its
governing body through equal opportunity employment campaigns. Other elements of the
UNDP’s gender equality strategy include training government employees to be more
gender aware, ensuring that women have the needed training to engage as public
servants, encouraging civil society participation and action on gender issues, and
engaging political parties to ensure they are gender aware and open to women’s
engagement (United Nations Development Programme 2008b-26). Such policies were
strategically pushed through the organization by various leaders, Administrators being
key to getting the Executive Board to approve such measures at some points.

How did the UNDP articulate the gender equality norm in policy?
Table 6.1: UNDP Committees, Departments and Units on Gender Equality
•

•
•
•
•
•

Women in Development Unit (1975), Replaced by Women in Development Division (WIDD)
(1975), Replaced by Gender in Development Division (GIDD) (1987), Replaced by Gender in
Development Programme (GIDP) (1992), Replaced by the Gender Unit (2000), (the latter two
units function under the Bureau for Development Policy (BDP)
UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) (1976), Replaced by UN Women (2012)
UNIFEM and UNDP Sub-Group on Women
Gender Mainstreaming Evaluation Team (2008)
Gender Steering and Implementation Committee (2006)
UNDP as Chair of the Global Gender Steering and Implementation Committee
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The UNDP created several different departments throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
keeping pace with the changing nature of gender equality projects and philosophy in the
development community, and often leading in gender equality policy. In 1975 the UNDP
established the Women in Development Division (WIDD). WIDD did not make a huge
impact on UNDP policy, if at all, but under Draper WIDD changed to the Gender in
Development Division (GIDD) in 1987 with a role “to ensure [each] project was
sufficiently sensitive to women’s needs” (Browne 2011, 47). WIDD was more successful
in making changes in UNDP’s gender policies. Thus, it was not until 1987 that the norm
of gender equality was articulated and mainstreamed into UNDP policy and this was
largely because of Draper’s influence. Further, Draper created GIDD just at the time
when the human development paradigm made waves through the organization. The
human development paradigm encouraged a focus on human freedom and participation in
government processes, and that focus was directly influential in the articulation of gender
equality for the UNDP.
Gender mainstreaming became an important element in the UNDP’s development
practice just as the organization was taking on a leading role in development in the 1980s.
While the UNDP women’s division changed names, placement, and influence over the
years, the concept of gender continues to be incorporated into policies and programming.
GIDD turned into the Gender in Development Programme (GIDP) under the Bureau for
Development Policy (BDP) in 1992. GIDP was highly productive in creating publications
and works that would guide the UNDP’s gender equality practice in years to come. Many
of its works focused on explaining gender equality and gender mainstreaming both to
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UNDP staff and for outside consumption (United Nations Development Programme
2001a).
GIDP produced the Gender and Development Monograph Series, 83 a series that
sought out academics to articulate gender equality and discuss specific issues related to
gender, development and governance. This series, as well as a multitude of other working
papers and documents produced by UNDP gender departments, continuously highlight
the importance of women’s inclusion in politics as active and equal participants.
The World Summit for Social Development, Copenhagen 1995, addressed itself
to the removal of poverty, the achievement of full employment and social
integration. Many believe that these questions cannot be effectively addressed
without the kind of democratization [sic] of the representative process… (Jain
1996, 14).
“This failure of governance is also a key economic issue of efficiency and equity. At the
root of it again is the treatment of women as “natural” physical reproductive and
nurturing beings, rather than legal and economic agents with rights” (United Nations
Development Programme 2001a).
UNDP’s measured success in the democratic governance practice area spills over
into the gender equality focus on participation. UNDP democratic governance policies
and projects engage citizens (both men and women) in political processes and political
parties of local/national government. The Evaluation Office notes that UNDP does well
on gender equality in democratic governance by focusing most of its projects and
resources on women’s participation, even to a fault.
83

A monograph is defined by the UN system as “a bibliographic resources that is complete in one part or
intended to be completed within a finite number of parts” quoting from the Anglo-American Cataloguing
Rules, 2002 Rev. Most of the UN documents are monographs, not intended for publication but as
documents that give an overview on a particular issue area.
www.un.org/depts/dhl/unbisref_manual/undocs/monographs.html accessed January 14, 2014.
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Often, however, the approach remains focused on women’s participation, rather
than recognizing gender-related impediments and addressing gender
inequality…Most programmes focus on women running for political office or
support for Ministries for Women… (United Nations Development Programme
Evaluation Office January 2006, viii).
On sensitive and contested issues like gender equality, the ability for an
organization’s members to share and discuss knowledge is crucial to the way the norm is
articulated in policy. Knowledge sharing, creating institutional memory through
communities of practice, and collaborative efforts serve to help colleagues create
guidance notes together and respond to demands in a comprehensive manner.
Collaborating on gender equality is essential to gender mainstreaming success because
collaborating with colleagues allows for dialogue and the ability to challenge roles and
cultural norms that counter gender equality.
Organizational barriers and push-back from vested interests make the practice of
gender mainstreaming difficult, and even make it difficult for leaders to get across their
points and make changes in the organization. Yet the reviews of gender mainstreaming in
UNDP cite that leaders have a crucial role to play in the success of the organization: “The
organization not only needs to establish a new and stronger institutional structure, but
also to demonstrate leadership…” (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation
Office January 2006, iii)
The internal reviews of the UNDP’s gender equality policy and gender
mainstreaming policy have been largely negative. The reviews argue that while the
UNDP certainly produces a variety of knowledge products on gender equality and
articulates gender equality quite well in statements and policy, it does not implement the
policies well in practice. The 2006 review argues that the main reason for such
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problematic implementation of the UNDP’s gender mainstreaming strategy is because of
ineffective leaders who lack the support that is needed for the organization to move
forward. “The accomplishments of some very committed individuals were constrained by
absence of leadership at a higher level. Top management should clarify what gender
mainstreaming means for UNDP, and introduce mechanisms to institutionalize policy”
(United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006, ix).
Yet leaders are not the only hindrance to internalization of the policies articulated
by leaders and the organization in various places. One consistent problem with the UNDP
gender departments is that they work separately from other departments and working
groups within the organization. Such separation means that attempts to encourage
colleagues to institutionalize gender equality policies into projects and programming
remain difficult, especially if the departments are encouraging something other than
inclusion of women in the political process. The Gender Unit, established under BDP in
2000 and 2004 (though removed for a short time to the poverty practice area in 2002)
promoted gender mainstreaming through all the departments. Yet, despite all the efforts
to mainstream gender equality into all its development projects and policies, the UNDP
still suffers from the silo effect which produces barriers to horizontal influence between
departments. 84
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My respondents referred to the culture of work as a barrier to promoting gender mainstreaming within
the UNDP: the silos in which people work in groups on thematic areas or practice areas but have no
connection with other groups, and thus the communication between groups is very little and serves as a
major barrier.
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Table 6.2: UNDP Policy on Gender Equality
•

Gender Balance in Management Policy (1994) (Phase I: 1995-1997; Phase II: 1998-2001; Phase
III: 2003-2006)
UNDP Introduces Gender Indicators into HDRs (1995) – The GDI (Gender Related
Development Index) and GEM (Gender Equality Measure)
Gender Unit Guidance Note on Gender Mainstreaming (2000)
Gender Equality included in Business Plan as “Cross-Cutting Issue” and not thematic area
(2000-2003) – BP priority to advocacy and upstream policy advice
Gender as Strategic Goal in UNDP’s Strategic Results Framework (SRF) (2000)
Gender Unit Gender Equality Policy Note (2002)
Gender Unit and Human Development Office issue Gender Thematic Guidance Note (2002)
Corporate Gender Strategy and Action Plan 2006-2007 (adopted by Executive Board 2005)
Gender Equality Strategy (GES) 2006-2007 and 2008-2011
Gender Inequality Index (GII) (builds off GDI and GEM of 1995) introduced into HDRs (2011)
Primers of Gender and Democratic Governance Published (2007-2011)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

For the UNDP, the gender-development-governance nexus has centered on
support for women’s equal access to all aspects of government, policy-making, and jobs.
Within the UNDP, the Administrators supported equal access to higher level positions
through the “Gender Balance in Management” policies instituted through the 1990s and
2000s. UNDP supported gender mainstreaming policies throughout the development
work that it does in guidance notes and support from the Gender Department. In
governance promotion, the UNDP focuses closely on engaging women in politics by
advising countries on how they can encourage women to vote and engage in political
parties and political office. Administrator Gustaph Speth supported the creation of the
gender indicators included in the 1995 HDR, a huge step in developing a place for gender
considerations in the development paradigm. The UNDP rallied behind the new concept
of human development and connected that with expanding women’s freedoms and
choices.
Over the years gender mainstreaming navigated a tentative position in UNDP’s
practice areas and goals. In the Strategic Plan of 2000-2003 gender was demoted to
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inclusion as a “cross-cutting” issue rather than a thematic area, noted as a weakness in the
2006 evaluation report of UNDP gender mainstreaming policy (United Nations
Development Programme Evaluation Office January 2006). Guidance notes and policy
papers from the variously named Gender Units laid the foundation and framework for the
Corporate Gender Strategy created in 2006. The creation of the Gender Strategic Plan
represented a turning point in that the gender unit gained more attention and thus more
employees even while team members still felt overwhelmed with the amount of work
they are required to do because they are understaffed.
In recent years, and in light of some critical evaluations of UNDP’s gender policy,
the organization and leadership worked tirelessly in identifying gender mainstreaming
goals, training staff, and incorporating gender analysis into projects and budgets. Starting
with the Strategic Plan of 2008-2011, gender equality and the empowerment of women is
a practice area that is incorporated in all four of its focus areas (UNDP 2008-2011, 33).
Furthermore, the UNDP created its own Gender Equality Strategy for 2008-2011
following on the 2006-2007 Gender Strategy (United Nations Development Programme
2008b). The Gender Equality Strategy of 2008-2011 represented a crucial step in the
UNDP’s gender mainstreaming because it closely mirrored the UNDP Strategic Plan and
took a more comprehensive and corporate approach to systematizing the inclusion of
gender equality and women’s rights across the UNDP’s thematic mandate areas.
The Strategic Plan furthermore incorporated gender mainstreaming and gender
equality concerns into the way that the UNDP creates its policies and runs the
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organization. 85 The focus on gender equality in the UNDP Strategic Plan and the creation
of the Gender Strategic Plan came about because of demand from countries for UNDP
support in a range of areas. Even the Executive Board, donors, and evaluation reports
suggested that the UNDP should focus on gender equality more closely. The pressures
from these areas did help the UNDP to change its strategies, strengthening the gender
team, and strengthening the UNDP’s approach to gender equality practice, which is
covered by the gender equality strategy.
One of the ways that gender equality has developed is through the publication of
documents that suggest that the UNDP and development organizations must support
gender equality in all projects and programs. The Gender and Development Monograph
Series, published under UNDP’s GIDP in the 1990s, claim a strong role for gender in
development (Miller and Ravazi 1998). In more recent years the Gender Unit
commissioned a series called Primers in Gender and Democratic Governance that argue
that gender equality and the promotion of democratic governance are essential to reach
development goals. 86
At this point in the UNDP’s history, it would be difficult for the UNDP to reduce
its support for gender mainstreaming strategies because it has become incorporated into
85

Article 18 of the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011 says that the Executive Board “Take notes of the
improved integration of a gender perspective into the UNDP focus areas, and encourages UNDP to
continue to build internal capacity to address gender dimensions in its work including, inter alia, the
creation of enabling incentives and accountability systems for staff at all operational levels, and calls upon
UNDP to continue to mainstream a gender perspective and to pursue gender equality in country
programmes, planning instruments and sector-wide programmes and to articulate specific country-level
goals and targets in that field in accordance with national development strategies” (4). (United Nations
Development Programme 2008c)
86

The primers cover five areas of democratic governance and are written by academics or practitioners
commissioned by the UNDP (Douglas 2007; Hijab 2007; Hijab and Zambrano 2009; Hossain, Musembi,
and Hughes 2011; Sidhu and Meena 2009)
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the way that the UNDP functions, as evident in the Gender Strategies produced by the
organization. Even so, gender mainstreaming is a slow and somewhat painful process
when results are not quickly forthcoming. Gender mainstreaming is tedious and requires
a long view of history. For example, western states have been very slow to include
women at the same rate as men in economic and political life. Many argue that we cannot
expect developing countries to do better than western states have done. Putting a new
norm into practice and implementing it is no easy feat. The inclusion of a gender
perspective in policies and projects, especially at the country level, is slowly and
intermittently implemented, depending on the leader in the position of authority who can
promote gender equality. Within the UNDP, resistance to gender mainstreaming is
minimal. Yet, the lack of connection in the minds of practitioners between
conceptualizing gender equality and putting it into practice can be debilitating. When
leaders provide entry points for new norms the possibility of internalization and
implementation is greater.
One example of actually providing those entry points in practice is evident in the
UNDP publication on gender and political parties (Ballington 2011). The document
includes an easy to read summary of entry points on pages 2-3 that include three stages of
the electoral cycle in which gender equality good practices can be implemented: Preelection period, election period, and post-election period. After the publication of this
document the UNDP received calls from around the world telling them that the
checklist/mapping methodology created in the political parties document was really well
received by political parties and parliaments all around the world because there were
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clear entry points and outcomes given. It wasn’t a long document, but it was clear, and it
offered tangible actions and results. In this example, norm internalization and
implementation had to do with knowing exact and specific practices that would promote
the norm.
For the UNDP, quotas represent the importance of gender equality and
representation in politics, an aspect of the development focus and paradigm of democratic
governance. For instance, the Beijing Conference on Women in 1995 discussed the
importance of having women participate in governments, not only for society as a whole,
but also in order to advance the cause of women’s equality. The conference produced the
Beijing Platform of Action which highlights the necessity to include women in decisionmaking, and for women to have an equal representation in politics (Ballington 2011;
Dahlerup 2007; Krook 2006; Tripp and Kang 2008; Htun and Jones 2002; Bush 2011). 87
The UNDP incorporates support for women in political participation and supports quotas,
in part because of the ideas that became influential at the Beijing conference. It melded
these ideals into its own policies, providing country support and guidance. UNDP’s goals
in this area are to
Increase the number of women in public office; Enhance women's leadership by
helping to reform electoral processes, change political parties, and strengthen
parliaments, judiciaries and the civil service; Promote judicial reform to ensure
equal legal protection to poor women and men (United Nations Development
Programme 2012a, 2011c).

87

Htun and Jones offer insight into where the norm came from in their oft-cited chapter. They argue that
"pressure from women politicians and international norms were the central causes of quotas" along with
presidential support and interest (Htun and Jones 2001, 35).
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The acceptance and adoption of gender quotas by most developing and many
developed countries around the world, indicates a norm in international relations because
it is an accepted standard of behavior that states follow (Krook 2006; Bush 2011; Baldez
2006; Dahlerup 2007, 2006). There are multiple types of gender quotas and are usually
classified as candidate gender quotas or reserved seat quotas. 88 Gender quotas often take
on the form of pushing for thirty percent women’s representation, though there is no
precedence in international law for that number, only in practice. 89 The gender quota
norm increased dramatically in acceptance since the mid-1980s. To date, 109 countries
have institutionalized at least one type of gender quota, whether legislative or
voluntarily. 90 “These measures [gender quotas] have appeared in countries in all major
world regions with a broad range of institutional, social, economic, and cultural
characteristics” (Krook 2006, 113).

88

Quotes come in a multitude of forms. Drude Dahlerup breaks down quotas into three categories of
importance: Candidate quotas (designating a percentage of candidates on party lists to one gender),
reserved seats quotas (allocating a percentage of the parliamentary seats for women), and aspirant quotas
(assigning a percentage requirement to the pool of potential candidates that will run). Dahlerup notes that
parties and their tactics and regulations are essential to the quota system and that the level of democracy
and the type of electoral system are crucial to whether or not gender quotas bring about the “equality of
result,” i.e., a higher percentage of women in political offices. On the other hand, Dahlerup considers the
“equality of opportunity,” i.e., that women are included in decision-making procedures, and that they start
seeing themselves as having agency, as more important that equality of result: if quotas achieve an
“equality of opportunity” they have been successful even if an “equality of result” has not been achieved
(Dahlerup 2007, 2005).
89

I am indebted to one of my interviewees for pointing out that the Beijing Platform for Action was
important in creating gender quotas, and that the norm of using a thirty percent quota target for women
reserved seats in parliament started with a 1990 ECOSOC, continued in the MDG target.
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Global Database of Quotas for Women. http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/search.cfm# Accessed
November 15, 2012. Voluntary Party Quotas have been of interest lately and have garnered much attention
because of the importance of party practice in implementing quotas. An exciting publication on political
parties and gender equality, including quotas, published by the UNDP incorporated local knowledge and
included specific action points for change. Party leaders in various countries were impressed with the
publication and used it to change party regulations and practices. (Ballington 2011)
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While the norm of gender quotas did not emerge in the UNDP itself, the
organization adopted the norm and defined it according to its own concerns with
development and human freedom. UNDPs work in post-conflict peace-building processes
includes encouraging states to include quotas in constitutions or legislation in the
formative years so that gender equality is ensured, at least by law. The UNDP has further
stated that gender equality, as represented in the norm of gender quotas, is an essential
element of democratic governance. The ideas for promoting gender as an essential
component of democratic governance turned into norms of gender quotas in constitutions,
gender mainstreaming policies, and gender training for parliaments and other
authoritative state figures.
The rise of quotas as gender-governance-development policy in the UNDP was
directly influenced by the people working in the organization on gender issues and the
types of policies that they chose to push. Furthermore, these “norm-entrepreneurs” did
not receive much resistance in promoting gender equality policies in UNDP. Gender
quotas were institutionalized in UNDP projects and policy because gender equality and
gender mainstreaming had already been well accepted in the organizational culture
through prior policies and departments that highlighted the importance of women’s
participation in development projects and in government. The GPECS program supports
the electoral cycle by training electoral management boards (EMBs), consulting countries
on how to run elections, and actively working with civil society to ensure equal access
and participation to the voting process.
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Table 6.3: UNDP Funding on Gender Equality
•
•
•

UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) established 1976, GA Resolution 31/133;
under UNDP according to GA Resolution 39/125, 1984
Direct Line 11 – Resources and Funding dedicated to Gender Mainstreaming (1996)
Gender Thematic Trust Fund Established (2001)

Administrators and Executive Boards make a big impact on norms in the form of
funding or de-funding and commitments in the budgets and Strategic Plans of the
organization. Administrator Speth’s renewal of Gender Mainstreaming Strategy with
earmarking of resources and staff positions (Memo to Staff, 1996) shows how he was
committed to gender issues (United Nations Development Programme Evaluation Office
January 2006, vi). The Multi-Year Funding Framework (MYYF) of 2004-2007 restored
Gender Unit to the BDP and included gender equality as a service line for achieving
MDGs, thus directly channeling funding toward gender equality practices and policies.
The UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has been instrumental in
guiding much of UNDP’s development work based on its ability to garner funds from the
UN. The UN created this fund to support the particular needs of women that were made
so obvious in the First UN Conference on Women. UNIFEM emerged out of the debate
in the 1970s over the need to help women by giving them access to funds and by creating
a situation in which women would be able to recreate those funds so that they would not
be dependent (i.e., not dependent on ad-hoc or revolving accounts) (Snyder 2004, 44).
UNIFEM directly encouraged funding projects that considered the different impacts that
the projects had on different genders, and projects that reflected the prevailing
understanding of how women should be able to engage in society. UNIFEM was placed
under the operational policies and bureaucracy of the UNDP in 1984. One of the reasons
for this is because of the UNDP’s coordinating role throughout all UN agencies (Snyder
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2004, 47). The UN had just begun to craft out a role for itself as a development
implementing agency (and not just a funding agency) and the prevailing thought was that
UNIFEM would now have the chance to continue its work and encourage other UN
agencies to implement gender equality policies.
Trying to integrate UNIFEM into the operational policies and practices of UNDP
further, in 2004 Mark Malloch Brown appointed the Director of UNIFEM as UNDP
Special Advisor to Administrator. This change meant that the Administrator was much
more likely to hear about and know what was going on in UNIFEM and collaborate with
UNIFEM and make sure that the whole UNDP was working with UNIFEM.

How did leaders articulate the gender equality norm in the UNDP?
Gender equality gained substantial attention within the UNDP when William H.
Draper III was Administrator of the organization from 1986-1993, although only in the
form of inclusion into policy and incorporating into ad hoc practice. It was under
Draper’s leadership that the UNDP took on the shape and quality that we know today, not
only in the way that it carries out its coordination of the UN development system through
its Resident Representatives, but also in its very vision of development. 91 As regards
gender equality, Draper actively worked to promote women to higher levels of office
within the organization, as well as to promote the kinds of development activities that
91

Draper, upon his appointment as Administrator, asked of the organization: “What does the UNDP believe
in?” and “Should it not be advocating what it believes in?” (Weiss and Thakur 2010) (194). Murphy
recounts that though Draper was a venture capitalist he did have a good understanding of development
politics because his father, Bill Draper, had been associated with Paul Hoffman when he was Administrator
of the Marshal Plan; furthermore Draper’s desire to include women in development planning, projects and
implementation was directly related to his work in the Export-Import Bank that occurred before his time at
UNDP (Murphy 2006, 236).
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included women as important recipients of aid under the WID paradigm. His leadership
was crucial to incorporating gender equality as a principle of democratic governance, and
indeed, in developing the concept of democratic governance in the UNDP. 92
Draper appointed women to high positions in the UNDP when he was
Administrator including Ellen Johnson Sirleaf appointed as Director of the Africa
Bureau, Elena Martinez as Regional Director, and Ingrid Eide as Head of the Women’s
Division (Browne 2011, 47; Murphy 2006, 260-262). Following Draper’s lead the issue
of “gender balance” in positions of authority rose to the notice of UNDP leaders in the
1990s and 2000s. UNDP published its first policy to directly support women’s status as
leaders and to promote women to positions of authority in 1995 under Gus Speth’s
Administration which was followed by two other such policies entitled “Gender Balance
in Management” (Bessis 2004). The trend however has not caught on at an equitable rate,
especially for positions of upper management. 93 Yet in 2009 the first women honored to
hold the position of UNDP Administrator and Assistance Administrator were Helen
Clark and Rebecca Grynspan.
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As far as this author is aware Draper never used the term “democratic governance” although in his
second to last speech to the General Assembly as the UNDP Administrator he said that “undoubtedly,
freedom and justice were the foundations of economic growth; but they must be underpinned by good
governance, effective policies, appropriate technologies and wide-ranging skills” (Sec. 16, p. 5). (United
Nations General Assembly Forty-Sixth Session 1991)
93

For instance, as of 2010 women make up 40.4 percent of the UN system in 2010, up from 33.5 percent in
2000. However, when considering from the viewpoint of ranks, women make up 30.9 percent of upper
ranks management in the UN system including Secretary-General, Under-Secretary-General, Assistant
Secretary-General, Director-General, Assistant Director-General, and Deputy Director-General and only
the bottom two ranks of employees have equitable (if not inequitable toward men) percentages of women in
positions: 60.2 percent of P-1 ranks are women and 57.3 percent of P-2 ranks are women whereas the P-3,
P-4, P-,5, D-1, and D-2 ranks have 45.1 percent, 38.4 percent, 31.7 percent, 30.2 percent, and 25.7 percent
respectively. See United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women. (31
December 2010). “Gender Balance Statistics,”
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/fpgenderbalancestats.htm Accessed February 1, 2013.
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Speth was very supportive of gender equality in the UNDP, following hard on his
predecessor’s promoting of the concept in practice and very specifically in project
creation. Yet even with a leader whose support for a concept is strong, roadblocks emerge
with the organizational structure and functioning. Gender mainstreaming saw ups and
downs under Mark Malloch Brown’s tenure as UNDP Administrator. Brown immediately
changed the rhetoric, marketing, and structure of the organization. He started the trend to
endorse practice areas as a way for UNDP to advocate development goals and specialize
(or gain a comparative advantage) on specific issue areas. The promotion of democratic
governance further changed the nature of the organization’s vision of development.
However, gender equality has mostly been incorporated as a cross-cutting issue rather
than a practice area, which marginalizes gender issues. The current Secretary General
(Ban Ki-Moon) and the current UNDP Administrator and Under-Administrator (Helen
Clark and Rebecca Greenspan) have been influential in supporting gender programs and
are concerned with gender equality and gender parity in the organization. In fact, one
respondent called these leaders “gender champions.”

THE WORLD BANK AND WOMEN’S ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY
Many documents describing the Bank’s development of gender equality policies
argue that forces outside the Bank were the most influential in getting the Bank to focus
on the issues and importance of gender (Snyder 2004). From their own experiences, they
describe how pressure from civil society organizations and feminist groups brought about
changes in international organizations (Fraser and Tinker 2004). However, these usually
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miss out on the nuances of the internal changes and influential leaders of these
organizations. Indeed, I argue that without the specific leaders of these organizations
actually highlighting gender equality as an important issue in international development,
the organization would have been less likely to change its focus and support for gender
equality in the way that it has done. In the 2000s it seems completely acceptable to focus
on gender issues in development, but that was not the case even as early as the 1970s and
80s. While there was much lobbying coming from outside sources on the UNDP and
World Bank, influential leaders had to push their organizations to the edge in order to
influence change in policy and practice.
The World Bank has had advisors and departments devoted to gender issues since
the 1970s, and it has interpreted gender issues as those related to its particular sectors and
issue areas. The World Bank speaks of expanding women’s freedoms and choices in
society, while much of its work on gender is to gain equality in access to goods and
services through government intervention. The most telling for the focus that the World
Bank takes on the gender-development-governance policy nexus is found in its recent
International Development Association (IDA)16 funding round, the WDR 2012, and the
associated commitments that the Bank has made concerning gender equality. The Bank
made commitments to include gender considerations in safety net projects, agriculture
and rural development, and health, creating an Education Sector Strategy, writing a
Reproductive Health Action Plan, in support for fragile areas, and in creating regional
gender action plans. All these focus on the supply-side of governance, urging
governments to supply goods and services to women and make sure that they have equal
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access to all the goods and services in their society, especially participating in the
economic sector. The Bank very closely connects its gender equality commitments to
poverty reduction.

How did the World Bank articulate the gender equality norm?
Table 6.4: World Bank Committees, Departments and Units on Gender Equality
•
•
•
•
•
•

Women in Development (WID) Advisor appointed (1977)
Women in Development Unit created (1986)
External Gender Consultative Group established (1996)
Gender and Development Board established in PREM Network (1997)
Gender and Development Board head promoted to director level (1998)
Think Equal Campaign

Gender equality is largely articulated by the Bank as increased efficiency and
effectiveness in the government’s provision of public goods and services to women,
although there is certainly a component of women’s participation in government and
development practice. The reason for focus on the former as belied in organizational
culture is three-fold. First, the organizational processes of the Bank dictate that it work
mostly with governments, traditionally the country offices primarily work with the
finance ministries of the country. Thus, supporting the government’s provision of public
services for women through public administration support came naturally to Bank
employees. Second, the Bank works in sectors and support for gender equality in those
sectors came to mean focusing on how women could be supported in greater depth in
each sector. Finally, the Bank started out with a focus on macroeconomic policy. It still
mostly hires economists who are very focused on measurements. In fact, for the Bank,
the culture suggests that “if it can’t be measured, it’s not important” and that idea goes all
the way back to the McNamara Presidency. Thus, measuring the kinds of goods and
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services that are accessed by and available to women is a major focus of how the gender
equality norm is articulated by the Bank.
The Bank’s support focuses on inclusion of gender considerations in all the
Bank’s formal policies and sector activities. The World Bank incorporates gender
equality in projects and funding with an increasing focus on country gender diagnostics
and gender indicators (related to attaining MDGs on health and maternal mortality since
2000). Essential characteristics of the World Bank’s gender mainstreaming norms outline
the definition and focus the World Bank takes on gender equality. “Informing country
policy dialogue; enhancing country-level gender diagnostics; scaling up lending for
domestic priorities; investing in gender-relevant data and statistics; and leveraging
partnerships” (World Bank Sept. 2012, 6). The Bank is making strides toward integrating
gender equality and mainstreaming practices throughout its sector work, supported by the
WDR 2012, its policy documents, and gender strategies from headquarters.
Gender mainstreaming is country focused in that the responsibility for
implementing and enacting gender equality norms, including gender analysis in budgets
and projects and training staff, lies at the country office level. The Bank works on the
country-demand principle so that the gender mainstreaming policies are incorporated into
Country Assistance Strategies (CASs) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)
with consultation and agreement from civil society and governing authorities of the
country. The trend in decentralization is evident even in how the norm emerges and is
adopted in the World Bank considering that some countries do better than others; the
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variety in implementation is ostensibly related to country office leadership, level of
accountability, and domestic politics in the country itself.
The Bank’s gender mainstreaming focus is on measurable outcomes of projects.
This is intensely obvious in the IDA16 funding round which included gender equality as
one of its thematic areas of focus. The overarching theme that the executive board agreed
on in the IDA16 meetings held in Brussels, Belgium in December 14-15, 2010 was that
of “delivering development results” (International Development Agency Nov. 2012). The
theme meant that the Bank enhanced its results management system and created projects
and policies that focused on the results based framework and tools of obtaining
measurable results for the money spent on aid. Success of loans, investments, and aid had
to be measured with targets of outputs and outcomes of the development projects.
World Bank gender equality norms and rules evolved in the 1980s and 1990s
largely through incorporation into the operational policies manual. The goal was to
encourage the inclusion of gender concerns in all World Bank policies and projects. After
the acceptance of Wolfensohn’s CDF this meant implementing gender considerations into
every CAS and PRSPs prepared by the World Bank staff in concert with the country in
question. These new policies came in response to commitments from leaders; Conable,
Lewis and Wolfensohn stand out in their commitment to engage women in all
development projects. But it was also a result of the criticism that the Bank endured from
the late 1980s to the late 1990s on the impact of its SAPs. Feminist economics literature
evaluates the impact of the Structural Adjustment Policies on women and argues that
those policies negatively impacted women by creating a situation in which women’s

259

unpaid work at home increased in order to meet the societal demands represented in men
being out of work and social services cut. Thus the SAPs placed an excessive burden on
women that was not even calculated by the Bank in any of its assessments of the impact
of SAPs. Sophie Bessis argues that it was not until 1985 that the World Bank seriously
focused on women as a way to deal with such criticisms of the SAPs, and that the focus
has remained since (Bessis 2004, 641).
In its operations the World Bank Group incorporated gender considerations as
early as the late 1970s just as gender was becoming more important worldwide. The
World Bank’s first effort was to create a position called Women in Development Advisor
(World Bank 2010a), a position that had very little authority or power (Bessis 2004, 640).
Yet contrary to what some argue, the Bank itself was influential in the creation of the
Women in Development (WID) movement and in charting out gender equality norms for
the organization. The name for the new movement, WID, developed out of an expert
group report for the Social Development Division. Gloria Scott wrote the phrase
“integration of women in development” in the report, and the name caught on (Scott
2004, 17). Scott was then hired by the Bank to "increase staff and borrowers'
understanding of how women affected, or were affected by, bank-financed activities"
(Scott 2004, 21). The “meagerness of the resources attached” to the WID advisor in the
World Bank limited action and influence, but Bank President Robert McNamara was
supportive and “insisted that WID issues be integrated within the framework of each
project” (Scott 2004,22).
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Table 6.5: World Bank Policy on Gender Equality
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Operational Manual Statement (OMS) 2.20 (1984)
Recommitment to Gender Mainstreaming through readjustment strategies (Bessis) (1985)
Operational Directive on Poverty Reduction – include women’s issues (1990)
World Bank Report “Enhancing Women's Participation in Economic Development” (1994)
Gender required in Country Assistance Strategies (1994)
Operational Policy (OP) 4.20 issued (1994), Replaced by OMS 2.20 (2001)
Comprehensive Development Framework approved by Board (1998)
Gender Mainstreaming Plan- “Integrating Gender into the World Bank’s Work: A Strategy for
Action” (2001; January 2002) - Country Gender Assessments (requirement of Gender
Mainstreaming Plan)
“Healthy Development” 10-year Strategy (2007)
Gender Action Plan 2007-2010 (GAP) (2006)
Reproductive Health Action Plan (RHAP) (May 2010)
Gender Action Plan – Transition Plan presented to Board (June 15, 2010)
IDA16 Plans include plans for gender equality
World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development
“World Bank Gender and Development Policy Framework – A Guidance Note”

Early considerations of gender equality incorporated into the operational manual
statement (OMS) in 1984 (OMS 2.20) which highlighted that women should be
considered in operations and activities of the Bank in certain economic sectors as
identified by country offices and authorities as needing a gender component (World Bank
2010a, x). Later additions replaced OMS 2.20 with the operational policies (OP) and
bank procedures (BP) in the Operational Manual under OP 4.20 in 2001.
The 1994 OP 4.20 not only guides staff action related to incorporation of gender
mainstreaming analysis into projects and planning, but provides rules on where the
analysis should be included. Gender mainstreaming policies should be included in CASs
and into sector areas in which the Bank works that have been identified as needing a
gender component in consultation with country authorities and civil society participation,
thus building on OMS 2.20. This represents a process of rule-making and norm-making
that culminated in the Gender Mainstreaming Strategy of 2001 (Gender and Development
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Group World Bank January 2002) which was followed up by the Gender Action Plan
(GAP) 2007-2010 and the current GAP Transition Plan 2010-2013.
Major policy documents of the Bank articulate the rules and associated practices.
These include the most recent World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and
Development which states: “Gender equality is a core development objective in its own
right. It is also smart economics” (xx). That “gender inequality is manifestly unfair”
comes out in the pages of the reports that the World Bank Group puts out on gender
mainstreaming in its internal practices and operations as well as in its funding operations
(World Bank 2012b).
In the latter 1990s the World Bank altered the way it lent money and the way it
encouraged states to make structural changes, a change instigated by the critiques of the
Bank’s 1980s macroeconomic lending practices (World Bank Independent Evaluation
Office April 2012). The Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) represented a
new way for the Bank to couch its development policy: through increasing the extant
support for civil society and participation, which included gender equality. 94
The two practices that developed out of the CDF guided by the principle of civil
society participation and stakeholder inclusion are the CASs and PRSPs. Although the
PRSPs are influential in the development practices pursued by the country and guided by
the World Bank and IMF, the CASs include gender strategies by sector called for by
94

The CDF called for alterations to lending practices under four principles: 1) “Development strategies
should be comprehensive and shaped by a long-term vision; 2) Each country should devise and direct its
own development agenda based on citizen participation; 3) Governments, donors, civil society, the private
sector and other stakeholders should work together in partnership led by recipient countries to carry out
development strategies; and 4) Development performance should be evaluated on the basis of measurable
results.”Comprehensive Development Framework. http://go.worldbank.org/N2NDBE5QL0 Accessed
February 10, 2013. See also (World Bank 2011a, 52-54.).
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OP/BP 4.20, although it is not required in CASs. 95 Country office incorporation of gender
equality practices in CASs further stands out because of its impact on staff members and
on how countries go about implementing development projects to achieve development
goals. Country office staff create CASs with the involvement of the government, however
government officials do not have final say in what is included in the CAS. The CAS goes
through a rigorous review by various elements of the World Bank’s departments before
approval (World Bank 2011a). While the OP/BPs mandate that CASs always include a
gender component, the practice is not always the case unless the country office and
country authorities themselves are on board. While the practice did not catch on right
away, the recent Gender Action Plan, IDA16 discussions, and associated Bank strategies
encouraged more integration.
The Bank Group’s Gender Action Plan (2007-2010) boosted attention to
innovative programs to promote women’s economic empowerment. Over 2006–
10, the share of the Bank’s lending operations integrating gender issues in design
increased by nearly 20 percentage points (to 53 percent), and the share of genderinformed Country Assistance Strategies increased by 27 percentage points to a
record 83 percent (World Bank Development Committee Sept. 2011, ii).
While the first gender mainstreaming strategy of 2001 called for Country Gender
Assessments (CGAs) to guide the CASs, very few countries actually conducted CGAs.
The 2001 gender mainstreaming strategy that created the CGAs represented a time when
assessments were required for almost every sector or cross-cutting area and thus Bank
employees were overwhelmed with the number of assessments they were required to
undertake, which is one reason that the CGAs did not become incorporated into practice
95

As an unofficial rule, more like a guidance note, gender equality analysis is incorporated into a CAS
according to OP/BP 4.20. As part of the review, the CAS is analyzed by the Independent Evaluation Group
(IEG) and given a rating on how well the CAS has done on incorporating a gendered perspective.
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as was hoped by the strategy. However, the very idea of a separate assessment for gender
is completely contradictory to the idea of gender mainstreaming in which one considers
gender in every sector. CGAs were not implemented or successful for that reason. 96 Yet
progress shows that even without the CGAs, country-based staff include gender analyses
and gender considerations in the CASs. In the 2010 FY funding cycle all of the CASs that
were created included a gender component (World Bank 2010a).
Within the focus on incorporating gender equality policies and analysis into CASs
under the CDF the 2001 Gender Mainstreaming Strategy and the IDA16 Strategy
highlighted work in sectors in which the Bank showed strong impact and in which civil
society participation and country negotiation identified gender analysis needs. The World
Bank continues to focus on targets and for this reason puts much effort into research and
projects that will aid countries in achieving the MDGs 4-5 related to maternal mortality,
girl’s education, and health. The highlights of the gender mainstreaming norms are in the
inclusion into CASs (which does not have a good record until very recently) and
inclusion in IDA16 which created targets and goals for reducing maternal mortality and
increasing girl’s education.
Furthermore, IDA 16 required the WDR report to focus on gender in which the
report created three dimensions of gender: endowment, opportunity, and agency. These
dimensions are not easily measured and the Bank’s Gender team is currently working to
create measurements and expressions of these dimensions, especially that of agency, in
96

Furthermore Country Gender Assessments are costly and it is inefficient for the Bank do to them since so
many other organizations and countries are conducting their own. The Bank turned to an operational
practice of using other organization’s or country’s gender assessments, or integrating gender assessments
into the Country Assistance Strategy sectors in order to overcome the inefficiency.
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the trend to measure everything that is important. The measurements of women’s agency
may include women’s control over resources (such as land and assets), gender based
violence, sexual and reproductive rights, freedom of movement, and political voice.
Furthermore, because of the decentralized nature of implementing such policies, the
focus on gender equality in some cases does depend on personality and independent
leadership. Uneven support across sectors is due to the personalities and support of team
leaders—some are diligent in getting gender into the policies and sectors.
The World Bank’s gender equality projects are most successful on the ground, at
the country level, in small projects. While the Bank has been instrumental in pushing for
gender equality in its development projects for decades, it could be much better at
promoting gender equality in its own work as well as through development advocacy. As
the Bank has shown, creating a dialogue with the government on mainstreaming gender is
essential, and the argument must take into account instrumental effects of gender
inequality as well as moral arguments (i.e., that gender inequality is harmful to a
country’s GDP growth, to agricultural production, and so on). Yet, even in places where
women outperform men it does not mean they are better off; it could mean they are
taking on the brunt of the work. In such cases, development organizations need to address
specific cultural issues that result in gender inequality, not just have a blanket approach,
because cultures differ around the world and women and men are affected differently
based on those cultures. Creating a dialogue by organizing is an essential way that both
development organizations and nongovernmental organizations can be involved. It
appears that the Bank is moving in this direction, especially since the creation of the
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World Development Report on gender inequality and the heightened concern for
integration of gender issues into all sector work.
Table 6.6: World Bank Funding on Gender Equality
•
•

IDA 16 Funding Round
Support for Gender Responsive Budgeting (GRB)

Over the years the Bank has focused on incorporating gender equality policy into
its sector work, and not something separate from that work. Thus, most of the monetary
support for gender issues is catalogued by counting those projects that have a gender
sensitive component. Recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number of projects
that include a gender component. The 2012 evaluation of gender mainstreaming noted
that “86 percent of projects classified as gender informed in FY11” (World Bank Sept.
2012, 7). Further, between 2006 and 2011 the World Bank records that it has devoted a
record amount to projects that support women’s issues.
Over the last five years, the World Bank allocated more than $65 billion, or 37
percent of its lending, to operations supporting developing countries’ efforts to
improve girls’ education, women’s and mothers’ health, and women’s access to
credit, land, agricultural extension services, jobs and infrastructure services
(World Bank Development Committee Sept. 2011, ii)
One more important norm that both the World Bank and UNDP supported
throughout this period was gender responsive budgeting. The norm emerged in Australia
and South Africa as an entry point in enhancing women’s participation in development
and considering how a project or policy would either positively or negatively affect
women. UNIFEM learned about gender budgeting from a conference in Zimbabwe. The
UNIFEM staff had not heard of it before and after the conference they pushed for
considering this budget process as an important aspect of women’s development needs.
Belgium ended up supporting an initial project on gender responsive budgeting called
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“Gender and Economic Governance” and while the outcomes were not positive
everywhere, there was a major positive impact in Southeast Asian and South American
countries including increasing money to women, but also in making the budget allocation
process more equitable to women. My respondents suggested that the gender sensitive
budgeting trend helped organizations, like the UNDP and UNIFEM, connect with
government offices to a greater degree.

How did leaders articulate the gender equality norm in the World Bank?
The Bank’s focus on gender as an essential element of development policy and
practice culminated during Wolfensohn’s Presidency, even with the recent IDA 16
funding focus. Wolfensohn made an incredible impact in the Bank related to gender
equality because Wolfensohn was inspired by Clinton’s speech at the Beijing Conference
for Women which gave him an impetus for trying to incorporate women’s concerns into
policy and practice. One of my respondents discussed how Wolfensohn would always
refer to the Beijing conference and the importance of including gender into the Bank’s
policy. Wolfensohn’s Presidency represented a peak and then fading, like any trend in
development. However, gender is still a significant focus for the Bank. In the latter 1990s
the development trends that took gender’s place as an important development issues
included anti-corruption, education and health.
In social settings norms are not often articulated or based in rational argument,
they are followed on the basis that they are right. The articulation of the reason for
incorporating gender equality policies into World Bank functioning is the very basis for

267

the existence of a norm. The argument stems back to Robert Zoellick’s essential focus on
gender mainstreaming during his Presidency and is almost taken verbatim from a
statement he made at an event entitled “Ways to Bridge Gender Gaps” in 2007. Zoellick
said
One motivation for women’s empowerment is basic fairness and
decency…Young girls should have the exact same opportunities that boys do to
lead full and productive lives. But second, the empowerment of women is smart
economics…studies show that investments in women yield large social and
economic returns (Zoellick 2008).
Some critics argue that the Bank focuses on women as a means to an end goal of
economic progress and development, and that such a focus is detrimental to its impact on
women’s equal access and rights (Hales 2007). Such a critique cannot be leveled at the
Bank’s gender rhetoric since Zoellick’s influence. Indeed in any document that has been
produced since his time, the Bank has argued both that focusing on gender and gender
mainstreaming policies are important for their own right and then secondly as smart
economics. Further, gender equality as fair and right bolsters the conceptual argument
that social norms cannot be separated out distinctly from moral norms or spliced up into
disaggregated practices, behaviors, and/or beliefs.
Though Zoellick’s Presidency was not the first evidence of gender equality norms
in the World Bank Group it did spark a concern that had not been evident to the extent
that it became in planning for the IDA16 funding round which included measurable
outcomes such as the writing of the WDR2012 to have a specific gender focus among
other practices as outlined above. In the same way that Draper’s Administration in the
UNDP influenced planning of gender mainstreaming into policies, increased positions for
women in higher management because he placed them there, and a concerted effort to
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include gender mainstreaming across the work of the organization, Zoellick’s Presidency
tapped into the ability of the World Bank to increase its focus on gender equality even
with the deep divide that exists between states in gender equality practices.

GENDER EQUALITY IN ACTION
This chapter shows that leadership influences policy under conditions in which
the organization is willing to learn and incorporate new policies (such as gender equality)
into practice, able to expand or change the original mandate, and in which leaders use
collaborative and inspirational leadership in order to influence policy. It is evident that
both organizations have a long way to go in overcoming the barriers to implementing
gender equality norms, whatever the focus (whether on health or political participation).
Within each organization, gender mainstreaming policies are weak and unevenly applied
across departments and in country offices. This is partly due to the decentralized nature
of the country office setting (under Zoellick’s leadership the World Bank started pursuing
this structural decentralization in the same manner as the UNDP). But often this has to do
with a simple lack of knowledge and understanding on how to incorporate these new
norms into practice. One important element of norm emergence is trying to figure out
how to put a new norm into practice and implement it. The best way for people to
understand how to implement gender equality and gender mainstreaming techniques into
their work is to understand what those techniques mean and how they should do it.
Increasing knowledge in the area of gender equality is as important as putting these
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techniques into practice because it helps people working in development organizations
understand how to practice gender mainstreaming and why it is important.
On promoting new and sensitive norms to states, and even to colleagues, my
respondents indicated that it was a matter of waiting, a matter of knowing when the time
was right, and a matter of giving the right information in the right way so that the ideas
were comprehensible. In terms of gender equality this means taking into consideration
the culture and the lack of knowledge as resistance, then thinking of entry points to
address the lack of knowledge and to sensitize those who are not willing to consider
gender equality or actions to overcome gender inequality. In cases where there is a
cultural barrier, opening up the dialogue so that these issues can be addressed is most
important. Leaders can be (and have to be) gender champions in order to overcome the
cultural barriers to achieving gender mainstreaming in projects, gender equality, and
gender parity within the organizations.
Both organizations are praised for their best practices: preparing gender guidance
notes, facilitating knowledge-sharing networks, writing gender mainstreaming strategies
at the operational level, and initiating in-house and independent evaluations of their
gender mainstreaming progress. Yet both organizations’ evaluations find them lacking,
both in the support they give to gender mainstreaming and in the very support for
women’s equal opportunity (neither organization has achieved gender parity in
management positions, though lower positions in the organizations changed throughout
the 1990s and 2000s to increase the number of women).
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Problems with implementing gender mainstreaming include the decentralized
nature of the organization, lack of accountability of country staff, and cultural values and
resistance because of cultural expectations of gender roles. If these organizations are to
be taken seriously on gender equality both in development and in political representation,
their own internal practices and allocations of resources to gender mainstreaming projects
and research need to change to highlight gender parity. Gender parity must be met in all
categories of jobs in both organizations. Resources must be allocated to initiating training
on gender sensitive project management and budgeting, policies must be created that are
followed both in country office and at headquarters, gender units should not be alone in
implementing practices of gender equality—the very definition of mainstreaming is that
it is implemented in such a way that it is naturally considered and enforced by all.
Without effective institutionalization and internalization of gender mainstreaming norms
through the mechanisms of leadership climate and organizational ideology, diffusion of
norms to states through development projects will be mixed, ineffectual, and unreliable.
An important element of what the UNDP, the World Bank, and other development
organizations do for promoting gender equality was creating constituencies that support
gender equality.
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CONCLUSION
The shift in development practice toward promoting governance intrigues many in
development circles (Acamoglu and Robinson 2006, 2012; Ager 2000; Cheema 2000,
2003; Feingberg 2008; Kauffmann, Kray and Mastruzzi 2009). This dissertation argued
that it is a puzzle that similarly placed international organizations articulate and promote
governance norms differently despite similarities in history, mandate, and coordinated
project implementation. It is odd that international development organizations take
responsibility to promote governance to their member states when their Articles of
Agreement and mandates clearly state that they should be apolitical organizations,
offering aid to further development, not hindering or impinging upon state sovereignty.
Indeed, the very essence of political behavior “is behavior which affects or is intended to
affect the decisional outcomes of government” (Milbrath 1965).
Some have noted that international organizations who engage in government
agencies are by definition political (Miller-Adams 1999), it is just that they cannot
characterize their work as such. International organizations influence decisions made by a
state’s executive, legislature, and judiciary concerning the provision of public goods and
services to citizens. They provide advice on how to set up bureaucracies, and even how to
run elections in the UNDP’s case. They have an enormous influence on the way that
states govern their citizens. Of course, there are several ways to interpret the promotion
of governance, including the suggestion that international development organizations
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only offer advice when they are asked by states and that they do remain apolitical by not
being involved in politics (that is, not supporting one party or political candidate over
another).
And yet, international development organizations that promote governance do not
have a clear, agreed upon understanding of what governance is and which norms should
be promoted to states. They focus on different aspects of governance. The UNDP
represents those organizations that interpret governance as connected to and ineluctably
melded with democracy or demand-side governance (Coston 1998). On the other hand,
international development organizations like the World Bank hold strongly to their
original Articles of Agreement in the current democratizing age. They argue that good
governance is about the efficient and effective provision of goods and services to a
population. They support supply-side governance, encouraging states and their
governments to act according to transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption efforts
in order to create an environment for sustainable human development.

REVIEW OF ARGUMENT AND FINDINGS
International development organizations are certainly influenced in various ways
by actors and events outside the walls and purview of the organization, yet the internal
structure and leadership are most influential in norm articulation into policy and
programming. Further, they also greatly affect the way that new norms and policies are
implemented in the practice and funding of the organization. Indeed, leaders use their
own personal influence to guide policy articulation in specific ways which is why
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focusing on the organizational culture level of espoused beliefs and values (Schein 2004)
is so important to this dissertation study. First, they sanction and reward employee
behavior in order to make changes in the organization that they think are important.
William H. Draper III provides an excellent example of this when he refused to sign
projects or programs that did not include a consideration of how the project affected
women and men differently (Browne 2011, 47).
Leaders influence policy through speeches and statements. James Wolfensohn’s
support for anti-corruption measures, especially in the “Cancer of Corruption” speech,
changed the way that the Bank spoke about governance and increased the Bank’s focus
on and funding of anti-corruption policies and projects. This emphasized the participation
norm as government efficiency and including stakeholders in decision making
procedures. Most difficult to assess is the way that leaders collaborate with and lead ideas
among employees on norm articulation or controlling employees with rules they create.
Gus Speth and Lewis Preston represent leaders whose leadership style was collaborative.
Many of the changes they made in their respective organizations were behind the scenes,
collaborating with employees to encourage work and change. Despite the disparate nature
of all these tactics, leaders use them to influence the way norms are articulated in policy.
However, the level of internalization that the norm has already taken in the
organization has an effect on how influential the leadership can be (Schein 2004; Weaver
2008). Indeed, if a norm is internalized into policy and practice, the only thing a leader
needs is a perfect moment (triggering event) to get it on the agenda and thus articulate the
norm for policy and practice. Often this is done by highlighting international events in
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speeches and statements, and then using the norm to interpret the event and suggest how
the organization can change to follow certain practices that will make a difference in the
way the organization handles the event.
My argument suggests that internal forces of the path-dependent nature of
international organizations and leadership are more important in norm articulation than
external forces. This goes against the traditional explanations of member state influence
(Babb 2009; Pincus and Winters 2002; Toussaint 2008), transnational or national civil
society influence (Covey 1998), or even more abstractly because of changes and shifts in
the international system (Buira 2005). I argue that norms may indeed emerge from these
places in international relations, but that the process of adoption and articulation within
international organizations will be dependent on the path that the norm takes in the
organization itself as well as on the leadership influence. My argument builds on those
that have focused on the influence of the bureaucratic nature of international
organizations on their behavior.
Further, this argument has implications for international organization autonomy.
Based on the evidence I have uncovered concerning norm articulation, I argue that
international organizations have a great deal of autonomy, especially when it comes to
norm articulation and policy outcomes. It is evident that international actors influenced
the way that international organizations think, act, and formulate policy. However, after
the organization picks up the norm from international actors, it melds it to fit in with the
shared beliefs, values, and practices already embedded in an organization. What is more,

275

the leadership can be very influential in pushing the organization to reinterpret the
mandate or mission in order to articulate a new norm in policy and practice.

NORM INTERNALIZATION IN ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE
The findings from this dissertation suggest that organizations internalize norms
long before leaders articulate norms into policy so that policy and norm articulation
follows practice. This is important to understand as it relates to how influential outside
forces can be on norm articulation. It takes years in order for a norm to become integrated
into the way people think and behave in their various roles in an organization, and then,
at specific points in time, leaders are able to meld the beliefs and practices of an
organization into the way that it talks about its own work and in the way that policies are
written. This suggests that in order to change an organization to have it meet new needs
in the international arena, it is necessary for the practice to become imbedded before
trying to change rhetoric and policy statements.
We saw this trend both in the development of the gender equality norm and in the
participation norm. For the World Bank, gender equality and participation slowly became
integrated into the macroeconomic outlook and sectoral work that the organization did at
the country level. More women and more citizens were consulted in development
projects in the 1980s, largely having to do with social costs of structural adjustment and
the understanding that new macroeconomic policies had some very consequential, if
unintended, impacts on citizens. Including them in discussions was a way to ameliorate
these negative impacts. Later, in the 1990s, Wolfensohn made this a specific policy and
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practice of the organization by incorporating civil society participation into the CDF and
its associated participatory documents, the CASs and PRSPs.
Because participation and concern for civil society had been developing
throughout the 1970s and 80s in the World Bank’s practice at the country level, the
leaders were then able to take up the idea and form it into specific policies and make it a
very clear element of how the Bank worked with countries. In the same way, gender
equality filtered into the practice of the World Bank through the sectoral practices, thus
we see that gender equality is couched mostly as “smart economics,” in terms of
integrating women into economic sectors, and in terms of making sure that government
supplies certain goods and services to women that are needed.
The UNDP’s story is somewhat different in the way that the norms were
articulated into the organization because it got a new lease on life in the 1980s when
Draper turned the organization from a funding agency to an actual development
implementing agency. That meant that there was a clean slate to work with, and Draper
took advantage by both challenging the nature of development thinking through the
human development report, and creating practices in the organization that took on a very
path-dependent character. On gender equality, Draper made sure that each project
contained a consideration of how the development loans and implementation would
affect genders differently. He hired women to authoritative positions and set in motion an
organizational strategy to strive for gender parity at all employment levels.
The Human Development paradigm drastically refocused UNDP’s work on
demand-side governance by suggesting that development was actually about human
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freedom and choice. Thus, subsequent versions of what the UNDP did always focused on
creating a society that was aiding people (of all genders) to participate in all aspects.
Participation came to be focused on participation in government through democratic
processes of voting, influence, running for office. Administrators that came after Draper
proved influential in making sure that the UNDP met that idea of supporting democracy
around the world, most notably with Gustaf Speth’s support for an “enabling
environment” and Mark Malloch Brown’s unhindered language of support for
“democratic governance.”
International organizations articulate norms in policy outcomes, a process that
affects the way that the organization interacts and influences state behavior. The
implications suggest that international organizations are not only autonomous entities, but
create their own ideas about governance norms they promote to states rather than taking
cues from member states or transnational civil society. This means that norms shift and
change between the times when actors encourage international organizations to promote
norms, and the norms international organizations actually promote. I have added to the
literature on norm promotion through international organizations (Legro 1997; Barnett
and Finnemore 1999; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Park 2006) by focusing specifically
on how the embeddedness of the norms in the organizational practices and policies, along
with the influence of leadership through specific mechanisms, influences norm
articulation.
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LEADERSHIP INFLUENCE ON NORM ARTICULATION
Leaders influence the articulation of the norm and its importance for the
organization, thus solidifying the practice for future theory and practice within the
organization. While donors, member states, civil society, and the changing nature of
international relations are also important, they usually have little influence over the way
that the organization articulates a norm into policy and pursues it in practice. The
evidence presented here shows that the typical studies that focus narrowly on
bureaucratic nature and systemic levels of analysis (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998;
Weaver 2006) miss out on important influence of individual actors. Indeed, those authors
do discuss leaders, but discuss them in the context of a system in which they are forced to
act rather than as their own independent variables.
As we have seen, the structure of the organization dictates the way that policy can
change and often indicates the ability of an organization to change or reinterpret its
mandate. In the UNDP’s case, the mandate was heavily dependent on the changing nature
of Resolutions coming from UNGA and ECOSOC, and thus UNDP was able to revise its
stance on governance. But differences within member states represented by UNGA and
ECOSOC showed that UNDP would also have to take its own stand on what it thought
governance norms should be. In this respect, the leaders of the organization made that
difference. William H. Draper III started it off with a complete overhaul of the
organization in the 1980s, turning it from a funding agency to an advocacy agency and
getting the staff to rally behind a development paradigm that they could support. He hired
new staff to articulate the new version of development. The human development

279

paradigm now rivals the development focus on economic structures and growth by
arguing that human freedoms and choices are the ends and the means of development
work. Gustaf Speth and Mark Malloch Brown further solidified this new paradigm of
development and inspired the UNDP to promote governance to states that focused on the
individual’s freedoms.
Because of the strong leadership influence, backed by the Executive Board and by
the UNGA and ECOSOC, the UNDP now promotes democratic governance and
democracy around the world. Leaders in the organization who were collaborative with
some controlling tactics generally led the organization to fill that role in international
politics. Indeed, Mark Malloch Brown’s strong belief in democracy and use of language
to that effect did much for instilling in the organization a sense that the UNDP’s
comparative advantage was democracy promotion through technical assistance and
advice.
The leaders of the World Bank, along with its intractable hierarchical culture,
made governance promotion a very different phenomenon for the Bank. Indeed, the Bank
shied away from discussions of governance up until the late 1980s, early 1990s when it
appeared inevitable that the Bank would be drawn into such development issues because
of the impact of its SAPs policies. It was Lewis Preston and James Wolfensohn who had
the biggest impacts on how governance was to be articulated in the Bank. Preston came
in to lead the Bank in a very tumultuous time, when it seemed that the world was
democratizing at the end of the Cold War and the fall of Apartheid. In the 1980s,
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developing countries reached such a degree of social misery they argued were caused by
World Bank loan conditionalities (SAPs) and criticism was at its height.
But it was really James Wolfensohn that defined governance for the Bank, with
his concern for inclusion of civil society in government decision-making and his belief
that corruption hindered the success of development and the impact of the Bank around
the world. His “Cancer of Corruption” speech is still cited as the turning point for the
Bank on governance policy. While the Bank had been working with governments since
the 1980s on creating practices in which countries were transparent and accountable to
citizens, it was not an openly discussed topic until Wolfensohn’s vision and leadership
made it so. In fact, after corruption became an open topic between World Bank and
country Finance Ministries, government public servants would come to the World Bank
country offices and thank the Bank employees for finally making a stand concerning
corruption issues.
For most of its history, the Bank has shied away from discussing political
governance openly, choosing to focus on supply-side governance and how to make
government more efficient and effective in the delivery of public goods and services. Yet,
norms and practice change on a daily basis and the Bank’s move toward open support for
democracy and democratic ideals in recent years of the latter 2001s is interesting and
surprising. Indeed, it currently is supporting measures in some states for instituting
democratic governance and has beefed up its direct support for civil society.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY
This dissertation analyzed the extent to which the articulation of a norm into the
policies of an international development organization, along with the influence of top
leaders in an organization, influence the way that governance norms are articulated in
policy. It finds some strong conclusions that indeed, from the moment the norm begins to
be articulated in policy, a path-dependence runs through the articulation of the norm so
that each successive step in the articulation of the norm depends on the last. Further,
leaders influence norm articulation through speeches and statements and in the way that
they work with employees of the organization. Their own beliefs and ideals then make an
indelible impression on the policy and practice of governance norms.
The implications are threefold. First, those actors outside powerful development
organizations who wish to make a difference in policy, either in the creation of policy or
changing current policy, must understand the beliefs, values, and current practices of the
organization. One way to understand extant beliefs of the organization is by considering
the multitude of publications, statements, guidance notes, policies, and knowledge
products that an organization produces. While they vary in authors and influence, they
will betray a guiding understanding of what constitutes a particular norm. Actors wishing
to influence international development organization policy should also understand the
impact and influence of a leader in that organization, noting whether or not the leader is
accepted, trusted, and respected by his or her peers. Making change in an international
development organization means assessing the extent to which the norm is already
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embedded in the practice and beliefs of the people who work in the organization. Then it
is important to get it on the agenda through leadership support.
Second, no matter the documents and statements that these organizations sign on
the international level, they will implement the ideas in ways that the organization leads.
This is crucial for the influence that international development organizations have on
nation-states. If these organizations really want to meet development goals, end poverty,
or reduce inequalities, then they should come together more often to plan what they mean
by, for instance, governance, or any other issue so heavily connected with development.
Third, changes to how international organizations promote governance policy go
through a sometimes long and tedious process of internalization and consensus-making in
the organization, even before being written into policy. Further, the way that the norm is
articulated in policy depends not on international agreements or pressure from member
states; rather it depends on the type of consensus already agreed upon in practice in the
organization. It also depends on leadership to capitalize on that consensus, using
triggering events to get the idea out of practice into rhetoric. These findings may be
applicable and important for discussion and contention in the Sustainable Development
Goal Review process going on at the moment. Governance as a goal that will be part of
what replaces the MDGs is a contentious topic because it does not have worldwide
support from member countries, but also because there is very little that binds governance
and a cohesive concept. Practices that are already embedded within these organizations
that are currently part of the Sustainable Development Goal Review process will be more
likely to be accepted and actually implemented than any new ideas and thoughts leaders
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or countries might have. Thus, building on extant goals and current accepted practice
may be the most influential way to introduce governance goals into the new development
goal framework.
Some of the limitations in the study of the process of norm internalization within
an organization are insurmountable. For constructivists, it is difficult to study the beliefs
of individuals within an organization at a certain time, studying such variables through
the process of triangulation, makes the endeavor more difficult if the study is being done
after the time period is over. The interviews conducted for this research included people
who came to the UNDP or World Bank within the last 5-10 years, making it impossible
for them to speak of the organization as it was in the 1980s or 90s. Furthermore, the few
exceptions of interviewees who had worked at the organization longer than that did not
really recollect or remember what the organization was like at the time, or could not
speak to my questions on norm influence because they had been involved in lower level
administration work in the early years. Moreover, an individual’s memory is rather
unreliable and therefore does not offer a full understanding of the organization as it was.
Further, many of my respondents preferred not to be quoted but were more than willing
to help in uncovering the institutional processes and policy processes of the
organizations.
Based on the above limitations on understanding the beliefs and social context of
an organization in periods of time before the immediate present, the nature of this
research shifted to examine the policy making process with a view to showing that
constructivist elements, such as beliefs and values, influenced that process. The
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dissertation relied on interviews, document analysis, and historical process-tracing to
indicate which elements of leadership style and influence were most important in the
process of creating policy in the international organization.
An agenda for future research is assessing the actual impact of governance
policies on state behavior and development outcomes. This is an ongoing subject for
study, but still needs further research, especially empirically. Much academic work has
been written on the connection between governance, democracy and development, but
much of it is theoretical in nature, saying nothing of the actual impact that governance
policies have on states’ prospects and movement toward achieving development
outcomes. Hopefully this dissertation will spur further interest in such research so that
our understanding of the policies that lead to achieving development outcomes can be
further solidified. At the same time, development is a local issue and perhaps finding
grand policies, even ambiguous guidance policies, will not bring the development
community closer to achieving its goals. As the participation studies show, perhaps
bottom-up approaches are the best answer for development. If this is true, then
international development organizations may be doing more harm than good in
promoting governance, and should rather strive to achieve limited goals while allowing
states or local government actors to make the real governance changes.
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APPENDIX II: DATA
Table A.1: Quantitative Content Analysis of the UNDP Annual Reports
(Data for Figure 3.1)

Year
of
Annual
Report
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Democratic
Governance
Keywords
Total
101
71
111
126
149
143
200
177
84
142
96
77
84

Good
Governance
Keywords
Total
59
60
75
109
146
94
178
178
130
175
111
86
121

Total
word
count
for
Both
160
131
186
235
295
237
378
355
214
317
207
163
205

Percentage
of
Democratic
Governance
Keywords
63.13%
54.20%
59.68%
53.62%
50.51%
60.34%
52.91%
49.86%
39.25%
44.79%
46.38%
47.24%
40.98%

Percentage
of Good
Governance
Keywords
36.88%
45.80%
40.32%
46.38%
49.49%
39.66%
47.09%
50.14%
60.75%
55.21%
53.62%
52.76%
59.02%

Percentage in
Favor of
Democratic
versus Good
Governance
Keywords
26.25%
8.40%
19.35%
7.23%
1.02%
20.68%
5.82%
-0.28%
-21.50%
-10.41%
-7.25%
-5.52%
-18.05%

Table A.2: Quantitative Content Analysis of the UNDP Human Development Reports
(Data for Figure 3.2)

HDRs
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Democratic
Governanc
e
Keywords
Total
604
627
651
727
621
806
1062
734
897

Good
Governance
Keywords
Total
441
387
267
696
282
282
635
383
394

Total
word
count
for
Both
1045
1014
918
1423
903
1088
1697
1117
1291

Percentage of
Democratic
Governance
Keywords
0.577990431
0.618343195
0.709150327
0.510892481
0.687707641
0.740808824
0.625810253
0.657117278
0.694810225
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Percentage of
Good
Governance
Keywords
0.422009569
0.381656805
0.290849673
0.489107519
0.312292359
0.259191176
0.374189747
0.342882722
0.305189775

Percentage in
Favor of
Democratic
versus Good
Governance
Keywords
15.60%
23.67%
41.83%
2.18%
37.54%
48.16%
25.16%
31.42%
38.96%

1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007/
08
2009
2010
2011
2012/
13

815
2693
1062
2099
1289
1544
1204
927

347
565
368
882
1023
328
748
746

1162
3258
1430
2981
2312
1872
1952
1673

0.701376936
0.826580724
0.742657343
0.704126132
0.557525952
0.824786325
0.616803279
0.554094441

0.298623064
0.173419276
0.257342657
0.295873868
0.442474048
0.175213675
0.383196721
0.445905559

40.28%
65.32%
48.53%
40.83%
11.51%
64.96%
23.36%
10.82%

1375
940
1423
817

450
352
437
289

1825
1292
1860
1106

0.753424658
0.72755418
0.765053763
0.738698011

0.246575342
0.27244582
0.234946237
0.261301989

50.68%
45.51%
53.01%
47.74%

1017

473

1490

0.682550336

0.317449664

36.51%

Table A.3: UNDP Democratic Governance Expenditure as Percentage of Total
(Data for Figure 3.3)
Year

Programme Expenditure
Distribution by Focus Area

Programme
Expenditure
(in millions)

2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002

Fostering Democratic Governance
Fostering Democratic Governance
Fostering Democratic Governance
Democratic Governance
Democratic Governance
Democratic Governance
Democratic Governance
Democratic Governance
Governance
Governance
Governance

$987
$1,192
$1,183
$1,474
$1,429
$1,290
$1,368
$1,395
no data
no data
$744

97

Total
Programme
Expenditure
(in millions)
$4,074
$4,608
$4,756
$4,107
$4,096
$3,169
$3,162
$3,000
$3,000+
$3,000+
$1,850

Percentage of
Total Loans

24.23%
25.87%
24.87%
35.89%
34.89%
40.71%
43.26%
46.50%
~ 36.25% 97
~ 36.25%
40.22%

The 2007 Annual Report gives an average of governance spending for 2002-2007 as 36.25% but the
Annual Reports for the years 2003-2004 fail to give specific breakdowns on governance spending like all
the other Annual Reports from 2002 on.
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Table A.4: Quantitative Content Analysis of the World Bank Annual Reports
(Data for Figure 3.4)

Year
of the
Report
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

Democratic
Governance
Keywords
Total
179
199
293
165
141
115
106
100
86
65
38
85

Good
Governance
Keywords
Total
825
915
1020
659
253
327
307
494
137
215
48
247

Total
word
count
for
Both
1004
1114
1313
824
394
442
413
594
223
280
86
332

Percentage
of
Democratic
Governance
Keywords
17.83%
17.86%
22.32%
20.02%
35.79%
26.02%
25.67%
16.84%
38.57%
23.21%
44.19%
25.60%

Percentage
of Good
Governance
Keywords
82.17%
82.14%
77.68%
79.98%
64.21%
73.98%
74.33%
83.16%
61.43%
76.79%
55.81%
74.40%

Percentage in
Favor of
Democratic versus
Good Governance
Keywords

-64.34%
-64.27%
-55.37%
-59.95%
-28.43%
-47.96%
-48.67%
-66.33%
-22.87%
-53.57%
-11.63%
-48.80%

Table A.5: Quantitative Content Analysis of the World Bank Development Reports
(Data for Figure 3.5)

WDRs
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2002

Democratic
Governance
Keywords
Total
72
156
157
216
152
127
148
420
945
453
518
737

Good
Governance Total word
Keywords
count for
Total
Both
653
725
891
1047
755
912
1553
1769
1168
1320
577
704
1018
1166
1981
2401
930
1875
1576
2029
1515
2033
1702
2439
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Percentage
of
Democratic
Governance
Keywords
9.93%
14.90%
17.21%
12.21%
11.52%
18.04%
12.69%
17.49%
50.40%
22.33%
25.48%
30.22%

Percentage
of Good
Governance
Keywords
90.07%
85.10%
82.79%
87.79%
88.48%
81.96%
87.31%
82.51%
49.60%
77.67%
74.52%
69.78%

Percentage
in Favor of
Democratic
versus
Good
Governance
Keywords
-80.14%
-70.20%
-65.57%
-75.58%
-76.97%
-63.92%
-74.61%
-65.01%
0.80%
-55.35%
-49.04%
-39.57%

2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013

478
780
295
571
834
367
227
402
718
1346
547

1046
2805
1533
1151
904
978
959
826
1506
1020
1070

1524
3585
1828
1722
1738
1345
1186
1228
2224
2366
1617

31.36%
21.76%
16.14%
33.16%
47.99%
27.29%
19.14%
32.74%
32.28%
56.89%
33.83%

68.64%
78.24%
83.86%
66.84%
52.01%
72.71%
80.86%
67.26%
67.72%
43.11%
66.17%

-37.27%
-56.49%
-67.72%
-33.68%
-4.03%
-45.43%
-61.72%
-34.53%
-35.43%
13.78%
-32.34%

Table A.6: World Bank Good Governance Expenditure as Percentage of Total
(Data for Figure 3.6)
Year

Sector representing governance
Loans

2012

Public Administration, Law, and
Justice
Public Administration, Law, and
Justice
Public Administration, Law, and
Justice
Public Administration, Law, and
Justice
Public Administration, Law, and
Justice
Public Administration, Law, and
Justice
Law, Justice and Public
Administration
Law, Justice and Public
Administration
Law, Justice and Public
Administration
Law, Justice and Public
Administration
Law, Justice and Public
Administration
Law, Justice and Public
Administration
Public Sector Management

2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000

Governance
loan Amount (in
millions)
$8,728

Total Loans
(in millions)

Percentage of
Total Loans

$35,335

24.70%

$9,673

$43,006

22.49%

$10,828

$58,747

18.43%

$9,492

$46,906

20.24%

$5,296

$24,702

21.44%

$5,468

$24,696

22.14%

$5,857

$23,641

24.77%

$5,569

$22,307

24.97%

$4,978

$20,079

24.79%

$3,956

$18,513

21.37%

$5,351

$19,519

27.41%

$3,850

$17,250

22.32%

$4,525

$15,276

29.62%
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